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## Research Articles

**Iddirs as Community-based Social Capital in the Amhara Region of Ethiopia: Case Study in Gende Woin Town of East Gojjam .....**

*Arega Bazezew & Wubliker Chanie*

**Intimate Partner Violence against Women: Practice and Attitude in South Wollo and East Gojjam Zones of Amhara National Regional State .....**

*Mulunesh Abebe & Kerebih Asres*

**Causes and Consequences of Sexual Abuse and Resilience Factors in Housemaids Working in Addis Ababa: A Qualitative Inquiry .....**

*Seblewongiel Ayenalem*

**Operation Flame and the Destruction of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division .....**

*Fantahun Ayele*

**Perception of Tomato Farmers on Effectiveness of Indigenous Postharvest Value Addition Practices in Surulere Area of Oyo State, Nigeria .....**

*Komolafe S.E, Ogundiran T.J., Akangbe J.A., Ifabiyi J.O. and Ajibola B.O.*

## Book Reviews

**The Modern World-System IV: Centrist Liberalism Triumphant, 1789-1914.** By Immanuel Wallerstein. University of California Press, 2011. ....

*Sisay Megersa*

**The Ethiopian Army from Victory to Collapse 1977-1991.** By Fantahun Ayele. Northwestern University Press, 2014. ....

*Gedef Abawa*

**Iddirs as Community-based Social Capital in the Amhara Region of Ethiopia: Case Study in Gende Woin Town of East Gojjam**

Arega Bazezew (PhD)<sup>\*1</sup> & Wubliker Chanie (Ato)<sup>2</sup>

**Abstract**

*Though iddirs are vital in reducing social and/or idiosyncratic crises, there are formidable challenges in the implementation of this social capital for sustainable development. Experiences across Ethiopia in general and the study area in particular showed that less attention is given by the government. In addition, corruptions and embezzlement by iddir leaders hamper the potentials of iddirs in enhancing community-based development. The general objective of the study was to assess the role of iddirs in Gende Woin town as a case study site. In this study, mixed research approach was used, and questionnaire survey, key informant interview and focus group discussion were employed to collect primary data. A total of 118 households were covered by the questionnaire survey and six key informants and one focus group discussions were employed to collect qualitative data. Descriptive statistics and binary logistic regression modeling were used to analyze quantitative data. This study revealed that the majority (80%) of respondents were members of iddirs, among them 74% were male-headed households. The majority of households perceived that iddir helps to organize and defend themselves at times of economic and social crises. However, the potentials of iddir in reducing shocks and mobilizing the community for development are underutilized due to lack of attention given by the previous and the current governments. Besides, financial constraints, lack of commitment among members and corruption perpetrated by their leaders and officials weakened the contributions of iddir for sustainable development. The binary logistic result showed that gender, income, family size and marital status were determinant factors for households' to be membership in iddirs. In order to build up the capacity of iddirs, and maximize their involvement and efficiency in developmental activities both governmental and non-governmental organizations are expected to encourage and work together with iddirs.*

**Key words:** Iddirs, Participation, poverty reduction, Gende Woin town

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## 1. Introduction

Cooperation among human societies can be traced back to the ancient times when people started to live together and cooperate in gathering, hunting and shelter construction (Bisrat, 2012). The same author further indicated that ancient civilizations had practiced collaboration among themselves from cooperative farming to establish informal savings and loan associations. Putnam (2000) describes the social connection norms, and social trust that an individual acquires social capital from the community to solve day-to-day challenges. For sustainable development, informal institutions, especially at local level, are important for mobilizing resources and regulating their use with a view in maintaining a long-term base for productive activity (Mowo *et al.*, 2013). Those communities endowed with a rich stock of social networks and civic associations will be in a stronger position to confront poverty and vulnerability (Narayan, 1997), resolve disputes (Schafft & Brown, 2000) and take advantage of new opportunities (Isham, 1999).

According to Kloos and Mariam (2000), *iddir*<sup>3</sup> is one of the social capital institutions, which helps to reduce poverty by creating strong network, cooperation among the community and as risk sharing and coping mechanism during economic crises. In practice, *iddir* is a sort of insurance program run by a community or a group to meet emergencies. The number of participants, the composition, the functions, and the organization are different from one *iddir* to another (Mauri, 1987). However, all *iddirs* are established based on a voluntary mutual agreement between community members in order to cooperate themselves during time of shock.

Even if there are similar associations in Africa, *iddir* is an indigenous community-based organization in Ethiopia (Pankhurst, 2003). Dejene (1993) specifically indicated that *iddirs* are unique to Ethiopia. The only indigenous insurance arrangement (in Africa) that appears to be similar to *iddir* is the “happiness-unhappiness funds” of Benin (Dejene, 1993) and Tanzanian *Bujumbi* (Thomas, 2013).

These institutions are described as arrangements having well-defined rules and regulations, offering premium-based insurance for funeral expenses, as well as other forms of insurance and credit to cope with hardships. Dercon *et al* (2009) noted that the relationship between state and *iddir* differs during the three regimes of Ethiopia. According to the same authors, during the imperial regime, politicians used *iddirs* as platforms for political purposes and different *iddirs* were involved in broader development activities. During the *derg* regime (1974-1991), the government established revolutionary structures known as *kebele* and *iddir* was viewed by the government as reactionary association (Pankhurst & Mariam, 2000). *Iddir* leaders were considered as reactionary elites and many *iddirs* were restricted to focus only on burial activities, and strong *iddirs* were marginalized (Dercon *et al.*, 2009). As Pankhurst (2003) stated, like the last two regimes, the current government has not declared rules and regulations which is favorable to indigenous community-based voluntary associations. Nevertheless, there are attempts in urban areas to utilize *iddir* in the campaign against HIV/AIDS.

In Ethiopia, *iddir* is an indigenous voluntary mutual help association that can be found throughout the country, both in rural and urban settings (Thomas, 2013). They are contributing a great role in bringing social cooperation and support among the people in the community. In relation to this, Sileshi (2006) and Shiferaw (2002) noted that *iddirs* helped the poor during adverse shocks and enable them to spring back quickly into their previous condition. However, Agency for Cooperation and Research in Development (1999) indicated that, *iddirs* in Ethiopia faced multifaceted problems such as

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<sup>3</sup> *Iddir* is a type of community-based institution, made up by a group of persons living in the same neighborhoods with an objective of providing financial assistance in certain circumstances (Temesgen, 2008).

corruption and mismanagement. Now a day, attentions have been given to formal institutions whereas community-based institutions have been neglected by the government officials. In Gende Woin town there are numerous large and small *iddirs*. However, their function in community organization and sustainable development like other parts of Ethiopia, is weak and their development potential remained unutilized. They simply serve to support funeral services and comfort those who lost family members or close relatives. More importantly, *Iddirs* faced problems of corruption and mismanagement while trying to perform their duties properly in the study area. In Gende Woin town, *iddirs* were not seen as formal institutions and local government officials have not given due attention to strengthen this important social capital. Although the recognition of *iddirs* in sustainable development is a good entry point, there still exist huge limitations in networking communities. Though community-based *iddirs* are best mechanisms to overcome some socio-cultural problems prevailing in the community, the authors of this study could not get a research work in relation to *iddirs* in the study area. This study tries to fill this gap. The General objective of the study was therefore to assess the roles of *iddirs* in strengthening households' social capital by taking Gende Woin town as a case study site. The specific objectives of the study include to: (i) explore *iddirs* at different government regimes in the study area. (ii) investigate the role of *iddirs* in networking people in the study area. (iii) identify the determinant variables affecting household heads to be members in *iddirs*.

## 2. Description of the Study Area

Gende Woin town is located along the main road which passes from Addis Ababa to Bahir Dar through Motta (Figure 1).




Figure 1. The location of the study area in relation to Goncha Siso Enesie Woreda

Gende Woin town is located 335 km far from Addis Ababa, and 150 km far from Bahir Dar city. The town has a total population of 10,313 from which 5,137 are males and 5,176 females (Goncha Siso Enesie woreda communication office, 2014). The livelihoods of the town dwellers are dominated by petty trade, daily labor and partly urban agriculture. *Kebele iddirs*, *Ketena iddirs*, *Women iddirs*, *Yebetemed* (Relatives) *iddirs* and *Sefer iddirs* are important social capitals in Gende Woin town. Among these, the study focused on *sefer iddirs*, because it has a wider scope in organizing the communities for short and long term strategies.

### 3. Research Methodology

Mixed concurrent research design composed of qualitative and quantitative approaches were used for the study. Both probability and non-probability sampling techniques were employed to get the necessary information. The town has two *kebele* administrations and these two *kebeles* were the target of the study. The sampling frame of the study was the total female and male headed households in both *kebeles*. To determine sample size for survey questionnaires, Kothari (2004) formula was employed. Finally using proportional stratified systematic sampling techniques, 118 household heads were selected to fill the questionnaire (Table 1).

Table 1. Summary of selected samples for the study

<i>kebele</i>	Total household heads		Sample households		Total samples
	Males	Females	Males	Females	
01	1105	366	54	18	72
02	706	222	35	11	46
<b>Total</b>	<b>1811</b>	<b>588</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>118</b>

Six leaders of *iddirs* were selected purposively for key informant interview. Likewise, one focused group discussion; two members from each type of *iddir* (Women *iddir*, *Sefer* (neighbors) *iddir* and *Yezemed* (relatives) *iddir* from both sexes were selected purposively.

The questionnaire survey focuses on demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the respondents and perception of households towards *iddirs*. In-depth interview and focused group discussions were conducted to collect perceptions of households towards *iddirs*, government's role in empowering *iddirs* and the role of *iddirs* in reducing shocks to their members. The data generated by the structured questionnaire were entered into the statistical package SPSS and analyzed using frequencies, tables and percentages. Independent T-test was employed to see the relationship between gender and continuous variables. Information collected through in-depth interview, FGDs, life history narratives and direct observations were documented and analyzed textually to substantiate the statistical results from the structured questionnaire. Binary logistic regression model was employed to identify determinant variables affecting households' to participate in *iddirs*. Such kind of model is suitable when the dependent variable is dummy/dichotomies. In this case, household who participated in *iddirs* was as coded as '0' and otherwise. The factors that determine households' participation in *iddirs* were grouped into demographic, institutional and socio-economic factors.

### 4. Results and Discussion

#### 4.1. Demographic and Socio-economic Characteristics of the Respondents

The survey data revealed that about 80% of sampled households were members of different *iddirs*. The result is consistent with the findings of Dercon and Bold (2004), which says, 80% households in Ethiopia are members of one or more *iddirs*. Likewise, Kiros (2012) added that, 85% of the households were members of *iddirs* in Ethiopia. The study also revealed that about 75% males and 24.6% females participated in *iddirs* during the field survey. From the total member of households, 86% were males and from nonmember households, 67.7% were female-headed households. The Chi square test result showed that, there was significant and strong association between households participating in *iddirs* at  $p < 0.001$  ( $X^2 = 34.5$ ,  $df = 117$ ,  $p = 0.000$ ). As it can be seen in Table 2, the age of sampled respondents ranges from 25 to 75 years with a mean age of 40 with a standard deviation of 8.21. As it was shown in the same Table, the majority of the respondents were found between the age categories of 31 and 50.

Table 2. The age categories of sampled respondents

The age categories of sample respondent(in years)	Frequency	Percentage (%)
25-30	25	21.2
31-40	39	33.1
41-50	41	34.7
51-60	10	8.5
61 and above	3	2.5
Total	118	100

The study indicated that household heads at old age hold social responsibility such as leading family, participate in different activities, and need the support of others in funeral services during death and they became members of *iddirs*. Independent T- test result showed that, there was a significant difference in the level of participation of *iddir* between old age and young age household heads at  $p < 0.05$ . This result is consistent with the works of Dercon et al. (2009) which says membership to *iddirs* increases with increasing age of household head. Likewise, the key informants interviewed and focused group discussions result indicated that household heads are initiated to be members of *iddirs* during their old age than young age.

Of the total respondents, 39.8% were non-literate and the remaining literate was about 60%. From those who are members in *iddir*, about 63.8% were literate while from non-member households 54.2% could not read and write. This showed that educational attainment of households did not bring significance difference in the membership of *iddirs*. The key informants and members of focus group discussion participants explained that membership to *iddir* was open to all regardless of educational background. The majority (~80%) of respondents was married (Table 3). According to key informants, membership of married households in *iddir* was higher than unmarried households. The independent T- test result also evidenced that there was significance difference in membership to *iddir* between married and unmarried household heads at  $p < 0.05$  (  $T = 34$ ,  $df = 116$ ,  $p = 0.023$ ). Consistent with the result, Anders (2010) indicated that individuals tend to join *iddirs* when they married and starting to have a family.

Table 3. Education and marital status of household heads (percentage of respondents)

Education background	Cannot read and write	Literate	Total
Nonmembers	54.2	45.8	100
Members	36.2	63.8	100
Total	39.8	60.2	100
Marital status households	Married	Unmarried	Total
Nonmembers	41.7	58.3	100
Members	88.3	11.7	100
of Total	78.8	21.2	100
Family size households	1-3	4-7	8-12
Nonmembers	58.3	8.3	33.3
Members	28.7	25.5	45.7
Total	34.7	22.0	43.2

The average family size of the sample household was 5.6 with the standard deviation of 1.6. This result is above the nation's average, which was 5.3 (CSA, 2011). The average family size was found to be 6.8 and 4.4 for members and nonmember households, respectively (Table 3).



The independent T-test result also showed that, there was significant difference in family size between households at  $p < 0.05$ . The result is consistent with the works of Dercon et al. (2007) which says, larger households take out more coverage, and they became member in *iddirs* to respond to the incentives given in the scheme. Hoddinott et al. (2005) also found out that larger household size are more likely to join in *iddir* since they have wider and more established networks in the area.

#### 4.2. Determinants of Household Membership to *Iddir*

The binary logistic regression model was used to establish the relationships between membership to *iddir* and a set of predictor variables. Binary logistic regression model was selected as it can be used with continuous, discrete and dichotomous variables mixed together (Alemu, 2007). Nine predictor variables were selected to explain the dependent variable (membership to *iddir*). Out of the total predictor variables, six variables were significant at 1%, 5% and 10% probability levels (Table 4). The omnibus test of model coefficients has a Chi-square value of 87.109 on 8 degrees of freedom, which is strongly significant at  $p < 0.001$  indicating that the predictor variables selected have a high joint effect in predicting the status of household membership to *iddir*. The independent variables were checked by Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness of fit. The model was best fit because the goodness of fit was greater than 0.05 (which was 0.311). The multicollinearity effect of independent variables indicated that there were no problems of multicollinearity between independent variables. The predictive efficiency of the model showed that out of 118 sample household heads included in the model, 94.1% were correctly predicted. The sensitivity (correctly predicted nonmembers to *iddir*) and specificity (correctly predicted members to *iddir*) were found to be 83.3% and 96.8%, respectively. The overall binary logistic regression results showed that family size, marital status, age, sex of the household head, average income and origin of members were determinant variables to participate in *iddirs*.

The binary logistic results showed that as family size increases the likelihood of membership of *iddir* also increases. As family size increased by one unit, the odds of being a member to *iddir* increase by a factor of 1.738, which is significant at  $p < 0.05$  (Table 4). Previous studies in different parts of the country have reported similar results that family size positively and significantly influences households' membership to *iddir* (Dercon et al., 2007; Hoddinott et al., 2005). Other variables being constant, an increase of average income of household head by one unit, membership households' in *iddir* decreases by the odds ratio of 0.998 and it is significant at  $p < 0.001$ .

Table 4. Result of binary logistic regression model

Variables tasted	Coeff.( $\beta$ )	S.E	Wald	Sig.	Exp( $\beta$ )
Household size	0.553	0.270	4.199	0.040**	1.738
Educational status of households	0.735	0.463	2.526	0.112ns	2.086
Age of the households	0.042	0.018	5.221	0.022**	1.043
Sex of the households	1.814	0.747	5.898	0.015**	6.137
Average income of the households	-0.002	0.001	10.855	0.001*	0.998
Religion of households	0.954	0.710	1.803	0.179ns	2.596
Source of income	1.204	1.104	1.189	0.276ns	3.333
Marital status of the households	1.104	0.490	5.074	0.024**	3.016
Origin of the households head	0.813	0.465	3.057	0.080***	2.256

\* at  $p < 0.001$  significance level \*\* at  $p < 0.05$  significance level, \*\*\* at  $p < 0.1$ , ns= not significance.

As hypothesized, age of household heads was found to be an important factor of households' membership in *iddir*. As age of household heads increases by one unit, the odds of a households' to participate in *iddir* increase by a factor of 1.043 at  $p < 0.05$ . The result is consistent with the works of Dercon et al. (2009). As hypothesized, origin of the household heads was found to be an important factor in households' membership in *iddir*. Original settlers in the study area are members of *iddir*

than recently settled by a factor of 2.256 and it was significant at  $p < 0.1$ , which is in agreement with the findings of Wubalem (2003), Schulpen (2004) and Anders (2010). Sex of the household heads was hypothesized as one of the factors determining household participation in *iddirs*. Male-headed households are members of *iddirs* than female-headed household heads by a factor of 6.137 and it is significant at  $p < 0.05$ . The result is in agreement with the works of Solomon (1999) and Castellani (2010). Marital status of the household head was hypothesized as one of determinant variable in membership to *iddir*. It is important that, married household heads were better participated in *iddir* than unmarried household heads. The married household heads became members by a factor of 3.016 than unmarried household heads and it was significant at  $p < 0.05$ .

#### 4.3. *Iddirs* during Different Government Regimes in the Study Area

Since the imperial regime, *iddirs* were not allowed to participate in politics and administrative affairs. As a result, some older *iddirs* in Gende Woin town had stated in their bylaws that they would not interfere in politics and administrative affairs of the governments during the time. Furthermore, their bylaws state that they would cooperate, accept and implement government regulations.

