

Research Article

Examining Counterinsurgency (Coin) and Counterterrorism Mechanisms in Nigeria (2010-2022)

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Abstract: *This paper examines counterinsurgency (COIN) and counterterrorism mechanism-legal, legislative, administrative, and coercive strategies that have been initiated and implemented in combating violence, insurgency, and terrorism in Nigeria (2010-2022). This is with a view to highlighting the various approaches initiated and put in place to tackle the insecurity challenges that has pervaded the country arising largely from the activities of Boko Haram and other armed groups in the country. The paper relies on primary data sourced from the field work conducted in 2017 as part of PhD study and utilizes data from the secondary sources and adopted content analysis of relevant literature. The discourse of this paper is important in that the issues of insecurity in Nigeria in the last decade have been worrisome considering the negative tales it portends for the country and its people. It is importantly to review the various efforts of the government at finding solution to the insecurity crises with a view to finding out their effectiveness or otherwise. The paper argues that though Nigerian government has put up various mechanisms a lot still has to be done to addressing the root causes of insurgency and terrorism in Nigeria. Also, issues of corruption, illicit arms, inter-agency rivalry, unprofessional attitudes of unpatriotic members of the country's military who report said sells arms to the insurgents, issue of the porous border and issues relating to lack of funding of military agencies, among other are still fundamental issues militating against the counterinsurgency and counterterrorism efforts.*

Key words: Boko Haram, Counterinsurgency, Counterterrorism, Terrorism, War on Terror

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1. Introduction

This paper is underscored by the prevailing insecurity crisis in Nigeria occasioned by insurgency and acts of terrorism. No doubt, over the last decade, the issue of insecurity has been a fundamental problem faced by Nigeria. Insecurity arising from the activities of insurgents and

terror groups and bandits such as the Islamic State of West Africa Province (ISWAP), Boko Haram (BH), Yan Daurkar Amarya and Kidnappers among others have been one of the many problems faced by the government and the people of the country. Specifically, the BH activities have brought the country into negative global limelight and represents the most severe of all the cases of conflicts and violence in Nigeria. The above statement can be justified on the fact that this is the only time that the country is facing the level of insurgency and terror activities that currently pervades the country arising essentially from the activities of Boko Haram and lately Islamic State of West Africa Province (ISWAP), confirmed by the fact that it is the first time a group from Nigeria is designated as Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) (Adeyeye, Akinrinde, & Omodunbi, 2022; Amusan and Oyewole, 2015; Amusan, Adeyeye, & Oyewole, 2019). The increasing cases of violence, killings and the attendant consequences are justifications for combating the terror activities of the insurgent groups' for succeeding governments since 2010. In recognizing this importance, governments since 2010 when the Boko Haram insurgency assumed social concern have initiated and adopted various mechanisms to fighting insecurity arising from insurgency and terrorism. In doing this, Nigerian governments have initiated and adopted non-coercive mechanisms-legal, legislative, administrative, and coercive strategies, among other means. To be sure, it is on record that governments since 2010, Nigerian governments have set up judicial commissions of enquiries, committees, collaborated with neighbouring countries, other countries, regional and international organizations, and adopted emergency rules and negotiations options in attempts to combating insurgency and terror in the country. Underscored by the need to examining the success and/or otherwise of these efforts, this paper examines counterinsurgency (COIN) and counterterrorism mechanism-legal, legislative, administrative, and coercive strategies that have been initiated and implemented in combating violence, insurgency, and terrorism in Nigeria (2010-2022). This is with a view to highlighting the various approaches initiated and put in place to tackle the insecurity challenges that has pervaded the country arising largely from the activities of Boko Haram and other armed groups in the country. The paper is largely drawn from and relies on primary data sourced through interviews as part of the PhD study in 2017. It utilizes data from the secondary sources and adopted content analysis of relevant literature. Adeyeye, Ige, and Omodunbi (2021) points that insurgency and acts of terror has not only resulted in several deaths, destruction of properties but has disrupted the unity of the country. To be sure, the activities of the insurgents have affected socio-economic and political fabrics of the country and have impacted negatively on the country's regional, continental, and global status. Therefore, the discourse of this paper is important because insecurity has been one worrisome issue in Nigeria since 2010 considering the negative tales it portends for the country and its people. Also very important is the need to examine the various efforts of the government at finding solution to the insecurity crises with a view to finding out their effectiveness or otherwise. The paper argues and concludes that though Nigerian government has put up various mechanisms a lot still has to be done to addressing the root causes of insurgency and terrorism in Nigeria. Also, issues of corruption, illicit arms, inter-agency rivalry, unprofessional attitudes of unpatriotic members of the country's military who report said sells arms to the insurgents, issue of the porous border and issues relating to lack of

funding of military agencies, among other are still fundamental issues militating against the counterinsurgency and counterterrorism efforts.

2. Methodology

This paper examines counterinsurgency and counterterrorism mechanisms in Nigeria from 2010 to 2022. In doing this, the paper employs qualitative and quantitative research methods. Data were obtained through survey of extant literature on the subject matter under investigation from texts, journal articles, informed opinions in newspapers, magazines, and official documents. Also, data were drawn from primary source through interviews conducted in 2015 and 2017 as part of PhD study completed in 2017. The interviews were conducted with the key informants that include officers at the Federal Ministry of Defense, Research Institutes, Military, Non-governmental and Civil Organizations and State Security Departments in Nigeria. Data were analyzed using thematic content analysis.