During the *Derg* regime, the government established revolutionary structures known as *kebele* in Gende Woin town and the older *iddirs* were perceived by then government as reactionary forces. In particular there was opposition from government to ethnic-based *iddirs*, and there were attempts by the local government to urge *iddirs* to be organized along *kebele* or *ketena* (sub-*kebele*) lines. In this regard, the key informants claim that their property was expropriated by the military government. The *Derg* regime nationalized some materials, which were bought for rent in order to obtain supplementary income for their *iddir*. On the other hand, *iddir* had contributed financially and materially to alleviate the problems of recurrent drought and famine and save the lives of some vulnerable people during times of distress.

In the EPRDF government, some joint efforts of *iddir* and state structure in development activities in prevention of HIV/AIDS had started. In relation to this, participants of FGDs noted that like the *Derg* regime, the EPRDF regime, in principle, does not recognize the role of *iddir* as independent legal entities and development actors. More importantly, members of *iddir* were obliged to contribute a certain amount of money to the local government. Since there was no way out and not to be cancelled from *iddir*, the poor were forced to pay in unfavorable situations. Distressingly, the members and their representatives have no power to decide the money they collected. This kind of unfavorable situations has created a conflict between some *iddir* members and leaders. *Iddir* members bitterly oppose this kind of imposed contributions. On the other hand, *iddir* leaders are obliged to implement decisions of the *kebele* officials. There is widespread suspicion that joint funds are embezzled jointly by *iddir* leaders and *kebeles* officials. This suspicion is based on absence of reports, lack of transparency and participation of leaders of *iddir* on the tender, absence of good quality performance, and lack of follow up and control by *iddir* members.

Some *iddir* leaders and members argue that participation of *iddir* should not be limited to contributions of money rather it should be holistic. The problem is severe because officials of *kebeles* are non-cooperative, non-considerate to the needs of the community. They are not accountable to the people and not transparent in their activities and yet, they always ask for money. In a similar study made by Aklilu and Dessalegn (2000), government institutions have been seen by the people as important only in so far as they provide official documents such as ID cards.

The study also revealed that the community and the local government administrative bodies do not trust each other and express their doubt about the intent of the government. They fear that, the local government may expropriate their money collected in the name of *iddir*. This is due to the fact that the communities have some experiences that at different times the successive governments expropriated

*iddir* resources in one way or another. The FGDs participants added that, their capital is eroded by immoral officials in their locality. This kind of trend may deplete the scarce resource of *iddir*. Some key informants informed that, the purpose of *iddirs*' money is merely for burial expenses of members and not for other purposes. Summarizing the situations, one key informant aging 75 years shared his experience as follows:

... During the Imperial Regime, *iddirs* in Gende Woin had invested their resources to alleviate social problems of the town dwellers and contributed towards sustainable development. However, after the revolution (1974) the Marxist regime, denied the participation of *iddirs* in development spectrum, and their role was replaced by *kebele* structures. Nevertheless, there were some joint efforts made and it was very minor. To mention few, *iddirs* had made great contribution to promote literacy programme. In addition, they contributed finance for the programme and mobilized the community to participate in literacy campaigns. Like the previous two regimes, the current government of Ethiopia does not declare laws favorable to *iddirs*, though some efforts have been made to link *iddirs* to *kebele* level development.

#### **4.4. The contributions of *Iddir* to their members**

Intensive discussions with key informants indicated that funeral insurance is the core function of *sefer iddir* in their locality. Support in terms of cash, cooking utensils food and/or labour are provided to members during death of members/relatives. Besides, *iddir* offered loans to members and the majority of these loans are used when members faced some events/shocks such as destruction of the family home, illness, fire shock and death of cattle. This indicates the roles of *iddir* to meet the economic needs of poor households by providing them credit services. Apart from supporting members in funerals and/or weddings, *iddir* also function to establish and maintain good relationships among members, engaging in development projects and coordinating members for community sanitation and crime prevention. Mekuria (1973) noted that, *iddirs* are not limited to the provision of insurance and psychological support for members; rather they involved in community development programs such as in construction of roads and schools, as well as installation of public utilities. Besides to its economic benefits, *iddirs* play essential roles in reducing harmful traditional practices prevailing in the community such as *Selist* (third day mourning), *Fit Menchet*, *Hawilt sera* (tomb or monument building), *Yehazen Cherk* (wearing of black cloth), *Yehazen Mels Digis* (feast after burial) and *Teskar*(commemoration feast). In this respect, one key informant from Saint Michael *iddir* stated his feeling in the following ways:

...Our *iddir* has ratified rules to prohibit members from practicing harmful traditions, but our members are still practicing these harmful traditional activities. Some of our members are tried to apply the ratified rule...it was good when strong measures are taken for those members who are practicing harmful traditions.

#### **4.5. Problems and/or Limitations of *Iddirs***

Most of the *iddirs* have problems of financial and material constraints. Four major problems are cited by the key informants in this respect. The first challenge that has been depleting the resources of *iddirs* is the system of the government at different times. Hence, *iddirs*' financial resources have been exploited and/or looted by their local officials. During the *Derg* regime for example, in the name of motherland *iddirs* were forced to donate their properties such as tents, and other materials. In relation to this, Pankhurst (2001) pointed out that *iddirs* during the *Derg* regime were requested to call *kebeles* meetings, recruit militia, and prepare dry food for the soldiers.

More importantly, misuse of members' finance was also a serious problem throughout the history of *iddir* in the study area. Leaders in many cases embezzled the members' financial resources, which ultimately led to the disappearance of *iddir*. Key informants and focus group discussants also evidenced these facts. Key Informants indicated that some types of *iddir* have already encountered shortage of money to cover losses incurred by members. Besides, the prevailing inflationary pressure in the country may undermine the ability of *iddir* to increase capital and build assets. To sum up, the

main problems identified by participants of FGDs and key informants were financial constraints, absence of support from formal institutions, embezzlement by leaders, lack initiation of members to participate in developmental activities and lack of government support. These problems prevent *sefer iddir* to participate in full developmental activities and contribute little role in poverty reduction.

### **5. Conclusions**

The study revealed that *iddir* is one of the community-based institutions that creates strong networks among communities. *Iddir* enables members to interact/discuss on issues in relation to social and economic situations prevailing in the communities. However, government officials at different regimes did not give support to strengthen *iddir* either socially or economically in the study area. The study also revealed that the major benefit gained from *iddir* were funeral services, risk copings, provision of credits, exchange of labor, conflict resolution and information transmission between members. The study recognized that gender, income, family size and marital status were determinant factors for households' to be membership in *iddir*. *Sefer Iddir* is appropriate to cope up with undesirable situations and is a base for poverty reductions. In this regard, local governments and concerned bodies have to give priority in promoting existing *iddirs* financially as well as protecting them from corruption and nepotism commonly practiced in the study area.

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**Intimate Partner Violence against Women: Practice and Attitude in South Wollo and East Gojjam Zones of Amhara National Regional State**

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***Abstract***

*Intimate partner violence against women (IPV) is a critical social problem in developing countries like Ethiopia. However, little research has been done to investigate the extent of the problem and the society's attitude in South Wollo and East Gojjam Zones of Amhara Region. This study investigates women's decision making participation in household matters, physical and sexual abuse, and attitude towards wife beating using both quantitative and qualitative methods. The findings show that women are deprived of their decision making rights, physical and sexual abuse of women are highly prevalent and are considered as 'normal' part of marital relationship. Majority of participants (66 %) support wife beating and statistically significant higher proportion of women support wife beating than their male counterparts. The findings indicate that women are experiencing high levels of intimate partner violence in the domestic sphere. Therefore, this issue should be a critical concern for social workers, other professionals and policy makers.*

**Keywords:** Intimate Partner Violence, Practice, Attitude, Amhara, Ethiopia.

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## Introduction

The issues of gender-based violence including intimate partner violence have received considerable attention, and came to the international agenda since the 1960s through the tireless efforts of women's organizations and feminist advocates worldwide (Cavanagh 2003; Henriette, 2005; Michalski, 2004). In the 1960s and 1970s, feminist activists and scholars brought wife abuse to the forefront of public consciousness through academic and popular presses (Hesser-Biber & Yasier, 2004). During these periods, the successful politicization of the feminist movement helped to reframe intimate partner violence from the traditionally held view as it is a personal matter to a public or social problem rooted in sexism, male dominance, and powerlessness of women. However, despite all the efforts made, the problem of IPV is still pervasive worldwide (Heise & Garcia-Moreno, 2002; Ting, 2010).

Although the definitions and conceptualizations of IPV vary greatly across empirical studies and literature, IPV is any form of physical, sexual, emotional, economic abuse or deprivation of decision-making rights of women carried out by husbands or their intimate partners (Heise & Garcia-Moreno, 2002; Henriette, 2005). Under each category, there are many abusive behaviors that need their own definitions and descriptions. In addition, it is very difficult to separate one form of IPV from the other, and one form of IPV may be a cause or consequence of the other. IPV is a multidimensional issue and its causes are inextricably linked with various personal, familial, social, cultural and structural factors. Although there are various theories that attempt to explain the causes of IPV, the feminist theories are among the well-know theories that provide due emphasis for structural factors. According to the feminist perspective, IPV is a manifestation of asymmetrical gender relations emanating from patriarchal social codes. In a patriarchal system, IPV represents men's domination and women's subordination in which men as a group maintain their domination of women through violence; such violence is both a symptom of power and a central way of maintaining that power (Watts & Zimmerman, 2002). The patriarchal system and asymmetrical gender relations are also common features of the Ethiopian society particularly in the mainstream Amhara culture. Therefore, in order to address IPV, its dynamic nature and multifaceted causes should be well understood.

IPV is a worldwide problem affecting 10-71% of the women globally (Garcia-Moreno, Jansen, Watts, Ellsberg & Heise, 2005; Heise & Garcia-Moreno, 2002, WHO, 2007). Being one of the least developed nations in the world, little is done in research, literature, and services related to IPV in Ethiopia. Although there is no national survey that indicates the magnitude of the problem in Ethiopia, different individual victimization surveys conducted in different part of the country show that intimate partner violence is a highly prevalent practice (Amare, 2008; Garcia-Moreno, et al., 2005; National Committee on Traditional Practice of Ethiopia (NCTPE), 2003; Yegomawork et. al., 2003). A study conducted by WHO in 10 countries found that the prevalence rate of reported sexual and physical violence against women is the highest in Ethiopia from other countries included in the study (WHO, 2007). The prevalence rate ranged from 15% in Japan to 71% in Ethiopia. NCTPE (2003) also points out that "Ethiopia has one of the highest reports of physical assault by male partners in the world" (p.43).

Regarding the knowledge and attitude towards IPV, Michalski (2004) states that the public in contemporary Western societies acknowledge that IPV does not represent an acceptable form of conflict management. Most men and women believe in gender equality and consider IPV as a crime. However, most of these people believe that IPV constitutes a widespread serious problem in USA and contemporary Western societies (Katz, 2006; Michalski, 2004). Empirical research findings from the developing nations like Uganda, Zimbabwe, India, South Africa, Latin America and Ethiopia indicate that IPV is considered as part of the normal marital relationships and justified in certain circumstances (Ethiopian Demographic Health Survey (EDHS), 2005; Heise & Garcia-Moreno, 2002; Hindin, 2003). For instance, a national representative survey conducted in Zimbabwe on 5907 women of reproductive age (15-49) found that 53% of the participants believe that wife beating was justified in certain



circumstances (Hindin, 2003). In this study, more women than men support wife beating. A similar trend is found in Ethiopia where 81 % of women and 51 % of men supporting wife beating under certain circumstances (EDHS, 2005).

Ethiopia is a large country consisting of more than 80 ethnic groups and 12 regional states. The socio-cultural context across regions and within a region is different. The Amhara Region is one of the largest regional states of the country where IPV is pervasive (NCTPE, 2003). Few available studies conducted at different places in the region support this claim. For instance, Mastewal (2008), Tegbar, Anwar and Yigzaw (2004), and Tizita and Assefa, (2006) studied the prevalence of different forms of IPV against women by their husbands in Yilmandensa Woreda of West Gojjam Zone, around Gondar town and in Bahir Dar town respectively. Their findings indicate that the prevalence of lifetime physical violence was 33.3% in Mastewal (2008), the prevalence of lifetime physical, sexual and emotional violence was 51% in Tegbar, Anwar and Yigzaw (2004), and the prevalence of physical violence within 12 months period was more than 60% in Tizita and Assefa (2006). In most of these studies, one of the most important type of IPV, violation of women's decision making rights, is not studied. Besides, anecdotal sources indicate that IPV is a common practice in South Wollo and East Gojjam Zones of the Region. However, as to the knowledge of the researchers, there are no representative empirical studies that investigated the magnitudes of different forms of IPV including women's decision making rights. In addition, the attitude of both men and women towards these practices in these two administrative Zones of the Region is not well studied.

Therefore, this study aims at investigating the practice of IPV and attitude towards this practice in South Wollo and East Gojjam Zones of the Amhara National Regional State. Among the various forms of IPV, this research specifically intends to investigate the practice of three forms of IPV: deprivation of decision-making rights of women on household matters, physical and sexual violence against women by their husbands as well as the attitude towards these practices.

## **1. Methods**

### **1.1. Description of the Study Area**

The Amhara Regional State is located in the northwestern part of Ethiopia between 9°20' and 14°20' North latitude and 36° 20' and 40° 20' East longitude (Ethiopian Demography and Health, n.d.). The Region has more than 18 million people living in 11 administrative zones. South Wollo and East Gojjam 'Zones' are among these administrative 'zones' of the region that were selected purposely for this research because anecdotal sources indicated that IPV is a prevalent practice in the study area so that this study was conducted to investigate the phenomenon empirically.

### **1.2. Research Design**

The main purpose of the study was to get a descriptive data on IPV using a cross-sectional survey supplemented by in-depth interview and focus group discussion methods. In order to get a detailed and reliable picture of the issue under study, both the quantitative and qualitative methods were used. In social science research, the use of quantitative and qualitative methods in integration is recommended to triangulate, supplement each other, and enrich the results sought (Creswell, 2005; Diken & Leach, 1978). "The best research often combines the features of each" (Newman & Kreuger, 2003, p.16).

### **1.3. Participants of the Study and Ethical Considerations**

Both men and women aged 18 and above participated in both the quantitative and qualitative methods. The household survey was collected from women and men who are ever or currently married. In-depth

interview and focus group discussants were selected using officials from different organizations including Women Children and Youth Affairs, Police and Kebele Offices as gate keepers. The inclusion criteria for the in-depth interview participants were women who experienced marked IPV and reported to different governmental systems and willing to share their life stories. The inclusion criteria for the FGD discussants were those officials who have direct work experiences with the issue including experts from Women, Children and Youth Affairs, Women's Association Office, and Police Offices.

Regarding the ethical considerations, an informed consent agreement was prepared and signed by all participants before the data collection.

#### **1.4. Sample Size Determination in the Quantitative Study**

To determine the sample size for this population-based survey, we used 5% as our acceptable margin of error and confidence interval of 95%. Using these cut points, a standard formula for unspecified population was used and a total number of 830 participants were considered. Among these, 524 were women and 306 were men. From these, 48 women's questionnaires and 13 men's questionnaires were discarded due to inconsistencies, incomplete responses and omission of response pages. Finally, 769 (476 women and 293 men) responses were analyzed.

#### **1.5. Sampling Technique and Procedures**

Multistage cluster sampling by administrative divisions was used to select study 'zones', 'woredas', 'kebeles' and households. Among the 33 rural 'woredas' in South Wollo and East Gojjam Zones, six 'woredas' (three from each 'zone') were selected randomly using lottery method. In addition, three urban centers were included in the study to make a comparison between the rural and urban centers. From each selected 'woreda' and urban center, two 'kebeles' were selected randomly. The selected 'kebeles' were then divided into 'sub-kebeles' and a 'sub-kebele' was selected randomly and taken as a final sampling unit (cluster) from each urban and rural 'kebeles'. Either a woman or a man was asked from a family to minimize the risk of further violence on women. The main reasons for using cluster sampling were (1) the population was much dispersed geographically and it was very difficult to get an accurate sampling frame, (2) employing other sampling methods in such a geographically dispersed population was also unmanageable in terms of time and resources (Newman & Kreuger, 2003).

#### **1.6. Data Gathering Instruments and Data Analysis**

The quantitative data was collected using structured questionnaire. The qualitative data was collected through focus group discussion and in-depth interviews using semi-structured interview guidelines. Instruments were pilot tested before conducting the data collection. Five FGDs and 18 in-depth interviews were conducted to gather the qualitative data.

The data collected using structured questionnaires were coded and entered into the SPSS version 16 for analysis. Univariate and bivariate analysis were used. For the bivariate analysis, the non-parametric statistical test *Chi-square* was used because the survey items particularly items related to the dependent variable were designed at nominal and ordinal level of measurement. FGD discussions and interviews were tape-recorded, transcribed, analyzed thematically, integrated and discussed with the quantitative data.

### **2. Findings and Discussion**

In this study, intimate partner violence against women was operationally defined in terms of three major dimensions. These were deprivation of women's decision making rights in household matters, physical, and sexual violence against women. To measure the decision making power of women, five

items were identified and used. These were (1) decision making on women's own health care, (2) large household purchases (*Example: purchase or selling of oxen, cows, fertilizers TV, refrigerator, etc*), (3) visiting families, (4) small household purchases (*Example: purchase of onion, oil, salt and other food items used for daily consumption*) and (5) decisions on daily food consumptions (*Example: who is responsible to decide on what to cook, in delivering the cooked food stuffs for family members or others and other related issues*). Among these, the first three items are considered as major household decisions; where as the remaining two items are considered as minor household decisions (EDHS, 2005). Both women and men participants were asked about the women's participation in these household decisions.

The response of ever and currently married 365 women and 278 men participants were analyzed about the decision-making roles of women with respect to the above stated five decisions in the household. The data show that women's decision making power on major household decisions is extremely low. The women data show that only 1.1%, 0.3% and 2.7% of women decide alone on their own health care, major household purchases and visiting families respectively. The men's data also show a similar trend. They reported that only 1.7%, 0.3% and 1% of their wives decide alone on their own health care, major household purchases and visiting families respectively. Both the women and men data show that less than 3% of women decide on major household decisions alone. On the other hand, minor household decisions are mostly made by women alone (85.2% and 68.3% as reported by women and men respectively). On the other hand, both the women and men data show that 65% vs. 68% and 64% vs. 71% of men decided alone on their wives' health care and large household purchases respectively. Similarly, decision on visiting families is mainly made by husbands.

According to EDHS (2005), women can be considered empowered in a household decision making if they are able to make decisions alone or jointly with their husbands. Taking this as a frame of reference, the proportion of joint decision making is also very low in all the decision making categories. Only 26.3% of currently married women are involved in the three major decisions and less than 20% of them are involved in all the five (both major and minor) household decisions jointly with husbands.

The trend of women's decision making power is similar to the EDHS (2005) although our data show much lesser degree of women's empowerment in decision making. This difference is likely due to difference of data sources (EDHS's respondents were those women who are paid in cash, town residents and likely to be educated). In order to see the influence of socio-demographic variables, the responses are categorized into more empowered (if women are involved in three or more of the decisions) and less empowered (if they are involved in two or less of the decisions). Women's decision-making role varies across some of the background variables in both the women's and men's data. For instance, the women's data show that urban residents than rural (62.5% vs. 37.4 %;  $\chi^2 = 6.882$ ), formally educated than illiterates (62.5% vs. 36.4%;  $\chi^2 = 87.435$ ) and women with exposure to mass media than those without exposure (53.1% vs. 35.3%;  $\chi^2 = 63.17$ ) are more empowered than their respective counterparts. In all these three variables, the difference is statistically significant at  $\alpha=0.05$ .

The qualitative data also show that there is meager decision-making power and property ownership of women in the study area. FGD discussants and interviewees described that women in general have less or no decision making roles on family matters. They point out that women's decision-making power does not go beyond the kitchen level in most homes. A 'Woreda' Women's Association Head said that "whether they are educated or not, majority of women do not have decision making power except on cooked food stuffs at home." According to the discussants, women in the study area are not enjoying equal property ownership and property sharing with men. Properties such as expensive household materials, tilling tools, fertile farmlands, good quality cows, oxen etc are often given to the husbands during divorce through the arbitration of mediators (local '*shimagle*'). Except very few women who are conscious about their legal rights and assertive, majority of women never think and ask a question of ownership on such and other similar properties either during divorce or while they are living with

their husbands. The participants described that this is mainly due to the deep-rooted socio-cultural factors that shape women to behave in a passive way.

The findings of this study indicate that women are deprived of their decision making rights. Decision making power is one of the key indicators of women's empowerment and this should be a critical area of concern for intervention. The data shows that among the socio-demographic variables urban residence, education and exposure to mass media have positive influence on women's decision-making participation. This trend is consistent with the findings of EDHS (2005). The finding implies that educating couples and access to information, especially for women, might enhance the negotiating capacity of women and in turn their decision making power.

Regarding physical violence against women, the findings of the study show that 63.4 % of ever married and 40.2% of currently married women participants' experienced physical violence by their partners in their lifetime. On the other hand, 70.6% of ever married and 39.7% currently married men participants reported that they beat their wives at least once in their lifetime. About 42 % of women reported that they have experiences of physical abuse by their husbands within 12 months until the time of data collection. Similarly, 44.95% men reported that they physically abused their wives in the last 12 months.

The study attempted to see the trend of physical violence among currently married couples in relation to background variables. Unlike decision-making role of women, more women who have access to mass media reported more physical violence (45% vs. 33%) than who do not have mass-media access. This might be due to the fact that media exposed women are more likely to have the awareness and to report the problem or else they are aware of their rights, challenge their husbands and be physically abused for their assertiveness. In addition, the effect of education does not follow a similar trend as for decision making. Informally educated women experienced higher rate of physical violence (52.4%) than both illiterates (39.8%) and formally educated (30.1%). Similarly, higher proportion of informally educated men reported their act of physical abuse on their wives. Further studies are required to explain these mixed trends of physical abuse in relation to education. Nevertheless, both the women and men data vividly show that physical violence is pervasive in the study area. This finding is relatively comparable with other previous studies in Ethiopia (For example: Tegbar et.al, 2004; Tizita & Assefa, 2006; Yegomawork, et al., 2003), but the extent is much higher than these previous studies. It seems that formal education and living in urban have positive influence in reducing physical violence against women in women's report. However, this needs further research and application of more advanced statistical analyses in order to measure the net effects of these variables controlling the effects of other intervening variables.

Focus group discussants and interviewees described that IPV against women is common in the study areas. Wives are frequently insulted, beaten and tortured by their husbands. When a wife quarrels with her husband, she would be beaten physically and often forced to leave her home together with younger children without any property. Physical abuse of women is not only common but also considered as a 'normal' part of marital relationship. There are popular proverbs in Amharic, mentioned by the discussants that connote wife beating is an acceptable norm of the community. For instance, '*Besaminit anid gizie yemayemata bale bale ayebalem.*' This proverb has an equivalent meaning to "a husband is not considered as a husband unless he beats his wife at least once in a week". The other related proverb says "*Yebale bitire kibie nitire.*" This proverb has a meaning close to "a husband's beating is as tasty as a spiced butter". The participants further described that when wives commit mistakes, husbands insult, beat or torture them as a means of correcting their mistakes instead of discussion and negotiation for mutual understanding.

The attitude of participants towards wife beating was sought and the findings show that about 66% of participants were in favor of wife beating. A statistically significant proportion of women were in favor of wife beating than men (70.3% vs. 59.7%;  $\chi^2 = 9.091$ ,  $P < 0.003$ ). The data shows that rural

residents ( $\chi^2=52.81$ ) illiterate ( $\chi^2=100.374$ ), women ( $\chi^2=9.091$ ), and participants who do not have exposure to mass media ( $\chi^2 = 15.76$ ) are more likely to support wife beating as a justifiable act in certain circumstances ( $P < 0.05$ ). Participants were also asked about the circumstances in which wife beating is justifiable. With slight variations in proportion for both women and men participants, the top three acceptable reasons for wife beating were: if the wife is suspected of having sexual affair with someone else, if she goes out without telling her husband and if she refuses sex with her husband in decreasing order. This finding is consistent with EDHS (2005) in Ethiopia and Hindin's study in Zimbabwe although the degree varies. The supportive attitude and high prevalence of physical violence is mainly due to the prevailing traditional customs in Ethiopia, particularly in Amhara culture, that teach and expect women to accept, tolerate and rationalize wife beating (Tegbar, Yemane, Nigussie & Mirgissa, 2010; Tsehay, 2009). The qualitative data also supports the assertion that wife beating is considered as part of the norm.

The study attempted to investigate the nature of sexual relation of participants with their respective partners. The data shows that 72.7% of women participants experienced sexual violence (forced sex) in their marital lifetimes, while 85.32% men participants reported that they forced their wives for sex regardless of their wives' sexual desire. In both women's and men's report, sexual violence is significantly higher in participants who are educated, living in urban and who have exposure to mass media. This might be due to the fact that these groups of men and women are more likely to be free to tell their sexual stories than their uneducated rural counterparts as well as more likely to be aware of their rights and to report it. The prevalence of sexual violence is much higher than previous research findings. For instance, a study conducted in Zimbabwe showed that about 26% of married women reported lifetime sexual violence by their partners.

Regarding participants' participation in decision making on sexual matters and their attitude, majority of women (78%) reported that they were not involved in any decision on sexual matters. Likewise, 58.5% of men reported that their wives never involved in decision of sexual matters. More than 78% of women believe that a woman should be forced for sex by her husband regardless of her desire or consent and 46% men believe in the same way. In the contrary, 92.3% of women believe that a woman/wife should not ask her husband for sex whenever she needs it and 74.6% of men responded in a similar manner. Finally, women participants were asked if they have ever asked their husbands for sex and men participants were also asked if they have ever been asked by their wives. Surprisingly, 95 % of women and 93% of men said no. This implies that women do not involve in sexual decisions and they are not enjoying mutual sexual satisfaction. This in turn have significant negative impacts for their marriage stability and mutual understanding of couples.

The qualitative data supports the findings of the quantitative data. FGD discussants and interviewees described that forcing one's wife for sex is not considered as sexual abuse. Often it is believed that once they are married, husbands have a legitimate right to ask or even force their wives for sex any time they want. On the other hand, the norm does not allow women to do so. If a wife is courageous or assertive to ask her husband for sex openly, she might be considered as a prostitute, naughty, over sexy, disgraceful, lustful, untrustworthy or may be suspected for having extramarital sexual affairs. The discussants described that women could express their sexual desires to their husbands indirectly if they are smart; otherwise, most of them are passive receivers of their husbands' obligations. They also described that this is also common among educated spouses except some exceptional cases. One of the discussants said "the culture shapes the behavior of both men and women and it has a greater power than education."

Sexual affairs between partners are among the main contributing factors for marriage stability, ease of communication between couples as well as for positive emotional attachments when the matter is a mutual concern for both parties. However, the study shows that talking about sexual issues between spouses is unusual and there is less or no mutual involvement of both parties. This might be due to the strict culture that treats sexual matters as taboo. Open discussion and mutual decision making within



couples about sex is important for mutual sexual gratification, marriage stability, limiting the number of children, and to prevent the spread of HIV among others. Thus, efforts need to be exerted to break the taboo and bring a culture of open discussion between couples in this regard.

### **3. Conclusion and Recommendation**

The findings of the study indicate that with slight variations among women and men participants' reports, women have meager decision-making power on major household decisions unlike on minor household decisions. Physical and sexual violence are highly prevalent, majority of the participants support wife beating and women are more likely to favor wife beating than men. Socio-demographic variables like education, urban residence, and exposure to mass media have positive influences on decision-making power of women and attitude towards wife beating while they have inconsistent relationship with the practice of physical and sexual violence. The prevalence of physical violence, sexual violence and violation of women's decision-making rights are higher than most of previous research findings conducted on similar issues in other parts of Ethiopia.

The findings of both the quantitative and qualitative data show that the different forms of IPV are not only common but they are also considered as 'normal', accepted, tolerated and justified with circumstances by victims, perpetrators and the society at large. One can imagine how it would be difficult to eradicate the problem when it is tolerated, accepted and justified not only by the perpetrators but also by the victims themselves. Abundant empirical studies and literature have documented that IPV has significant negative impacts on the physical, emotional, social, and economic well-being of women in particular, children, family and the society in general (Butterfield, Rocha & Butterfield, 2010; DeJonghe, Bogat, Levendosky & Avon, 2008; Edleson & Tolman, 1992; Hetling & Born, 2005; Katz, 2006; Pagelow, 1984; Williams & Mickelson, 2004). Particularly it violates the human rights of women, hampers their participation in developmental activities including in politics, economic and social activities. Thus, whether wife beating and other forms of IPV are justifiable with circumstances or not, this should not be tolerated at all by helping professionals and all concerned bodies. In traditional societies like Ethiopia, women are not in a position to defend for their rights because of their low level of consciousness and cultural influences. Therefore, social workers, other helping professionals and all concerned bodies should take coordinated actions to address this pressing social problem.

Although there are changes through time, women, men and the society especially in rural areas have no/less awareness about women's rights, the negative impacts of different forms of IPV on women, children, family and the society at large. Thus, information, education and sensitization of the society through different ways including community conversations, debates, radio, TV and experience sharing with role model individuals, families, communities or administrative localities and communities like 'Awra Amba' might be important to minimize and eradicate the problem.

Community participatory discussions, debates should be strengthened at the community level. These discussions should vigorously involve men, influential people, women particularly the non-educated, rural women who have no access to information. Open discussion on family matters including sexual matters and their importance for both men and women should be emphasized in the discussions.

Gender issues are not only the concerns of women or the women's affairs ministry, but, the issue touches every home and every one's life. In order to address the problem, it needs the involvement of various stakeholders including governmental and nongovernmental organizations and from community to individual level.

Further research is needed to identify contributing and protective factors from insider's perspectives so that important inputs could be obtained to design appropriate intervention measures.

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**Causes and Consequences of Sexual Abuse and Resilience Factors in Housemaids  
Working in Addis Ababa: A Qualitative Inquiry**

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*Abstract*

*This study explored the resilience of sexually abused female housemaids in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The study employed exploratory qualitative methods, using in-depth and key informant interviews to collect data. The participants were one broker, one counselor, and eight purposively selected housemaids who were young, single female migrants with impoverished family backgrounds. Among the eight study participants, four experienced rape, one faced attempted rape, and the remaining three had their private body parts touched without their consent. Contexts that enhanced possibilities of sexual abuses, as expressed by respondents, include drinking of perpetrators, absence of wives from the home, lack of well-defined boundaries to the sector, and tricked with false promises. As a result, study participants faced emotional disturbance, distrust, hopelessness, job insecurity, unsafe abortion, unwanted pregnancy, and contracted HIV. The major strategies used by sexually abused housemaids to become resilient identified were normalizing the problem, disclosing, religious coping, personal values, and setting positive life goals. The study calls for service providers, professionals, policy makers, and legal agencies to recognize the issue of sexual abuse in housemaids as fertile ground for intervention research and practice.*

**Keywords:** Housemaids, Resilience, Sexual abuse.

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## **Background**

Sexual abuse is a traumatic life experience that can happen to anyone. Sexually abused women were found to live with fear, frustration, shame, loss of self-esteem and lack of confidence unless they receive appropriate professional help or have the personal strength to cope (WHO, 2005).

A World Health Organization study of 24,000 women from 10 different countries with different cultures found that 15% to 71% had experienced physical or sexual violence at some point in their lifetime. One out of 3 women worldwide has experienced rape or sexual assault. In sub-Saharan Africa, 59% of Ethiopian women, 59% of Zambian women, 47% of Tanzanian women, and 43% of Kenyan women have ever experienced sexual violence (World Health Organization [WHO], 2005).

Housemaids, who spent their whole time on domestic work with informal contract and low payment, are often victims of sexual abuse which includes assault, rape and other forms of sexual exploitation for various reasons (Anderson, 2000; West, 2006). Given the disproportionately high poverty rate in Ethiopia, the undignified nature of domestic work in the society, the socio-economic situation of domestic workers, and lack of access to legal and social services, one can easily imagine the vulnerability of domestic workers for sexual violence (Selamawit, 2007).

Sexually abused women in turn are prone to subsequent physical, psychosocial and health problems such as job insecurity, unwanted pregnancy, unsafe abortion, sexually transmitted diseases, unwed parenthood, prostitution as well as psychological problems (International Labor Organization [ILO], 2000; WHO, 2005).

Violence has a significant impact on the health and life expectancy of women. Rape and domestic abuse account for 5% of deaths of women at reproductive age in developing countries (United Nations Development Fund for Women [UNDFW], 2005). Research has also shows that sexual abuse potentially leads to mental health problems such as personality disorders, anxiety disorders and major affective disorders (Ubidu & Scott-Samuel, 2011).

However, there are women who develop coping strategies to be resilient and function well despite the various adversities they encounter. Many complex variables may determine whether a woman will function well after sexual abuse. These include her internal strength, the legal response, her educational background, economic factors, community support and the extent of the abuse itself (Ahmed, 2007; Faith et al; 2008).

Local studies (Addisu, 2001; Selamawit, 2007) indicate sexual abuse is one of the serious challenges in the life of housemaids. However, there is no comprehensive and adequate study in Ethiopia to show the positive life experience of sexually abused housemaids. Therefore, this study was undertaken to explore the type of sexual abuse female housemaids who work in Addis Ababa had experienced, the possible contributing factors and consequences of sexual abuse, and strategies that contribute to become resilient. Such information can be helpful for policy makers, social workers, psychologists and social service providers to design programs and strategies that may be helpful to prevent or minimize the impact of sexual abuse using a strength perspective.

## **Review of Literature**

### **Domestic Work**

Domestic work in Ethiopia has two basic categories - the first involves individual domestic workers who work within the family without payment. This is mainly performed by children and women family members and may not be hazardous as such. The second form of domestic work is performed in unrelated households with payment who are known as housemaids. This category can be hazardous which makes women prone to exploitation and abuse. The job arrangements are

frequently made informally between the housemaids or the employing agent (brokers) and the employer. Currently, there are two categories of paid housemaids in Ethiopia - live-in or full-time workers, in which the majority of workers belong, and live-out or part-time workers (*Temelalash* in Amharic) (Selamawit, 2007).

### **Violence against Housemaids**

In reality, the status and role of housemaids in Ethiopia is that of a master and a servant (Abiy, 2002). The sense of being non-relative makes housemaids vulnerable to various forms of violence (Motesi, 1990). The context of isolation in which these workers live, coupled with their low social status, makes them susceptible to a range of physical, sexual, and psychological violence (ILO, 2000).

Amnesty International's (2006) report also showed many domestic workers live in inadequate and abusive conditions of work, have no contractual relationships with their employers, are subjected to massive underpayment, work long hours with no rest, and face major obstacles to joining a union. Domestic workers in Ethiopia are not exceptions to these prevalent forms of mistreatment.

### **Contributing factors for Sexual Abuse**

No single factor alone can 'cause' violence against women, rather a number of interrelated factors work in combination at different levels increasing the likelihood of individual to engage in a violent action (WHO, 2005). There are different arguments about factors that expose women to different forms of sexual abuse. Meyer (2000) suggested that slightly different biological make-up of perpetrators can contribute to sexual assault. These studies argue that a difference is found in the hormones and other chemicals in the body, as well as in the brain that may cause abnormalities that may lead someone to sexually abuse others.

On the other hand, Leather and Lawrence (1999) argued that it is the interaction of developmental and environmental factors that lead someone into abusive relationship. In this regard, lack of social conscience, attitudes, and gender schemas, sociocultural influences, and poor family relationships are mentioned as contributing factors for sexual abuse.

In Ethiopian context, Nestanet (1999) argued that the issue of sexual abuse could be exacerbated by the different socio-cultural norms which condone men's superiority and women's submissiveness. Sexual abuse in Ethiopia is often justified by the naturalistic argument that men are likely to be aggressive as a result of their biological nature when in fact abuse is mainly concerned with gender socialization and power. In the case of domestic workers, sexual abuse may be characterized by an unwelcome imposition of sexual requirements in the context of extreme inequality of power in the employer-employee relationship, combined with desperation to keep the job on the part of the employee (Addisu, 2001; Selamawit, 2007).

### **Consequences of Sexual Abuse**

Research has shown that domestic workers who have experienced sexual assault became victims of sexual and reproductive health problems, such as sexually transmitted diseases, unwanted pregnancy and adverse pregnancy outcomes, including miscarriage and low birth weight infants (Moors, 2003).

Ullman and Brecklin (2003) indicated that women who have been sexually assaulted exhibit a variety of emotional and behavioral problems such as fear, anxiety, depression, and sexual dysfunction. In this sense, a sexual assault can shatter the victim's construction of reality and challenge her coping strategies.

### Legal Issues and Housemaids

In many countries, housemaids are not included in the domain of labor legislation. As a result, many housemaids are prevented from attaining an adequate standard of living, reasonable working hours, the right to rest, and the right to form a union (Ramirez-Machado, 2003; Tomasevski, 1993).

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) stipulate special provisions for the protection of women's rights. Specifically, ILO (2002) stipulates the international standards on decent work conditions and bounds state parties to ensure their application. However, their enforcement in many developing countries is usually minimal.

In Ethiopia, Proclamation No.42/1993, the existing labor law legislation, explicitly sets aside housemaids from its realm and stipulates that their rights and duties will be governed under a special regulation (Proc. 42/1993, Art. 3(1)). Title XVI of the Ethiopian Civil Code which deals with the contract of particular kinds of work has a section containing special provisions concerned with the contracts of resident domestic employment but does not address their rights as workers. It also does not give a definition of what constitutes a "domestic worker."

### Rationale for the Study

In Ethiopia, housemaids contribute major role, through their care and services, to the lives of many working class populations. In reality, such women represent one of the vulnerable populations who have less respect in the society and face many challenges. However, housemaids are one of the most understudied populations in Ethiopia (Selamawit, 2007).

Sexual abuse is one of the major challenges of housemaids. Fear of losing job is a big trap for many domestic workers to stay in domestic work (Addisu, 2001; Selamawit, 2007). However, no studies have examined resiliency among domestic workers. Therefore, this study explored both internal and external resilient factors that build strengths and positive survival of abused domestic workers

In this context, the ability to function well after sexual trauma calls for the use of positive survival techniques or intrapersonal strengths and social support systems available in the society (Ahmed, 2007). The findings in this study provided useful information to alleviate the situation of sexually abused housemaids and to develop protective policies and intervention plans that can promote and empower housemaids. Exploring how these women deal with life challenges is helpful especially for those women who have no alternative to leaving the line of work and would like to minimize their risks.

### Research Question

The main research question of this study was: How resilient are housemaids who are survivors of sexual abuse to function well in their lives?

Specific Questions:

- What **circumstances** expose housemaids to sexual abuse?
- What are the psychosocial and health **consequences** of sexual abuse as described by housemaids?
- What are the **contributing strategies** for sexually abused housemaids to become resilient?

## **Methods**

### **Research Design**

An exploratory qualitative phenomenological approach was found to be appropriate to explore contributing factors, consequences of sexual abuse, and the resiliency strategies used by housemaids. The data was obtained based on the participants' interpretation of their reality and lived experience (Richard & Grinnell, 1997).

### **Study Site**

This study was conducted in the city of Addis Ababa the capital of Ethiopia with a population of over 3 million. This city was chosen because there are many housemaids in the city who are mainly migrated from the rural areas with different sociocultural backgrounds. Being immigrant and living away from families might increase the risk of housemaids to sexual abuse which in turn challenge housemaids to source out different strategies to cope with problems they are facing. This makes the city an ideal place to investigate contributing factors and consequences of sexual abuse, and experiences of resiliency strategies for housemaids.

### **Participant Selection Techniques**

To identify housemaids for the study, purposive and snowball sampling techniques were employed. From the eight participants; five were identified from the broker's office and one from the Organization against Gender Based Violence (*Tsotawi Tekate Tekelaky Maheber* or TTTM). Snowball technique was used to find one case via a friend who already recruited from the TTTM office.

### **Participant Selection Criteria**

Criteria used to determine the eligibility of eight prospective participants include:

- Paid housemaids who were 18 years old and above, who work in live-in base. Unpaid housemaids are excluded because mainly they are living with relatives and were not visited either the broker or service providing organization (TTTM) during the time of data collection.
- Housemaids who had faced different psychological, social or health problems due to the sexual abuse they encountered,
- Housemaids who have used different coping strategies after encountering sexual abuse,
- Housemaids who were willing to participate in the study.

### **Data Collection Instruments**

As mentioned by Ritchie and Lewis (2003), the researcher has to choose methods that are practical, cost-effective, time-efficient, and culturally sensitive that can help get adequate information as much as possible. Taking these factors into consideration, in-depth face to face interview was used as data collection tool for this study. An interview guide was prepared in Amharic language. Open-ended questions used to obtain housemaids' oral narratives about their demographic profile, contributing factors and consequences of sexual abuse, and strategies that helped them to become resilient.

### **Ethical Considerations**

The majority of issues raised in the interviews can be considered sensitive issues. Thus, informed consent of the participants was obtained to assure their voluntary participation. The aim of the study and the benefits and risks of participating in the study were discussed before the actual interview. Study participants were not asked to disclose their names to protect their anonymity.

### Data Processing and Analysis Procedure

The interviews with housemaids were undertaken privately at TTTM office and the researcher home for those who were recruited from the broker's office. Each interview took 2 to 3 hours with tea-break. Careful steps were followed to transcribe the tape-recorded and notes taken in Amharic and to translate into English. The data collected was logged in accordance with dates, cases, and content. The data were then analyzed thematically to bring meaningful coherence to the themes, patterns, and categories.

### Results

#### Profiles of the Study Participants

As illustrated in Table 1, the 8 study participants ranged in age from 18 to 27. All eight had migrated from rural areas-five from Gondar, Amhara region and the others were from Nekmet, Wolo, and Jimma. All of the participants were single women affiliated with the *Orthodox Tewahido* religion. All except one participant were at the primary education level. However, only three participants were in school during the time of the study. Participants mentioned various reasons for being employed as domestic workers such as death of a parent, running away from early marriage, separation of parents, induced by false promises of relatives or a stranger, to gain access to education, and to support their family financially.

The participants served in domestic work from 3 to 12 years and earned a monthly salary ranging from 150 to 300 ETB (equivalent of \$7 to \$15 USD). These domestic workers entered into the field because it does not require special skill and can be done without formal occupational training.

Five participants were found at the broker's office while they were looking for employers a live-in work arrangement. Two study participants were living in the TTTM Safe House (drop in center) which provides basic needs, counseling, medical support, and life skill trainings to women who had been facing sever forms of physical or sexual violence. One respondent who used to live in the Safe House was found running her own small business.

*Background of the broker (Delala in Amharic):* The broker was a 32 year old married man. He ran a legally registered employer-employee contracting agency.

*Background of TTTM:* This is an Organization against Gender-Based Violence established in 2003. The interview was held with a 23 year old female lawyer who had been working as a project assistant.

Table 1: Profile of the Study Participants

Cases	Age	Birth place	Educational Status	Push and pull factors into domestic service	No of years in domestic work
Case 1	27	Gondar	7 <sup>th</sup> (Dropout)	Parents' separation	7
Case 2	20	Gondar	5 <sup>th</sup> (Dropout)	Parent death	9
Case3	20	Gondar	4 <sup>th</sup> (Active)	Induced by relative	5
Case 4	20	Gondar	5 <sup>th</sup> (Active)	To enroll in school	4
Case 5	22	Gondar	6 <sup>th</sup> (Dropout)	Parent death	7
Case 6	23	Wolo	4 <sup>th</sup> (Active)	Running away from	3
Case 7	18	Nekemt	5 <sup>th</sup> (Dropout)	To help family	4
Case 8	19	Jimma	No Schooling	Induced by a stranger	12



### Contributing Factors for Sexual Abuse

As illustrated in Table 2, among the 8 study participants, four experienced actual rape, one participant faced attempted rape, and the remaining three were touched on their private body parts (breast, hip, and button) without their consent. Four of the perpetrators were male employers. The other four perpetrators were relatives of employers, a stranger, and a waitress who was working for the employer's cafe. The four study participants who had been raped revealed that they faced rape once. The remaining participants faced different forms of sexual abuse more than once.

The main causes of sexual abuse, as identified by participants, were ignoring the pre-sexual abuse acts and not leaving the perpetrators' home early, drinking of the perpetrator, low respect of the perpetrators, considering housemaids as sex workers, and the private nature of the work. For example, Case 3 recalled the incidence as:

One day, I went to a house of a man who agreed to employ me. Then he pulled me into his chest and said '*I do not want a housemaid, I want to have sex with you, I will give you 100 birr and you will go.*' I was shocked! I just begged him to let me go. When I started crying loudly he opened the door and I went off.

In this regard, the broker pointed that housemaids could be easily cheated by perpetrators' false promises to get money. The broker also commented on the unnecessary actions of housemaids who were interested in marrying their employers might contribute to the sexual abuse they had faced. However, Case 3 argued "*While sex workers can be easily available at bars and night clubs, why employers prefer domestic workers for sex?*" Absence of well defined boundary between domestic work and sex work and mixing up of job preferences is the other risk exposing factor explained by Case three.

### Psychosocial and Health Consequences of Sexual Abuse

All of the study participants experienced emotional turmoil as a consequence of sexual abuse ranging from being hesitant towards men, depression, hopelessness, crying, nightmares, self-blaming, and hating themselves. Likewise, the TTTM project assistant and the broker mentioned that sexually abused domestic workers exhibited less control of emotions, unwillingness to eat, and blaming themselves frequently.

Two of the raped participants subsequently experienced unsafe abortions. These women mentioned they had no or little awareness about the consequence of unsafe abortion and they did not take any medical checkup, including HIV/AIDS test, after the abortion. One participant had a twins' pregnancy and the other one became HIV positive in addition to an unwanted pregnancy. These two women got support to start a small business and life skill trainings from TTTM. The children of these women were given up for adoption. Case 8 recalled her experience as follows:

A relative of my employer came to home. He was drunk. I shouted when he pulled me, but no one was around to help me. He raped me and went out. When my menstruation stopped coming, I told my employer about the rape but he fired me for falsely accusing his relative. I was pregnant of twins.

Table 2. Summary of Causes and Consequences of Sexual Abuse

Cases	Forms of sexual abuse	Perpetrator	Causes of abuse	Consequence
Case 1	Touched on her breast without her consent, verbal sexual remarks	Employer (Married)	Less respect towards domestic workers	Quitting of job, Emotional disturbance, Distrusting of men

Case 2	Raped	Employer (Married)	Ignoring the prerequisite acts of perpetrators	Unsafe abortion, Self-blaming
Case 3	Pulled in to the chest of the perpetrator, asked for sex	Employer (Single)	Misunderstanding between sex work and domestic work	Distrusting men, emotional disturbance
Case 4	Forced to touch the perpetrator's private body parts (Sex organ)	Employer (Divorced)	absence of wife from home	Emotional disturbance, Job insecurity
Case 5	Raped	Stranger	Private nature of the work	Unwanted pregnancy, HIV positive status, Sudden firing, Hating people
Case 6	Raped	Waitress		Unsafe abortion, Distrusting men
Case 7	Attempted rape	Employer's relative		Emotional disturbances, Job insecurity, Fear
Case 8	Raped	Employer's Relative	Drinking, private nature of the work	Twins pregnancy, Sudden firing, Hopelessness

### Resilience Strategies to Cope with Sexual Abuse

#### Internal Strategies for Resilience

*Efforts to prevent the incident:* The immediate response of all but one participant to sexual abuse was trying to prevent the incident from happening by shouting, throwing objects, insulting the perpetrator, begging, and threatening to tell the police. Only one of the participants responded in silence. Participants explained their efforts did not succeed but gave them a sense of '*it was beyond my control and I could not help it.*'

*Setting life goals and aspirations:* Two study participants were looking for meaning in life by setting future goals and being optimistic about their future success. For example, Case 7 had a great ambition to be a great runner. In 2007 she got fifth rank in Ethiopian annual running competition. She said "*When I see Ethiopian runners win at international level, hope flourished into my heart to be a well known runner one day.*"

*Personal conviction:* Taking time to make positive life decisions and choosing constructive ways is another internal strength described by one study participant. Case 3 described the locus of self control which helped her in the face of adversity:

After I had faced sexual abuse I was thinking to work as a sex worker and fulfill my basic necessities but I withdrew myself from wrong decisions by saying I should not be like this or I should not go on in this way.

*Denial or suppressing the incident:* Finally, two of the study participants shared a different view of coping mechanisms. For example Case 6 cited forgetting the past or convincing herself that the problem had not happened as a strategy that helped her to escape from stressful feelings.



### External Strategies for resilience

*Caring relationships after disclosure:* Seven of the eight participants disclosed the incident to significant others such as the perpetrators' family, neighbors, friends, relatives, brokers, a priest, as well as the media. Participants emphasized that sharing their emotions with others and the empathy they received back gave them relief and a feeling of belongingness. However, only one participant reported the incident to police though the perpetrator was not accused due to the unwillingness of neighbors to witnesses. The broker further added, some polices assume "*domestic workers engaged in the sexual act willingly and accused men as 'abusers' when the relationship ended.*" The broker also expressed the bureaucracy in the legal system is one obstacle for housemaids not to take their case to the court.

Case 5 who was raped by a stranger, became pregnant and contracted HIV mentioned: "*In those days I was blaming myself and God. But with the help of my counselor at TTTM, I stopped complaining about the past and began to plan for a better future.*" Regarding, the help the broker offers he said:

I advise those domestic workers who share me about the incident. I also lend money and give them a shelter until they found another employer. Since most of them are usually fired without receiving their salary.

*Opportunities for job and life skill trainings:* Two study participants have received help from TTTM. One participant trained with small business running skills. The other one received training on life skills. These participants mentioned that the counseling and trainings helped them to develop a sense of '*I am competent so that I will have a better opportunity.*'

*Spiritual affiliation:* Faith and religion is another resilience factor revealed by four participants. Participants emphasized the relief they have got from praying, confession, and going to spiritual programs. For example Case 1 said "*Whenever I got depressed, I used to go to church, laid on the floor and pray to God. Then I felt relieved.*"

**Table 3. Resilience Factors of Survivors of Sexual Abuse**

Internal Factors for Resilience	External Factors for Resilience
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Efforts to prevent the incident</li><li>• Personal conviction</li><li>• Denial or suppressing the incident</li><li>• Setting life goals and aspirations</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Caring relationships after disclosure</li><li>• Spiritual affiliation</li><li>• Opportunities for job and life skill training</li></ul>

### Discussion

Housemaids who participated in this study were young women of low educational status who predominantly migrated from rural areas. Participants mentioned various reasons for their migration to Addis Ababa and to be employed as domestic workers such as death of a parent, running away from early marriage, separation of parents, induced by false promises of relatives or a stranger, to gain access to education, and to support their family financially.

Persistent levels of poverty, harmful traditional practices, lack of access to education, and limited opportunities for decent employment contribute to large numbers of young women to migrate in to large cities and being engaged in domestic work where they are exposed to high levels of violence (Amnesty International, 2006; Original, Emebet, & Mellese, 2004). After entering in to domestic work, lack of skill and training, insecure ways of finding other jobs and low economic status of

workers contribute for housemaids to stay in domestic work in a difficult situation (Ondimu, 2007). As a result, in Addis Ababa "... a good proportion of housemaids, particularly those over 12 years of age, were sexually harassed, mostly by sons of the employers" (Kifle, 2002).

Participants in this study articulated three categories of contributing factors for sexual abuse. The first theme includes factors related with themselves such as ignoring the pre-sexual abuse acts and not leaving the perpetrators' home early. The second themes are contexts related to the perpetrators such as drinking, low respect, considering housemaids as sex workers. The third theme emerged is the private and informal nature of the work which is also acknowledged by early research by Motesi (1990). Motesi emphasized that unorganized and private nature of the work, lack of legal recognition of the sector, and workers' lack of knowledge and awareness about their rights as the main factors which exacerbate workers' vulnerability to sexual abuse.

The absence of boundaries between sex work and domestic work was mentioned as one potential contributor of sexual abuse. In fact, there are women who run double jobs as domestic work and sex worker. However, this does not mean that all housemaids use sex work as alternative means of income generation, though many housemaids also lack self-confidence and be unaware of their rights so that they become easily cheated by perpetrators and enter in to commercial sex (Charney, 2004).

On the other hand, the broker emphasized that there are housemaids who had shown sexual interest towards their employers which might lead to sexual abuse. Of course, the majority of housemaids are usually adolescent girls below 20 years old who are curious about sexual relationship. In addition, the private nature of the work and absence of day off might hinder housemaids not to explore options outside home. Most women and children working as housemaids are not even allowed to go outside the compound in which they work unless they are ordered to undertake chores for other family members (Endeshaw, Gebeyehu, & Reta, 2008). Therefore, it may not be unusual to find housemaids who try to build intimacy with the available male individuals at home such as single employers, guards, and relatives in the house. But due to different cultural and religious reasons it's rare for housemaids to show sexual interest towards married employer unless they are forced to do so. In line with this, Nestanet (1999) argued that in Ethiopia issues and concepts related to the cause of sexual abuse are ill understood by the larger society. Due to this, it is common to blame victims as a major contributor and even initiators of sexual abuse.

In this study, only two individuals accessed institutional support for assistance with their traumatic life experience. Only one participant disclosed the issue to the police. The other participants mentioned religious affiliation, disclosing, silence, and normalizing the problem as a means to cope with trauma. Studies have shown that the courage to explain the incident and the caring relationships that is available after disclosure is helpful for victims of sexual abuse (Faith et al., 2008; Gunnestad, 2003).

However, in Ethiopia, getting institutional help for traumatic experiences is not a usual trend. This may be due to the absence of organizations working on rehabilitation, the general lack of awareness of victims to approach helping agencies, or the availability of informal support systems like families, friends, neighbors, and spiritual leaders whenever needed.

Amnesty International (2006) elaborates the existence of many obstacles in the legal and social systems that hamper the protection of domestic workers from abuse. On the other hand, scholars argue that young people at risk have low motivation to approach and utilize social support resources even when they knew it was available (Dumont & Provost, 1999; Lyon, 2002).

The study participants also emphasized the spiritual support that helped them to cope after sexual trauma. Research has shown that spirituality and religious beliefs are important factors in resilience. As Niaz (2006) reported praying and faith can be used as a source of strength to get through major problems in life by providing meaning and purpose in life.

Setting goals and searching for meaning from life were also noted by study participants as a resilience factor. Faith et al. (2008) and Rutter (1990) stated that aspiring to future success helps survivors not to bother about their past problems. Denial of the incident as a resilient factor was mentioned by one participant. Gunnestad (2003) reported that normalizing the abusive situation is used by a considerable proportion of victims, especially when there is no one around to help them. However, such kind of coping mechanism is not recommended due to its side effect of coming out in later life.

### **Conclusion**

The findings in this study indicated that women domestic workers often have few or no options for other work. They also lack awareness and knowledge of their options since most come from poor families, are migrants from the countryside, and have little chance for education.

According to the study participants, the absence of clear boundaries between domestic worker and sex worker, drinking of employers, absence of wives from the home, little cooperation of the society to offer emergency help, and lack of legal enforcement are major factors which encouraged perpetrators to sexually abuse them. From the respondents' side, ignoring the prerequisite acts of perpetrators, fear of losing job, being cheated by false promises and lack of self-defense against the perpetrator's sexual advances were mentioned as risk exposing factors. The study identified that sexually abused domestic workers face difficulties ranging from emotional disturbance and physical damage up to serious reproductive health complications and HIV/AIDS.

Finally, the study assessed both internal and external factors to understand what helps sexually abused domestic workers to function well after sexual trauma. The study participants believe they are functioning well. The factors contributing to their resiliency included: social support, religious affiliation, disclosing, and normalizing the problem.

The study confirms the need for a holistic approach to address the challenges faced by sexually abused women. Attention should be given to the personal strengths of victims, the available community resources such as rehabilitation centers, religious institutions, health sectors, the police and legal systems as potential areas to improve the services available to sexually abused domestic workers.

### **Limitations of the Study**

During the course of the study, there were some limitations which have surfaced to affect the study process. The study was limited to assess the perceived impact of sexual abuse because the study did not conduct actual check-ups to make sure that such recollections of the incidence as described by the victims were completely accurate. Thus, the sexual abuse was reported as perceived by housemaids without counter checking. Moreover, only eight housemaids were drawn as the study participants. Despite efforts were made to include additional participants it was difficult to obtain additional cases who could fulfill the selection criteria within the limited period of data collection. It should be noted that victims of sexual violence are a 'hidden group' that are difficult to access. This in turn put limitations in employing additional study participants to ensure data saturation. Despite such drawbacks, it is hoped that this research has achieved its purposes well.

### **Implications and Recommendations**

- Domestic service is one of the unorganized and legally unrecognized informal sectors which support the life of many poor women. Social service providers should advocate for the

formulation of associations, labor law, and policy which specifically address the issues of housemaids. Moreover, empowering housemaid through education, and improving their ability to find employment and income, along with increasing public awareness of human rights issues through education could lower their exposure for sexual abuse

- This study applied resilience concepts which can be adopted to implement new strategies in the Ethiopian context. Previous studies in the area of housemaids were mainly problem-based and aimed to design preventive strategies. However, this research looked at how victims cope after experiencing sexual abuse, shifts the longtime problem and prevention focused research tradition into strengths perspective in order to build appropriate interventions if the problem already happened.
- In this study, the participants mentioned different strategies for resilience such as their own values and norms, friends, brokers, neighborhoods and helping agencies which helped them to stand in the face of adversity. Social service providers should be aware of the available formal and informal networks in the community and then prioritize options which are most applicable to sexually abused housemaids.
- There is a need to identify the gaps of service providers under the umbrella of government and nongovernment organizations. This will help to strengthen the needed services and enhance the positive development of sexually abused women.
- This study has implication for future researchers to identify what kind of services should be provided to improve the life of sexually abused housemaids and how to improve employers' awareness about the rights of housemaids?

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**Operation Flame and the Destruction of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division**

**Fantahun Ayele\*<sup>7</sup>**

*Abstract*

*The Third Division was one of the eminent army units of the Ethiopian ground forces. Since its creation in the 1940s, it was based in the Ogaden for many years to repulse possible Somali invasion. Following the defeat of Somali in 1978, it was involved in many counter-insurgency operations in Eritrea, Tigray, Wollo and Northern Shewa. In May 1990, the high command worked out a plan known as “Operation Flame” to wipe out the insurgents based in Northern Shewa and southern Wollo. But the operation miserably failed and that led to the destruction of the Third Division. Using untapped archival and oral sources, this paper attempts to investigate the main reasons for the failure of the operation.*

**Key words:** Operation flame, army division, military, Derg, command.

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### **Introduction**

Following Ethiopia's liberation from the Italian occupation in 1941, the Ethiopian army was reorganized along modern lines by foreign military missions. The British Military Mission to Ethiopia (BMME) was entrusted to train and equip the regular army and then the Territorial Army. In the early 1950s, the task of training and equipping the army was taken over by the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) of the United States and American assistance to the Ethiopian army continued until 1977. Between 1977 and 1991, the Ethiopian army was heavily dependent on Soviet military assistance. As Soviet assistance began to decline in 1988, the Ethiopian military government tried to acquire new arms from Israel and North Korea. In the mean time, the army was losing major battles in Eritrea and Tigray between 1988 and 1990 as the northern insurgents launched a coordinated assault. Although huge campaigns like "Operation Flame" were mounted by the army, they failed to reverse the military situation. Finally, the army crumbled in 1991 following the flight of Mengistu H. Maryam to Zimbabwe.

### **Research Objectives**

The overriding objective of this research is to investigate the fundamental factors for the failure of "Operation Flame." The study also has the following specific objectives:

- To chronicle the history of the Third Division;
- To look into the strengths and weaknesses of the division; and
- To critically examine the command structure, logistics and intelligence of the army as well as its combat capabilities.

### **Research Methods**

The study involves several methods of data collection. The researcher has extensively used the untapped archives of the Ministry of National Defence (MOND) based in Addis Ababa. In order to corroborate the archival evidence, the researcher has also interviewed many members of the army ranging from privates to senior commanders. In addition, attempts were made to gather all available written evidence about the Third Division.

The information gathered from various sources were cross-checked, re-examined and analyzed in order to reconstruct the history of the Third Division in general and "Operation Flame" in particular.

### **The Background**

The 3<sup>rd</sup> Division was organized in 1941 as one of the earliest army units organized in the immediate post-liberation period. Originally, it consisted of seven battalions and was based in the Ogaden. It was primarily entrusted with the protection of the Ogaden from possible Somali incursions. After beating off the Somali force at Danot on January 6, 1961, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division came to be called "Lion of the Ogaden." True to its name, the Division scored a brilliant victory over Somali forces in February, 1964 as the Somali government made its audacious attempt to take the Ogaden.<sup>1</sup>

On the eve of the 1977 Somali invasion, the artillery, mechanized and infantry units of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division were scattered throughout Härärgé and were based in Härär, Diré Dawa, Jijiga, Chinaqsän, Dägä Habur, Qäbri Dähar, Godé, Gäladin, Mustahil and Wardér. Ethiopian army units stationed in isolated garrison towns of the Ogaden were thus outgunned and outnumbered by the Somali forces. In the first six months following the July 12 1977 full-scale invasion, Somali forces enjoyed superiority especially in tanks, artillery guns and infantrymen. As a result, not only did the Somalis manage to overrun most of the Ogaden, but also threaten to capture the most strategic towns of Diré Dawa and Härär.<sup>2</sup>

Following the fall of Jijiga into Somali hands on September 12, 1977, units of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division were ordered to dig themselves in the Qoré defence lines. The 3<sup>rd</sup> Division at Qoré was soon reinforced by new militia units as well as Cuban and South Yemeni contingents.<sup>3</sup> The Ethiopian forces then launched a large scale counter-offensive on January 22, 1978 against the Somalis. After weeks of fierce fighting, they scored a decisive victory at Mt. Karra Mara on March 5, 1978 and liberated Jijiga on the same day.<sup>4</sup> Between March 8 and 17, 1978, several motorized and infantry battalions of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division liberated Dägä Habur, Awaré, Wardér and Godé. Then, the Division set up its headquarters at Dägä Habur. However, due to the growing threat from the northern insurgents, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division was ordered to turn to northern Ethiopia in early May 1978.<sup>5</sup>

In an attempt to stamp out the insurgency in northern Ethiopia, the government created the Second Revolutionary Liberation Army consisting of seven task forces, 501-507. Task Force 501 was made up of the 3<sup>rd</sup> and the 7<sup>th</sup> Divisions, three artillery battalions, two anti-tank battalions, and a tank battalion with a total of 23,753 combatants.<sup>6</sup>

Since Task Force 501 was assigned to advance to Täsänäy through Humära and Omhajer, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division moved to Gondar in May 1978. After a brief stay at Azäzo, the Division reopened the Tekel Dengay-Humära road by routing the forces of the Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU) and triumphantly entered Humära town in June 1978. Following a brief rehabilitation, the 92<sup>nd</sup> Militia Brigade of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division advanced to Omhajer and reinforced the 17<sup>th</sup> Brigade which had been fiercely fighting with the insurgents of the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF). The 3<sup>rd</sup> and the 7<sup>th</sup> Divisions then mobilized the inhabitants of Humära and rebuilt the bridge over the Tākäzé River which had been destroyed by the insurgents.<sup>7</sup>

Although the road leading to Täsänäy was highly fortified by the ELF insurgents, units of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division carried out a highly coordinated offensive and swept across south western Eritrea. Between July and October, 1978, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division captured Galoji, Ali Gidär, Täsänäy, Haykota and Go✱i. Soon afterwards, it broke the siege around Baréntu and captured Aqordat. Following a brief rehabilitation, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division resumed its advance to Kärän in November, 1978.<sup>8</sup>

As the army surged forward, it met stiff resistance from the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF). Even then, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division in collaboration with other army units captured Kärän town on November 27, 1978. The advance to Afabét proved harder. The EPLF insurgents had dug themselves in the strategic passes at Gäsamit, Mäsahlit, Gezgeza and Qälämit. The 3<sup>rd</sup> Division and other units fought ferocious battles before taking control of Afabét on January 30, 1979. But the repeated attempts to capture Naqfa failed and the task of storming the last stronghold of the EPLF was postponed.<sup>9</sup>

After a large scale preparation that lasted for about 30 months, the long-awaited and much-advertised Red Star Operation was launched on February 15, 1982. The government deployed three commands namely Mäbräq (lightning), Nadäw (demolish) and Weqaw (thrash) to capture Naqfa through a three-pronged offensive. The 3<sup>rd</sup> Division was placed under the Nadäw Command and it was assigned to storm Naqfa from the north after severing the Naqfa-Algéna road. Among the 10 divisions deployed on the Algéna, Kärkäbät and Naqfa fronts, only the 3<sup>rd</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> Divisions of the Nadäw Command came very close to victory. But the collapse of the Kärkäbät front helped the EPLF to transfer fighters to the Naqfa front and eject the two divisions from the strategic heights they had captured. The 3<sup>rd</sup> Division lost its commander, Colonel Täshagär Yemam in one of the fierce engagements of the operation. Despite immeasurable tenacity and sacrifice, Operation Red Star finally failed to achieve its goal.<sup>10</sup>

The failure of the operation led to desperation and mutiny in the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division. The first to go on mutiny was the 10<sup>th</sup> Brigade. In July 1982, the mutineers demanded that they should be given a fortnight respite. Brigade and division commanders tried in vain to placate the mutineers. Commanders had to concede to their demands and allowed the 101<sup>st</sup>, 102<sup>nd</sup> and the 103<sup>rd</sup> battalions to move to Asmara for a

brief respite. Once in Asmara, the ringleaders of the mutiny were detained in the Qagnāw station while others were given political indoctrination.<sup>11</sup>

However, the mutiny soon spread to other brigades of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division. Troops of the 93<sup>rd</sup> Battalion of the 9<sup>th</sup> Brigade and 924<sup>th</sup> Battalion of the 92<sup>nd</sup> Brigade arrested their commanders and moved to Afabét from Kāmchāwa. However, as they tried to force their way to Asmara, they were intercepted by other army units and forced to surrender. The mutiny was finally quelled.<sup>12</sup>

After some indoctrination, the government managed to rehabilitate the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division and made it ready for other operations. In an attempt to weaken the Tegray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and prevent it from reinforcing the EPLF as it did during Operation Red Star, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division swept across western Tegray in late 1982. The Division temporarily controlled TPLF base areas including Dādābit, Addi Hagāray, Addi Da'ero and Sheraro. Then in early 1983, the Division swiftly marched to Eritrea and took part in what was known as the "Stealth Offensive" on the Mālābso front under the Mānter (clear up) Command. During that operation, the army managed to make a deep thrust into EPLF-held areas around Naqfa in a U-shaped offensive. But, in June 1983, the EPLF regained the areas it had lost during the Stealth Offensive.<sup>13</sup>

In recognition of its fighting capability shown during Operation Red Star and the Stealth Offensive, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division was awarded a first rank feat of bravery medal in September 1983. Likewise, the division commander Colonel Yāmata Meseker, and the division's political commissar Captain Gétachāw Saleleh were promoted to the rank of Brigadier General and Major respectively.<sup>14</sup>

The awards and promotions were expected to boost the morale of commanders and combatants and make them more resolute for the challenges ahead. Indeed, the army had still enormous challenges. The EPLF had already taken the strategic initiative in June 1983 and begun surprise attacks on isolated army units. On January 14, 1985, for instance, it displaced the 15<sup>th</sup> Brigade and captured Tāsānāy. Subsequently, on July 6, 1985, the insurgents launched a surprise attack on the three brigades stationed at Baréntu and captured the town for the first time.<sup>15</sup>

With the intention of dislodging the EPLF from Baréntu and Tāsānāy, the government launched a successful counter-offensive named Operation Red Sea in August, 1985. The 3<sup>rd</sup> Division was one of the five divisions deployed for the operation. In a matter of days, the army regained Baréntu, Tāsānāy, Haykota and even captured the EPLF training camp, Sawa Forto, in August, 1985.<sup>16</sup>

In order to maintain the strategic initiative and capture Naqfa, the government once again launched another huge offensive known as Operation Bahrā Nāgash in October 1985. The 3<sup>rd</sup> Division took part in the operation on the Mālābso front. Although a total of 45,843 combatants were deployed on the three fronts, the costly operation ended in failure and 14,442 men were put out of action.<sup>17</sup>

Across the Mārāb River, the TPLF intensified its insurgency in Tegray. In February, 1986, it mounted a nocturnal raid on Māqālē prison and freed many political prisoners. In an attempt to curb the insurgency in Tegray, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division was deployed to the region. After setting up its headquarters in Māqālē, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division in collaboration with the 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> Divisions carried out a series of operations named "Nābālbāl," "Alula," "Mānter," and "Mābrāq," between April and August, 1987.<sup>18</sup>

While the 3<sup>rd</sup>, the 16<sup>th</sup> and the 17<sup>th</sup> Divisions were carrying out counter-insurgency operations in Tegray, the army in Eritrea remained in its defence lines. It seemed unprepared for the impending disaster. In March 1988, the EPLF insurgents launched the largest offensive ever around Afabét against the Nadāw Command. Within 48 hours, the Nadāw Command disintegrated and Afabét, the largest garrison in Eritrea, fell into EPLF hands along with its ammunition depots and heavy weapons.<sup>19</sup> Two days after the fall of Afabét, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division was swiftly moved to Karan to reinforce the army there. For the next 18 months, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division stayed in Eritrea.<sup>20</sup>

Meanwhile, the military situation in north central Ethiopia was also getting worse. As insurgents of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) threatened to capture Dässé, the capital of south Wollo, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division was rushed to the town in October, 1989.<sup>21</sup> Then, the high command worked out an operation plan named "Zāmācha Māket" (Operation Defend) in December, 1989. The operation aimed at regaining the strategic heights along the Dässé-Worä Ilu road. The two renowned strike units, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division and the 102<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Division were to be reinforced by three Special Commando (Sparta) brigades.<sup>22</sup>

Two days before the 3<sup>rd</sup> and the 102<sup>nd</sup> Divisions began their offensive, the government announced its decision to award medals of gallantry to seven units of the armed forces. Of these, the First Revolutionary Army (FRA), the Air Force, the 3<sup>rd</sup> and the 102<sup>nd</sup> Divisions received medals for greatly distinguished feats of bravery. Since then, the state media and compilers of operation reports began to use the term "jägnaw" (which means "the brave" or "the lion-hearted") while referring to the 3<sup>rd</sup> and the 102<sup>nd</sup> Divisions.<sup>23</sup>

The awards and decorations seemed to have a direct effect on the operation awaiting the 3<sup>rd</sup> and the 102<sup>nd</sup> Divisions. Within a couple of days, the two divisions captured all the strategic heights as far as Kabé along the Dässé-Worä Ilu line including Mts. Yäwol and Gugufu.<sup>24</sup>

A month later, EPRDF forces mounted an offensive on the Hayq front and captured the town on January 14, 1990. Several brigades arrived soon and drove the insurgents out of Hayq on the next day. The insurgents once again mounted a fierce counter-offensive on January 15 and recaptured Hayq at 2100 hours. Then, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division and the 2<sup>nd</sup> Para Commando Brigade were rushed to Hayq. They beat off the insurgents and regained the town on January 16 at 1200 hours.<sup>25</sup>

Before turning to the Dässé-Worä Ilu line, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division, in collaboration with the 8<sup>th</sup> Division pushed the insurgents back as far as Ninni Bär, a highly strategic pass between Märša and Wurgéssa towns. Soon afterwards, however, the two divisions were thrown back to Hayq in early February 1990 by the insurgents.<sup>26</sup>

### **Operation Flame and the Demise of the Third Division**

Between March 25 and 30, 1990, EPRDF forces overran all government defences between Täbasit and Alām Kätäma forcing army units to retreat in two directions. As the insurgents took control of the more strategic Yäwol and Gugufu mountains, they captured among other weapons six tanks, two artillery guns and two BM-21 rocket launchers.<sup>27</sup>

In order to annihilate the whole EPRDF force stretched between Täbasit and Alām Kätäma, the high command worked out an ambitious operation named "Zāmācha Nābälbal" ("Operation Flame."). The operation was to be executed in four phases and it was supposed to involve a total of 21 brigades (10 in southern Wollo and 11 in northern Shäwa). The first phase of the operation was actually a preparation time involving reconnoitering of adjacent areas, positioning and repositioning of infantry, airborne, and special commando units. Accordingly, while the 4<sup>th</sup> Division was supposed to carryout reconnaissance in Lalo Meder, Wägäre and Dängäz, the 1<sup>st</sup> Division would seep through Rabél in northern Shäwa. Meanwhile, the 3<sup>rd</sup> and 8<sup>th</sup> Divisions were poised to advance along the Dässé-Worä Ilu line from Dässé and Kombolcha respectively. The high command anticipated that while the two divisions marched to northern Shäwa, the insurgents might mount an offensive around Dässé and possibly capture the town. As a precaution against such danger, four special commando brigades were brought to Dässé. In order to further tighten the security around Dässé, the 505<sup>th</sup> Brigade was moved from Bati to Kombolcha and the 152<sup>nd</sup> Brigade was transferred from Millé to Bati. In the mean time, the 26<sup>th</sup> and the 27<sup>th</sup> Divisions were assigned to exercise vigilance in the areas west and north of Dässé.<sup>28</sup>

In the second phase of the operation, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division was expected to eject the insurgents from Kabé, Worä Ilu and Dägolo. The 8<sup>th</sup> Division would follow the footsteps of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division as a reserve force. On the northern Shäwa sector, the 1<sup>st</sup> Division would be entrusted with the security of Rabél, Mähal Méda, Zärät, Molalé and Tarma Bär. During the same phase, while the 4<sup>th</sup> Division was expected to advance to Kolash and Zoma, the 102<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Division would reconnoiter the Jäma Valley and make a faint offensive toward Fitra and Aläm Kätäma.<sup>29</sup>

In the third phase, the 4<sup>th</sup> Division was expected to make a deep thrust into Aläm Kätäma, Märagna and Karra Mesheg from Kolash and Mt. Zoma. At the same time, the 102<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Division would sweep through Aläm Kätäma, Rima and Därra. Likewise, the 8<sup>th</sup> Division was supposed to overpass the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division and take control of Karra Mesheg and Märagna. On its part, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division would ensure the security of the supply line from Dägolo to Kabé and Mt. Yäwol.<sup>30</sup>

The last phase of the operations would involve consolidation of army units and maintenance of law and order in the areas of operation. Accordingly, the 4<sup>th</sup> Division would set up its headquarters at Aläm Kätäma and ensure the security of Rima, Karra Mesheg and Därra. Then, the 8<sup>th</sup> Division would return to Worä Ilu and safeguard the supply line between Karra Mesheg and Kabé. Finally, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division would return to Dässé and exercise vigilance.<sup>31</sup>

In accordance with the plan of Operation Flame, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division managed to capture Mt. Gugufu, Kabé Worä Ilu and Dägolo without fighting. The insurgents had already rolled back to Karra Mesheg to dig themselves in that formidable fortress and concentrate their forces between Aläm Kätäma and Märagna. Meanwhile two brigades of the 26<sup>th</sup> Division captured Gimba with minor skirmishes. As the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division advanced to Dägolo, the 8<sup>th</sup> Division was ordered to ensure the security of the Gugufu-Worä Ilu supply route.<sup>32</sup>

While the operation in southern Wollo was being executed with much ease and speed, the insurgents launched a surprise attack on the 102<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Division based at Lämi. The insurgents seemed to have planned to disrupt the whole operation by mounting a preemptive strike on the country's strategic force.<sup>33</sup>

At this critical moment, the high command committed a strategic blunder. Instead of allowing the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division to march to Karra Mesheg and overstretch the insurgents, it was ordered to stay idle at Dägolo. That helped the insurgents to concentrate their forces around Lämi and strike the Airborne Division with full force.<sup>34</sup>

The battle raged for three days (22-24 May, 1990). In order to reinforce the Airborne Division the government rushed three special commando brigades, a mechanized brigade and three infantry brigades to Lämi.<sup>35</sup> Even then, the Airborne Division suffered nearly 50 percent casualty (i.e., 95 killed, 381 wounded and 2,653 missing in action), probably the worst damage in its entire history. In other words, out of the 6,421 paratroopers, 3,128 men were put out of action.<sup>36</sup>

After inflicting heavy damage on the Airborne Division, the insurgents retreated to Fitra and Aläm Kätäma so as to face the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division.<sup>37</sup> Because of the unexpected damage inflicted on the Airborne Division, the high command modified the third and fourth phases of Operation Flame. By doing so, it helped the insurgents to consolidate their forces around Aläm Kätäma. Instead of attempting to launch a three-pronged offensive into Aläm Kätäma from Fitra, Kolash and Dägolo, the high command ordered the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division to make a deep thrust into Karra Mesheg and Märagna.<sup>38</sup>

Since the insurgents had already entrenched themselves at Karra Mesheg, storming the fortress was a daunting task and it required careful planning. The skilful and capable commander of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division, Colonel Säräqä Berhané, gathered his staff officers and brigade commanders to map out a workable plan of storming the Karra Mesheg fortress with minimum casualty. Accordingly, 17 infantrymen who volunteered to storm Karra Mesheg with hand grenades through a nocturnal operation were gathered from the vanguard unit, the 92<sup>nd</sup> Brigade of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division. Each volunteer was armed with eight



grenades, an AK-47 assault rifle and 120 bullets.<sup>39</sup> On May 27, 1990, at 0200 hours, the 17 volunteers lurked to the fortress under the cover of darkness. They were closely followed by an infantry company moving along the Dägolo-Märagna road. While the 17 infantrymen stormed the fortress with hand grenades, the infantry company attacked the insurgents from behind.<sup>40</sup> At 0820 hours, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division captured Karra Mesheg with minimum sacrifice.<sup>41</sup> In the next night, the insurgents made 17 attempts to recapture Karra Mesheg. But the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division successfully defended its position and forced the insurgents to retreat to Ahya Fäj and Aläm Kätäma directions.<sup>42</sup>

Although the army had controlled Karra Mesheg, marching along the 16 kilometer plain to Märagna was not an easy task. The insurgents put up stiff resistance in an attempt to halt the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division's advance. But the Division managed to capture Märagna on May 29, 1990 at 0730 hours.<sup>43</sup>

Following the capture of Märagna, the high command once again committed a grave strategic mistake. Instead of ordering the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division to advance to Aläm Kätäma immediately on the heels of the retreating insurgents, government troops were left idle at Märagna for several days. That helped the insurgents not only to rehabilitate from earlier losses but also to gather reinforcements from other areas for the planned war of annihilation against the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division.<sup>44</sup>

While the insurgents were concentrating forces around Aläm Kätäma, Märagna and Karra Mesheg, the high command was still designing another campaign named "Zämächa Nābālbāl 02" ("Operation Flame II"). The operation was planned to involve seven divisions, six infantry and five special commando brigades.<sup>45</sup> The high command wanted the operation to be executed in two phases. During the first phase, the 4<sup>th</sup> Division, the 19<sup>th</sup> and 89<sup>th</sup> infantry brigades and the 3/82/3 Special Commando Brigade were to be assembled at Märagna and would capture Rima, Aläm Kätäma, Därra, Dängoré Maryam and Gānda Bārbāré. The 3<sup>rd</sup> Division was expected to give support to those units whenever necessary. In the mean time, while the 8<sup>th</sup> Division was supposed to advance to Gimba and control Ajbar, Tanta and Tare, the 26<sup>th</sup> Division would block insurgent movements from Borāna to Aqāsta and Gimba.<sup>46</sup>

In the second phase, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division would hand over the task of safeguarding Märagna, Karra Mesheg and Dägolo to the 605<sup>th</sup> Corps and then move to Mts. Yāwol, Gugufu and Tābasit. According to plan of the operation, the army was to move to its targets on June 4, 1990 at 0100 hours.<sup>47</sup>

A day earlier, the insurgents mounted a preemptive offensive and captured Gimba displacing the army stationed there. In the next few days, the insurgents managed to sever the Dässé-Worä Ilu-Karra Mesheg road. Government forces stationed at Märagna were then cut off and could not get supplies or reinforcements either from Dässé or Lāmi. To make matters worse, the high command that had already failed to position capable units along the main supply route did not take urgent measures to reopen the Dässé-Worä Ilu road. The insurgents were now poised to launch a war of annihilation against government forces stationed at Märagna and Karra Mesheg. According to the Third Revolutionary Army (TRA) Intelligence Department, the EPRDF gathered units of the Awrora, Awash, Alula, Ag'azi, Lab Adär, May Day, Ma'ebäl and Mäqdāla Divisions to encircle and destroy the government forces around Märagna and Karra Mesheg.<sup>48</sup>

At this crucial moment, the army at Märagna faced a critical shortage of rations and ammunition. Since the main roads leading to Märagna were cut off, supplies could only be delivered by helicopters. Colonel Sārāqā repeatedly requested his superiors to urgently send the much needed supplies to the army at Märagna. But officials in the Operations Department seemed to have been sabotaging the army. Instead of swiftly sending the required supplies, they dispatched shoes and uniforms to Märagna by helicopter. On June 11, 1990, at 1400 hours, the insurgents attacked the army from all directions. On the next day at 0830 hours, they managed to capture Karra Mesheg. Despite the enormous challenges, the starved and under-supplied troops of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Para Commando and the 92<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Brigades regained Karra Mesheg following a ferocious fighting that raged until 1730 hours.<sup>49</sup>



Although it was too late, the high command rushed the 10<sup>th</sup> Brigade from Dässé to Mt. Zoma, the 6<sup>th</sup> Mechanized Brigade from Enäwari to Lämi and two other brigades from Diré Dawa to Addis Ababa and then to Lämi. The 10<sup>th</sup> Brigade temporarily captured Mt. Zoma. But it was soon repulsed by the insurgents. Then on June 15, 1990, at 0230 hours, the insurgents made some readjustments and re-launched the war of annihilation against the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division from all directions.<sup>50</sup> The insurgents soon recaptured Dängoré and Karra Mesheg and then tightened the noose around Märagna. At 1230 Colonel Säräqä disconnected his radio communication with his superiors. As the insurgents came closer to Märagna, the army destroyed its tanks, artillery pieces and military vehicles. Colonel Säräqä, his staff officers as well as the remaining troops of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division retreated in the direction of Kolash and Ahya Fäj. But Colonel Säräqä fell into the hands of the insurgents before crossing the Wonçhet River.<sup>51</sup> Between June 11 and 15, 1990, 3,858 troops of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division were put out of action. The table below shows the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division's casualty:<sup>52</sup>

3 <sup>rd</sup> Division	Officers	NCOs	National Servicemen	People's Militia	Total
Killed	10	267	17	29	<b>323</b>
Wounded	30	857	61	69	<b>1,017</b>
Missing in action	60	2,202	110	146	<b>2,518</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>3,326</b>	<b>188</b>	<b>244</b>	<b>3,858</b>

In addition, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division also lost among other weapons ten 122 mm artillery guns, thirteen T-55 tanks, thirty 82 mm mortars, eight Zu-23 anti-aircraft guns, 17 heavy machineguns, 76 RPG-7 launchers, 122 PKM machineguns, 162 M-14 and 3840 AKM assault rifles.<sup>53</sup>

### Conclusion

The 3<sup>rd</sup> Division was one of the oldest army units in the country. Several members of the Därg including Mängestu Haylä Maryam were drawn from the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division. Classified documents of the Ministry of National Defence (MOND) indicate that no special privileges or favours were given to the Division as writers like Dawit Wolde Giorgis tried to tell us.<sup>54</sup> Rather, it was always rushed to flash points and suffered the brunt of fighting in many battles. It suffered heavy casualty during Operation Red Star and Operation Flame II. With regard to its composition, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division was not homogenous. It included in its ranks regulars, militiamen and national servicemen. This composition later affected the division's cohesion. Since militiamen were not given leave of absence and received much lower payments than the regulars, they were disillusioned and demoralized. As a result, they were on the forefront in the 1974 mutiny. Since then, the fighting capability of the Division was diminishing until it was destroyed in June 1990. Remnants of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division were rehabilitated and deployed on the Ambo front in May 1991. By then, the fighting capability of the division was reported to be 33.2 percent.<sup>55</sup> Finally, the flight of Mängestu H. Maryam on May 21, 1991, to Zimbabwe and the fall of Addis Ababa a week later into the hands of EPRDF forces brought about the collapse of the army.<sup>56</sup>

**Notes**

<sup>1</sup> Ministry of National Defence (MOND) Archives, Administration 1713, Yä Sostägnaw Keflä Tor Amäsärarät Enna Tägadlo (Emergence and Struggle of the of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division), 1982 E.C., 2.

<sup>2</sup> MOND Archives, Operations 518B, Adhariw Yä Somalia Mängest Selakahédäben Gelts Worära Atäqalay Zägäba 1966 – 1971 E. C (A Comprehensive Report on the Flagrant Invasion of the Reactionary Somali Government 1974 -1978), 1970 E. C., 1-3, 6-11.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 11, 14 – 16.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, 31, 38.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 42-43.

<sup>6</sup> MOND Archives, Operations 168, Bä Ertera Keflä Hagär Bä Hulätägnaw Abyotawi Särawit Yätäfätsämu Wotadärawi Enqesqaséwoch (Military Activities Carried out by the Second Revolutionary Army in Eritrea), 1979 E.C., 7-8. For other task forces see Fantahun Ayele, *The Ethiopian Army: From Victory to Collapse 1977-1991* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2014).

<sup>7</sup> MOND Archives, Administration 1713, Anbäsaw Sostäгна Keflä Tor Selä Fätsämächäw Gedajochena Selä Agägnachäw Akuri Deloch Acher Riport (A Brief Report on the Engagements Carried Out and the Brilliant Victories Scored by the Lion 3<sup>rd</sup> Division), 1976 E.C., 1.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 1-2.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 2-3.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6; MOND Archives, Administration 4635, Yä Aser Amät A Zämächa Riport (A Ten Year Operation Report), 1977 E. C., 19-21; Gebru Tareke “From Lash to Red Star: the Pitfalls Counter-Insurgency in Ethiopia, 1980-1982,” *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 40, No. 3, 2002, 483-485; Gännät Ayélä, *Yä Létäna Colonel Mängestu H. Maryam Tezetawoch (Recollections of Lt. Col. Mängestu H. Maryam)*. (Addis Ababa: Mega Publishing Enterprise, 1994 E.C), 252.

<sup>11</sup> MOND Archives, Administration 1223, Bä Sostägnaw Keflä Tor Yä Tänäsäwen Amäts Lämämärmär Yätäquaquamä Buden Riport (Report of the Committee Formed to Investigate the Mutiny in the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division), 8/2/75 E.C., 1-4.

<sup>12</sup> MOND Archives, Intelligence 295, Bä Sostägnaw Keflä Tor Selä Täfätsämäw Adma Yätädärägä Mermära (An Investigation of the Mutiny that Occurred in the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division), 12-23/2/75 E.C., 1-8.

<sup>13</sup> MOND archives, Operations 168, Bä Ertera Keflä Hagär ... 25; Administration 1713, Yä Sostägnaw Keflä Tor ..., 8-9.

<sup>14</sup> *Addis Zaman*, Amharic Daily Newspaper, 6/13/75 E.C., 6; 19/01/76 E.C., 1; see also MOND Archives, Administration 1713, Yä Sostägnaw Keflä Tor ..., 9.

<sup>15</sup> MOND Archives, Operations 168, Bä Ertera Kelä Hagär ... , 30-31.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, 31-34.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 36-39.

<sup>18</sup> MOND Archives, Administration 1713, Yä Sostägnaw Kelä Tor ..., 12-13; Operations 431, Yä Zämächa Alula Yä Wegya Te'ezaz (Operation Alula Combat Order) 15/11/79 E.C., 1-4; Yä Zämächa Nābälbal Riport (Report on Operation Flame), 3/9/79 E.C., 1-3. Yä Zämächa Mäbräq Yä Wegya Riport (Combat Report of Operation Lightning) 21/8/79 E.C., 1-3; Yä Zämächa Mänter Riport (Report on Operation Mänter), 27/12/79 E.C., 1-5.

<sup>19</sup> Gebru Tareke, "From Af Abet to Shire: The Defeat and Demise of Ethiopia's 'Red' Army 1988-89," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 42, No. 2, 2004, 239-281; D. Connell, *Against All Odds: A Chronicle of the Eritrean Revolution* (Lawrenceville: The Red Sea Press, 1993), 228; Dawit W. Giorgis, *Red Tears: War, Famine and Revolution in Ethiopia*. (Lawrenceville: The Red Sea Press, 1989), 365.

<sup>20</sup> MOND Archives, Administration 1713, Yä Sostägnaw Keflä Tor ....., 13-15.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, 15-16.

<sup>22</sup> MOND Archives, Operations 418, Zämächa Mäket (Operation Defend), 14/3/82 E.C., 1-4.

<sup>23</sup> *The Ethiopian Herald*, December 17, 1989, 6.

<sup>24</sup> MOND Archives, Operations 262, Yä Särawitoch Enna Yä Koroch Yä Zämächa Riport (Operations Report of Armies and Corps), 9-15/04/82 E.C., 1.

<sup>25</sup> MOND Archives, Operations 262, Yä Soasä Samentawi Yä Zämächa Riport (Weekly Operations Report of the Third Revolutionary Army (TRA)), 6-15/05/82 E.C., 1.

<sup>26</sup> MOND Archives, Intelligence 022-24, Yä Soasä Wotädäräwi Märäja Amätawi Riport (Annual Report of the TRA's Military Intelligence), 1982 E.C., 53-57.

<sup>27</sup> MOND Archives, Operations 262, Yä Soasä Zämächa Riport (Report of TRA's Operations), 10-17/07/82 E.C., 1-3; Operations 262 Bā Soasä Genbar Yätädärägä Wegya Acher Zägäba (A Brief Record of the Engagement on the TRA Front), 16-30/07/82 E.C., 1-2.

<sup>28</sup> MOND Archives, Operations 418, Yä Soasä Tor Asäläläw Lāwt (A Change in the Positioning of TRA's Force), ND, 1-6.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, 6-7.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>32</sup> MOND Archives, Operations 262, Yä Soasä Zämächa Riport (TRA's Operations Riport), 13-19/09/82 E.C., 1.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 2.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, 5.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, 2-4.

<sup>36</sup> MOND Archives, Operations 493, Bā 102 gnaw Ayär Wäläd Keflä Tor Lay Yädäräsä Gudat (Damage Inflicted on the 102<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Division), 15/09/ 82 E.C., 1-6.

<sup>37</sup> MOND Archives, Operations 262, Yä Soasä Zämächa Riport ..., 13-19/09/82 E.C., 4-5.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, 4-5.

# The Ethiopian Journal of Social Sciences Volume 1, Number 1, May, 2015

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<sup>39</sup> Anonymous, “Zämächa Nābälbal: Kā Karra Mesheg Eskä Märagna,” (operations Flame: From Karra Mesheg to Märagna), *Ethiop*, Vol. 2, No., 17, 1993 E.C., 23-24.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>41</sup> MOND Archives, Operations 262, Yä Soasä Zämächa Riport ..., 13-19/09/82 E.C., 5-6.

<sup>42</sup> Anonymous, “Zämächa Nābälbal ..., 23-24.

<sup>43</sup> MOND Archives, Intelligence 022-24, Yä Soasä Wotadärawi ... , 70.

<sup>44</sup> Tsägga Mogäs, “Kā Woldya Eskä Midda: Kā Mängaga Yätäfäläqäqäw Yä Särawitu Del,” (From Woldya to Midda: the Victory Snatched from the Jaws of the Army), *Tobyä*, Vol. 3, No., 7, 1987 E.C., 32.

<sup>45</sup> MOND Archives, Administration 2521, Zämächa Nābälbal 02 (Operation Flame II), 1982 E.C., 1-3.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, 4-5.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, 4-6.

<sup>48</sup> MOND Archives, Intelligence 022-24, Yä Soasä Wotadärawi ..., 71 – 75.

<sup>49</sup> Anonymous, “Zämächa Nābälbal ..., pp. 24-25; MOND Archives, Operations 262, Yä Soasä Zämächa Riport (TRA’s Operations Report), 4-5/10/82 E.C., 3-4.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.* ; Intelligence 022-24, 71-72.

<sup>52</sup> MOND Archives, Operations 513-514, Major General Kenfä Gäbrél Denqu to Operations Main Department, 05/12/82 E.C.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>54</sup> Dawit, 109.

<sup>55</sup> MOND Archives, Operations 532, Tämäsgän Chala to 3<sup>rd</sup> Division Commander, 08/09/83 E.C.

<sup>56</sup> Bahru Zewde, *A History of Modern Ethiopia 1855-1991*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Oxford: James Currey, 2001), 267-268.

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**Perception of Tomato Farmers on Effectiveness of Indigenous Postharvest Value Addition Practices in Surulere Area of Oyo State, Nigeria**

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**ABSTRACT**

*The study examined the perception of tomato farmers on effectiveness of indigenous postharvest value addition practices in Surulere Area of Oyo State Nigeria. 160 tomato farmers were randomly selected and interviewed through structured interview schedule. Data obtained were subjected to descriptive and inferential statistics. Results revealed that majority of tomato farmers in the study area were; female, married, aged between 41- 45 years and had secondary school education. Harvesting of fully ripe tomato usually packed in basket/ raffia early in the morning were common indigenous handling and packaging practices to prevent post-harvest losses by tomato farmers in the study area. Indigenous preservative methods such as sun drying, pureed and sealed with oil in jars, boiled and sealed, cold water were mostly perceived to be effective indigenous preservative methods by tomato farmers in the study area. Regression analysis further revealed that age of respondent has positive influence on farmers' perception of the effectiveness of indigenous preservative practices. In the view of the findings, it can be concluded that tomato farmers still hold to indigenous postharvest handling, packaging and preservative practices. It is therefore important that agricultural extension services should focus on the provision of facilities that will improve sun drying method commonly used by farmers in the study area.*

**Keywords:** Tomato, post-harvest, indigenous, effectiveness, value addition.

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## INTRODUCTION

Tomato (*Lycopersicon esculentum* Mill) fruit contained nutritional values and it is widely acceptable as food which makes the production highly profitable in Nigeria (Afolami & Ayinde, 2002; Haruna et al 2012; Usman and Bakari, 2013). Unfortunately, tomatoes quality and nutritional values can be affected by post-harvest handling and storage condition (Sablani et al 2006). Babalola *et al.* (2010) have however identified postharvest losses to be one of the problems faced by tomato farmers in the country. FAO, (2004) estimated postharvest losses of fruits and vegetables amounts to 35-45% of the annual production. Postharvest activities include harvesting, handling, storage, processing, packaging, transportation and marketing (Mrema and Rolle, 2002). It includes all points in the value chain from production in the field to the food being placed on the table for consumption.

Due to tomatoes perishable nature and mishandling of tomato during harvesting and post-harvesting, farmers are losing tangible quantity of their produce thus facing a drastic reduction in income generation (FAO 2004). USDA (2010) has attributed such loss to lack of knowledge about improved storage methods, packaging, transporting, processing and marketing of produce. This is because local farmers in the country still use indigenous practices in tomato production, storing and packing produce to prevent losses. Muhammad *et al.* (2012) concludes that the farmers lack general knowledge of postharvest handling despite their years of farming experience.

Asiabaka *et al.* (2001) noted that, if farmers do not adopt a new technology, it is because they do not understand well the technology, it is not compatible with existing practice or because they have perceived the technology to be too complicated or too risky and not because they are ignorant. Roger, (2003) further stated that the five important characteristics of innovation related to an individual's perception towards decision-making process and eventual adoption are; relative advantage, compatibility, complexity, observable and trial. Ouma *et al.* (2012) affirmed that the use of improved agricultural technology is the solution to increased growth and agricultural productivity. It is against this background that this study examined indigenous post-harvest practices and attitude of tomato farmers to value addition in Surulere Area of Oyo State Nigeria. Specifically, the study aimed to; (i) describe the socioeconomic characteristic of tomato farmers in the study area, (ii) identify the indigenous methods of handling and packaging employed by tomato farmers, (iii) examine the perception on effectiveness of tomato postharvest preservative and processing value addition practices in the study area.

## Hypothesis of the study

**H<sub>01</sub>:** There is no significant relationship between selected socioeconomic characteristics of respondents and their perception on effectiveness of tomato postharvest value addition practices.

## METHODOLOGY

The study was conducted in Surulere Local Government of Oyo State. Surulere Local Government shared boundary with Ifelodun and Araolu Local Government of Osun Local Government, Asa Local Government in Kwara State. Surulere is located within longitude 4° and latitude 8°, the local government lies with the tropical rain forest zone with its characteristics of wet and dry seasons with the average of 250mm. The temperature ranges from 70°- 90° F throughout the season. The area is blessed with vast arable land, shifting cultivation is still the main method of farming in Surulere Local government since the rural population comprising mainly of peasants farmers. Farming is the main occupation of the people but few others have diversified into petty trading, carpentry and others. The Local Government is divided into 10 wards namely: Gambari, Bayaoje, Iresaapa, Arolu, Iresaadu, Iregba, Iwofin, Oko, Illajue and Magin.

The study population comprised of all tomato farmers in Surulere Local Government of Oyo State. Two stage random sampling was used in the selection of respondents for the study. The first stage

involved a simple purposive selection of ten (10) villages in the local government namely: Gambari, Bayaoje, Araolu, Iresaapa, Iresaasadu, Illajue, Mayin, Iwofin, Oko and Iregeba. The large number of tomato farmers and marketers necessitated the choice of this area in Oyo State. The second stage involved the random selection of sixteen (16) tomato farmers from the list of registered tomato farmers' association from the selected villages. A total number of 160 farmers were used for the study.

Primary and Secondary data was used for the study. Primary data was gotten from the field survey through the administration of well-structured interview schedule. The structured questionnaire was used to solicit information from the respondents on issues that bothers on the set objectives of the study. The secondary data was gathered from related journals and library. Perception of effectiveness on indigenous postharvest practices among farmers in the study area were measured on 5 point likert-type scales of; 5= Strongly Agreed (SA), 4= Agreed (A), 3=Undecided (U), 2= Disagree (D), 1= Strongly Disagree (SD). The data collected were analysed using descriptive statistics such as frequency, percentage, mean score, mean ranking to achieve objective 1, 2 and 3. Also, multiple regression model was used to investigate the determinants of respondents' perception of effectiveness of tomato farmers on indigenous postharvest value addition practices. The form of the regression model is given as:

$$Y = b_0 + b_1X_1 + b_2X_2 + b_3X_3 + b_4X_4 + b_5X_5 + b_6X_6 + b_7X_7 + b_8X_8 + e_t$$

Where:  $b_0$  is constant term

$b_1, \dots, b_9$  = coefficient of regression

Y = Perception of effectiveness on indigenous postharvest practices (dependent variable)

$X_n$  = Explanatory variables

$X_1$  = Gender

$X_2$  = Age

$X_3$  = Marital Status

$X_4$  = Household size

$X_5$  = Educational level

$X_6$  = Occupation

$X_7$  = Farm experience

$X_8$  = Farm size

$e_t$  = Error term/disturbance term

## RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

### *Socio-economic Characteristics of Respondents*

Analysis of data illustrated in table 1 showed that 62.5% were females while 37.5% of the tomato farmers in the study area were males. The highest number of female respondents suggests that tomato farming in the study area is mostly practiced by females. This finding is not in line with Adepeju, (2014) who reported majority of tomato farmers in Ogbomoso, Oyo state were male.

Result presented in table 1 further show the mean age of respondents to be 43 years. Also, majority (81.6%) were married and 7.6% were widower. As regards educational status of respondents, results revealed that majority (55.6%) had secondary school education. With majority of the tomato farmers in the study area having secondary education implies respondents are literate to some extent to use value addition practices. This is in line with Mrema (2002) who stated the education imparts knowledge, creates awareness and makes inquisitiveness to explore and learn, helps become skilled and make desirable changes in adoption.

Results presented in table 1 further indicated that majority (74.3%) of the respondents have no other occupation aside tomato production with majority (46.8%) cultivating about 2 hectares. About 28.1% who have engaged in tomato farming venture for not less than 11 – 15 year. This finding implies that tomato farming in the study area is profitable.

**Table 1:** Socioeconomic characteristics of respondents

<i>Socioeconomic Characteristics</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
<b>Gender:</b>		
Male	60	37.5
Female	100	62.5
<b>Age in years:</b>		
<35	8	5.0
36 – 40	35	21.8
41 – 45	50	31.3
46 – 50	24	15.0
51 – 55	20	12.5
>56	23	14.4
<b>Marital status:</b>		
Married	131	81.8
Divorce	17	10.6
Widow/ widower	12	7.6
<b>Educational level:</b>		
No formal education	3	1.8
Adult education	16	10.0
Primary education	48	30.0
Secondary education	89	55.6
Tertiary education	4	2.5
<b>Occupation</b>		
Tomato farming	119	74.3
Cassava farming	20	21.5
Trading	21	4.2
<b>Household size (people)</b>		
<5	24	15.0
6 – 8	38	24.0
9 – 11	53	33.1
12 – 14	20	12.5
>15	25	15.4
<b>Year of farm experience</b>		
1 – 5	9	5.6
6 – 10	35	21.8
11 – 15	45	28.1
16 – 20	35	21.8
>20	36	22.5
<b>Farm size in hectare</b>		
1	28	17.5
2	75	46.8
3	50	31.3
4	7	4.4

*Source: Field survey, 2013*

***Indigenous value Addition Practices Employed by Tomato Farmers to prevent postharvest losses***

Analysis of data presented on handling practices in table 2 revealed that majority (58.6%) of the respondents harvest their tomato early in the morning. Only 0.6% harvests their produce in the afternoon while 40.6% harvest their tomato in the evening. This finding does not agree with Ajagbe *et al.* (2014) who reported that majority of tomato farmers in Ogun State, Nigeria preferred to harvest tomatoes in the evening. This implies that majority of the respondents under this study were aware of the postharvest implication of the time of harvest on tomato produce and to ensure tomatoes were

harvested at the coolest possible temperature. Within this favourable temperature period, farmers will be able to get to the market to sell to the consumers on the same day. This way, the rate of tomato spoilage will be reduced.

It was also revealed in table 2 that 30.6% of the respondents harvest their tomato when it is matured green, 51.9% harvest their tomato when fully ripe and 17.5% harvest their tomato when it is half ripe. Indication that majority of the respondents' harvest their tomato when fully ripe is evidence for considerable losses of tomato produce among farmers in the study area. This is contained in a statement by Orzolek *et al.* (2006) that tomatoes (especially for the wholesale market) should usually be picked at the mature green to prevent the fruit from becoming overripe during long transportation/shipping and handling.

Table 2 also revealed that majority (72.5%) of the respondents use basket/ raffia in packaging their produce to the market, 8.8% of the respondents use plastic crates and 18.8% use bucket in packaging their tomato produce to the market. Majority of the respondents using basket to package their tomato produce implies reduce postharvest losses. This practice is in accordance with Kitinoja (2008) who recommends the use of plastic crate or baskets to package tomato produce because of its susceptibility in order to avoid the produce being compressed together and damage.

**Table 2:** Indigenous value addition initiatives of postharvest for handling and packaging

<i>Indigenous Methods</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
<b>Time of harvest</b>		
Early morning	94	58.6
Afternoon	1	0.6
Evening	65	40.6
<b>Stage of harvesting</b>		
Matured green	49	30.6
Fully ripe	83	51.9
Half ripe	28	17.5
<b>Packaging materials</b>		
Basket/ raffia	116	72.5
Sack with mango leaves	14	8.8
Plastic crates	30	18.8
Bucket		

**Source:** Field survey, 2013

**Perception of Tomato Farmers to effectiveness of Value Practices for preservation and processing**

Perception of respondents on effectiveness of indigenous tomato postharvest value addition practices as presented in table 3 revealed effectiveness in the order of sun dried into chips was ranked first with mean score = 4.8, pureed and sealed with oil in jars, Boiled, sealed and sealed, peeled tomato preserves were ranked second with mean score = 4.3 respectively, cold water bath was ranked fifth with mean score = 4.2, fresh and frozen was ranked sixth with mean score = 3.7, fresh refrigerated was ranked seventh with mean score = 3.5, Ground and frozen was ranked eighth with mean score = 3.4, fresh frozen was ranked ninth with mean score = 3.3, processed into jams and processed into juice was ranked tenth with mean score = 3.2 respectively, picking and sorting initiative was ranked twelfth with mean score = 2.4, keeping fresh produce inside farm structure for cooling and keeping fresh produce under shady tree for cooling initiatives were considered the least effective which ranked thirteenth with mean score = 2.1. For sun dried into chip to be ranked first for its effectiveness, this implies that sun-drying of tomato into chip is the commonly used indigenous initiative to preserve tomato among farmers in the study area.

**Table 3:** Percentage distribution of respondents according to their perception on effectiveness of indigenous tomato postharvest value addition initiatives



	SD	D	U	A	SA	Mean	Rank
Cold water bath	53.1	0.5	23.4	-	8.2	4.2	5
Sun dried into chips	91.8	5.0	-	-	3.2	4.8	1
Fresh frozen	3.8	27.0	57.9		1.2	3.3	9
Keep fresh produce inside farm structure for cooling	-	4.4	1.9	90.6	3.2	2.1	13
Pureed and sealed with oil in jars	40.3	54.1	5.0	-	0.6	4.3	2
Boiled and sealed	40.3	54.1	5.0	-	0.6	4.3	2
Keep fresh produce under shady tree for cooling	-	3.8	-	95.6	0.6	2.1	13
Picking and sorting	1.3	2.5	9.4	86.2	0.6	2.4	12
Ground and frozen	7.5	7.5	54.8	1.9	0.6	3.4	8
Fresh and frozen	22.6	25.8	50.9	-	0.6	3.7	6
Fresh refrigerated	9.4	36.5	53.5	-	0.6	3.5	7
Peeled tomato preserves	38.3	59.7	1.0	-	-	4.3	2
Processed into jams	3.0	27.7	58.5	9.4	0.6	3.2	10
Processed into juice	3.0	27.7	58.5	9.4	0.6	3.2	10

Note: SA= Strongly Agreed, A= Agreed, Undecided, D= Disagree, SD= Strongly Disagree.

**Hypothesis:** There is no significant relationship between selected socioeconomic characteristics of respondents and their perception to effectiveness of tomato postharvest value addition initiatives.

The result of regression analysis presented in table 4 revealed that gender was negatively influenced tomato farmers' perception of effectiveness of indigenous postharvest value addition practices ( $p < 0.000$ ) at 1% level of significant. Age was positively significant to perception of tomato farmers' effectiveness of indigenous postharvest practices with p-value (0.062) at 10% level of significant. This means that the older the farmers get, the more their levels of perceived effectiveness of tomato indigenous values addition practices. This may be as a result of better experience in tomato farming and preservation. It may also be expected that the elderly will tend to attach more value to indigenous practices due to lesser complexity involved in those practices.

**Table 4:** Regression table

Factors	Coefficient	Std error	t - value	P -value	Conclusion
Gender	-2.402217	0.5952622	-4.04	0.000***	Significant
Age	0.0702872	0.0373967	1.88	0.062*	Significant
Marital status	-0.0200696	0.4591748	-0.04	0.965	Not significant
Household size	0.02336	0.0661113	0.35	0.724	Not significant
Level of education	0.4753125	0.3488909	1.36	0.270	Not Significant
Occupation	-0.6411536	0.4212996	-1.52	0.10*	Not significant
Farm experience	-0.0165169	0.0421062	-0.39	0.695	Not significant
Farm size	0.3645328	0.4705778	0.77	0.440	Not significant
<b>Constant</b>	20.41868	3.257076	6.74	0.000	
<b>Adjusted R<sup>2</sup></b>	= 0.2027				
<b>P</b>	< 0.01				

**Coefficient significant:** (\*\*\*=1%, \*\* = 5%, \* = 10%).

## CONCLUSION

The study concludes that majority of tomato farmers in Surulere Local government area of Oyo State were; Female, married, aged between 41- 45 years and had secondary school education.

Harvesting of fully ripe tomato usually packed in basket/ raffia early in the morning were common indigenous handling and packaging practices to prevent post-harvest losses by tomato farmers in the study area. Indigenous preservative methods such as sun drying, pureed and sealed with oil in jars, boiled and sealed, cold water were mostly perceived to be effective indigenous preservative methods by tomato farmers in the study area. Regression analysis further revealed that age of respondent has positive influence on farmers' perception of the effectiveness of indigenous preservative practices.

#### **RECOMMENDATIONS**

The following recommendations were made based on findings of this study:

1. Agricultural extension services should focus on the provision of facilities that will improve sun drying method commonly used by farmers in the study area.
2. Tomato farmers are encouraged to come together or join existing cooperative group for easy access of facilities for postharvest practices.

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**The Modern World-System IV: Centrist Liberalism Triumphant, 1789-1914.** By Immanuel Wallerstein. University of California Press, 2011. xvii, 377pp. Bibliography. Index.

Recent publications in the fields of sociology, social anthropology and history seem to give importance for multidisciplinary approaches transecting each other's boundary of discipline. A good number of scholars representing these three disciplines do not seem content to limit their endeavor with a mere task of borrowing an approach from one another. Current trends unveil a surge in synthesizing historical and sociological approaches for a comprehensive analysis of the social world. "Without the combination of history and [social] theory," argues the renowned social historian Peter Burke<sup>8</sup>, "we are unlikely to understand either the past or the present." Immanuel Wallerstein's multivolume work addresses the aforementioned urgency to realize unison in epistemological ground between history and sociology. The current publication is part of the series titled "The World System," which the author has been working on since 1974. Like the earlier volumes, number four also fits into a methodological synergy of history and sociology for which the author's reputation seem to rest on. If "Social reality is always and necessarily both historical...and structural," (xi) Wallerstein plainly argues, that there has to be a common ground between the two disciplines wherein methodological synergy can be possible.

The central theme of the current volume is the triumph of liberalism as an ideology and consequently the advent and later consolidation of the Liberal state in some countries of Western Europe and in the United States during the nineteenth century. The first two chapters of the book are entirely devoted for setting the background and presenting the two pillars of the central theme, the liberal state and what it seems its tentacle—liberal ideology. The rest three chapters of the book attempt to uncover the inherent tension among forces of different economic and social interest groups during the latter half of the nineteenth century.

As in the previous volumes, the author craftily identifies a world system in his current volume. This time, however, the system is a global culture propelled by the centrist triumphant liberalism. It has an external shell delimited by chronological watersheds, 1789 to 1914. The whole system has also internal components of various levels of which relationship towards the whole and among the parts is based on internal tensions and contradictions in what it seems a dialectical interplay. The author has skillfully unfolded a multitude of contradictions that deeply rooted in the modern capitalist world system. One can observe structural tensions at different levels of this world throughout the nineteenth century. We can observe these tensions along the lines of citizenship, discourse versus praxis, vying for global hegemony, protectionism versus disguised *laissez-faire*, liberal states versus non-liberal states, center versus periphery and so forth.

Though the author argues that the structural relationship embedded in the current volume manifests hierarchical nature of structural components—viz., center, semi-periphery and periphery; the author's claims in this volume are relatively weak and fuzzy at least in a global context. Even if the application of this conceptual toolkit is appropriate and helpful to understand the alienation of the working class, women, and some ethno-racial groups within the core states; its historical validity seems highly precarious insofar as the inclusion of none European polities, but USA, within the same schematic outline is considered.

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Peter Burke, *History and Social Theory*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992. A review by Hugh L. Guilderson in *Theory and Society*, Vol. 24, No. 6 (Dec., 1995), pp. 877-881 <<http://www.jstor.org/stable/657822>> Accessed: 01/01/2012

Structurally also, apart from explaining the dynamics that led to the consolidation of the liberal state and liberal ideology deep within the core, the book does little to show what role those presumed to be situated on the periphery played in the construction of 'Geo-culture'. "By a geo-culture," the author defines it as, "values that are very widely shared throughout the world-system, both explicitly and latently." (277) Far beyond confining himself with the task of presenting the structural transformation that merely took place at the heart of the core zone during the two chronological watersheds of the present volume, it would have been more appealing if the author had also told us as to how the transformation mentioned earlier reached into the other zones outside the core; such as, Africa and Asia. If division of labor was the basic structural component which was instrumental in holding the world system together like a network—as well indicated in the previous volumes, then one would be forced to ask which integral component of the 'Geo-culture' played the role that was previously filled by international division of labor.

Despite its limitations, the book is well researched, uses an abundance of written and visual sources. Though the author largely confines himself to accessible British and French historical sources, tribute should be paid to the author for digging into the rich British and French archival materials to supplement his theoretical analysis of the Modern capitalist World System during the nineteenth century. Above all, it could be argued that the book has achieved its objective, in delivering historical and sociological synergy for the study of the common territory.

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**The Ethiopian Army from Victory to Collapse 1977-1991.** By Fantahun Ayele. Northwestern University Press, 2014. xviii, 309 pp. Bibliography. Index.

This book is organized into seven chapters with a general introduction and concluding remark. The first chapter gives detailed explanations on the Ethiopian army in the post liberation imperial regime. With a brief introduction about the history of Ethiopian military tradition, this chapter focuses mainly on the genesis, consolidation and organization of the army in the years between 1941 and 1974. Particularly, it discusses the serious challenges and problems such as material constraints, acute shortages of military expertise and other technical limitations in the creation, organization and modernization of the army. It also indicates the internal political challenges and growing external threats directed against the emperor as well as on the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the country. Still this chapter discusses the mounting dissatisfaction and secessionist move in Eritrea and growing threats from Somalia in the east that appeared as the severe test against the power and the very existence of the imperial government and the country as a whole. In addition, it shows the diplomatic and administrative skill and achievement of Emperor Haile Selassie in laying the foundation of the Ethiopian army and his earnest struggle in tackling the major threats and challenges the country faced. In other words, it explains how, amidst of those internal and external threats, did the emperor succeed in securing vital technical, material and financial resources for training, organizing and equipping the various sections of the Ethiopian army, including the opening of military academy that served as very pivotal institution in defending the country from external invasion.

Moreover, this chapter gives sufficient description regarding the involvement and heightened influence of foreign powers, mainly the British and later the Americans, in various aspects of the country's internal affairs. In the concluding section, this chapter also describes the changing situation in the interest of major world powers on the geopolitics of the Red Sea and Indian Ocean region and the resultant influences on the later history of the entire region. It thoroughly examines the declining American interest in the Red Sea region, subsequent reduction of their military support to the Ethiopian government, the growing pressure both internally and externally, and the eventual demise of the Haile Selassie's regime in 1974. It also shows the consequent reorientation of Ethiopian international relations and political order.

In chapter two, the author investigates the situation of the Ethiopian army during the *Derg* with an emphasis on its expansion, recruitment of new army, major reorganizations, consolidation and strengthening of the various groups of the army. The active role of the soviets in the expansion process, particularly in the provision of firearms, military vehicles and equipment, and their direct involvement in military training and other important activities such as military advice and command are discussed in detail. Furthermore, it indicates the preoccupation of the military government in combating the increased Somalia threats in the east, the intensified pressure from Eritrean rebels in the north, the evolving political dissents in the center and the general unrest in many parts of the country, especially in the early days of the *Derg*. It also deals with the various military campaigns the *Derg* launched against the Somali aggressors and Eritrean rebels in the subsequent years, the determination of the *Derg* to train huge and superior army, the challenges it faced in the process, the growing dissatisfaction among some generals and senior commanders against Mengistu and soviet military advisors. The chapter gives detailed evidence about the overall structure in the army including human resources, type and amount of armament, the budget allocated for the maintenances of the military apparatus, and loans and military aid supplied from other countries. In the last section of the chapter, the deteriorating situation of the Ethiopian government (both economically and politically), the retreat or decline of the soviet assistances, the consolidation of the rebels in Eritrea, the military sabotage and its daunting effect on Ethiopian army are treated in great depth.

In the third chapter, the author has presented the logistical and command problems prevalent within the Ethiopian army under the *Derg*. This section clearly shows the chronic shortage of supplies, problems of administration in the military logistics, and the deteriorating effects of these problems on the fighting moral and spirits of Ethiopian army at various fronts. It also deals with the nature and



main characterizing features of military organization and systems of command, and assesses how these affected the course of military engagements and the final fate of the army. It indicates the highly centralized nature of military command that denied the efficient and able army commanders and generals from taking independent decisions whenever necessary, or from launching timely military operations against the rebels. It on the other hand shows how this chronic problem helped the insurgents, in several occasions, to buy time to reinforce and reorganize themselves. In general, this chapter outlines logistical and command problems that had engulfed the Ethiopian army, and how these factors eventually brought about heavy human and material loss and destruction.

In Chapter four, the main issue focuses on another vital element of the army: the military intelligence devised and implemented during the military government. It outlines both the strategic and combat intelligence systems, and states how it was functioning and operating. It clearly pinpoints the incapacitation of the military intelligence system, the limitation in the training and in producing professionals capable of escorting, identifying insurgent positions, planning and establishing efficient counterinsurgency measures and interpreting enemy positions. It also discusses other problems such as delays to take actions, lack of willingness to cooperate each other, inability to surpass enemy intelligent systems and penetrate deep into their clandestine intelligence systems created within the local population. In addition, the indifference and ignorance among intelligence officers of the *Derg* and the military sabotages they committed are thoroughly discussed. This chapter in general gives details about how the weaknesses of the intelligence system resulted in severe destruction and loss on the side of the Ethiopian army. However, it shows that, in contrast to the situation in the north, the military intelligence was quite efficient in the fight against the Somali aggressors in the east.

Chapter five deals with the 1977/78 military campaigns of the *Derg*. It explains the critical challenges that the military government faced especially on Eastern fronts, and discusses how the government of Somalia purposefully calculated to exploit the internal division and political turmoil in the early years of the *Derg* to its best advantage. The author discusses the active involvement of the Somali government in recruiting, training and equipping large number of minorities living mainly in the Ogden, and how the Mogadishu government utilized these forces as an effective guerrilla force in the fight against Ethiopia. The chapter also indicates the dramatic spread of the invading Somalia forces deep into the Ethiopian territory particularly across vast stretches of eastern and southeastern parts of the country, including the occupation of Jijiga, attacks on Dire Dawa and several other towns in the region.

In addition, in this chapter, the author examines the worsening military situation in Eritrea and the internal power struggle and political tensions while the Ethiopian army was preoccupied in the fight against Somalia. It also indicates the immediate actions of the *Derg* such as massive military mobilization and training supported by external powers mainly the soviet and Cuban governments, and the launching of protracted counter offenses and several battles against the invading Somalia forces. The chapter concludes itself by critically examining the cost of the war and the underlying reasons for the triumph of the Ethiopian troops. The author argues that several factors had contributed to the crucial victory scored over the invading army, yet the most decisive factor is the deep-rooted spirit of patriotism, nationwide indignation and determination of Ethiopians to fight for their territorial sovereignty and integrity.

In chapter six, the author treats the most protracted fighting between the *Derg* and the northern rebels from 1976-1991. This chapter provides very detailed discussions on the organization, tactics and strategies, intelligence system of the Eritrean rebels, and their sources of material gains. The evidence presented in this section gives an insight about the remarkable determination and efficient military strategies of the Eritrean rebels. It also deals with the renewed determination and military reorganization of the government to launch counterinsurgency assaults against the Eritrean rebels, particularly in the immediate aftermath of the decisive victory in the eastern front. Furthermore, it indicates the extensive training of Special Forces targeted for effective military operations to dismantle rebels fortified in the mountainous areas and harsh lowlands of western Eritrea.

In general, this section of the book explains in detail about the several military operations launched by the Ethiopian government in the northern front, and the devastating military consequences that followed. It also explains the main reasons why the long awaited and so-called well-planned major military operations led to a total fiasco to the government troops. The book describes the major military operations: the siege and storming of Naqfa, operation Red Star, operation Bahra Nagash, the fall of Afabet, the intensification of rebel military operations in Tigray (operation Adwa, Aksum, the Shere disaster), the fall of Massawa in the hands of rebels, the fighting at Guna, Southern Wollo, northern Shewa (operation Flame), fall of Karra Mesheg and Maragna, Gondar, and the fall of the military government.

In the last chapter, the author goes back to the question how the revolution changed the army, and raises two major themes: the impact of the 1974 revolution and the Soviet military assistance. The army mutiny and growing discontent against Haile Selassie's regime dictated the need for change. Although the change of government was welcomed by the various sections of the population, the junior military officers who took power had failed to listen to the earnest demand for civilian government. In addition, it discusses the harsh measures undertaken by the *Derg* on various opposition or dissent groups and how such and other actions dissociated the *Derg* from the wider sections of the population, including the army. Another important issue raised in this chapter is the mixed blessing of the Soviet military assistance to Ethiopia. It argues that although the Soviets supported the Ethiopian government substantially in many ways, they were also part of the main problems to the Ethiopian government. The book states that Soviets were not willing to train Ethiopian mechanics and technicians. They had also obliged the Ethiopian government to send engines to Russia for maintenance that in turn caused significant delays in delivering them back. It is also mentioned that their military advisors were arrogant and unfriendly, which brought about serious discontent and bitterness among Ethiopian generals and commanders. This had also been a cause for the failure of many military operations. Generally, this chapter attempts to show how these situations influenced the Ethiopian army.

Finally, the author concludes the book with detailed investigations of the fundamental factors that led to the collapse of the Ethiopian army. The author argues that the departure of Mengistu in May 1991 not only led to the demise of the *Derg*, but it had also sapped the fighting morale of the Ethiopian army and eventual demise of the entire military apparatus. Under this section, the author eloquently explains to the weakness of the military government in handing the local population as one of the serious mistakes that forced the *Derg* to pay high-price in the course of the war. The author also shows that inappropriate ways of treating and handling the people in the rebel-dominated areas allowed the rebels to tap vital military information from the local population. The leakage of top military secrets had helped the rebels to launch unexpected attacks on the government troops. He also discusses how decisive was the conflict and rivalry among top military commanders for the eventual success of the rebels. The deployment of various groups of army units, having different training background and fighting experience, in the same front or battle was another source of disaster for military government. In general, this section of the book critically discusses the several factors that contributed to the downfall of the *Derg* and the collapse of the military apparatus of the country. These include loss of public support due to unpopular measures of the military government, weak counter-insurgency strategy, intelligence failure, problems of command and control, conscription and training problems, organizational weakness, and war-weariness and disillusionment.

#### **Methodology and Organization of the Book**

The book appears to be reconstructed based on a narrative style of writing history involving a focus on presenting the factual evidence and description of the data. This approach gives readers the opportunity to interpret and understand the issue and the period better.

Thematically the book is very well organized, clear and precise that demonstrates the authors' fascinating command of language. The extraordinary huge volumes of data are systemically

scrutinized and coherently presented, which makes the book more interesting and readable. Abundant primary sources mainly from defense minister archives are consulted and exploited. Several archives are attached in the appendix. We found the extensive use of such sources as one of the most important qualities of this book. Supportive sources such as oral information, video records and extensive interviews are utilized. In search of first hand information, the author also devoted much of his time in finding and interviewing several leading army commanders and generals. He explored and travelled to most of the major battlefields located in different parts of the country. All these efforts further witness the courage and commitment of the author to the discipline and ethics of the profession, as well as his ability in the selection and use of relevant sources. In general, the book is well organized, substantiated and balanced.

#### **The contribution of the book**

This brief review cannot adequately explain the contributions of the book. The book primarily deals with the military history of the country, but its enormous data is also very valuable for social scientists in general, and politicians, policy makers, administrators and others in particular. For example, it provides rich knowledge on the art of diplomacy and world politics in the cold war era that in turn allows an exemplary opportunity to infer how the political tensions and rivalry of major world powers have been affecting the life and history of innocent societies in the developing world. The detailed accounts on each battlefield, organization, structures and security issues give crucial lessons for people involved in the fields of military science. The multifaceted challenges and issues that both rebels and government forces encountered practically at several battlefields can also be invaluable for the better understanding of our future if they are cautiously explored and investigated. The atrocities and destructions in those protracted military engagements also offer a very clear impression of the severe pains that the country had been exposed for about the last fifty or more years. The book clearly demonstrates the heavy-handed measures of the *Derg* against its own people, and the resulting consequences and sacrifices the *Derg* paid that in turn can be instructive for rulers to consider the society at the grass root level.

In conclusion, the book gives vital lessons for readers interested to explore the magnitude of the problems or the challenges the country encountered for more than a quarter of a century, and the resulting repercussions upon our present socio-economic and political development. The book will in short be valuable to academicians, government bodies (policy makers and executives) and other stakeholders interested to gain important lessons from the recent history of the country. However, the book fails to investigate the role of external forces and bodies that might have directly and indirectly been involved in the country's affairs during the military government. The influence of the neighboring countries including the Arab world could have been incorporated and thoroughly treated. In terms of the structure or organization of the chapters, the issue raised "how the revolution influenced the army" towards the last section of the book should have been treated in the initial part of the book.

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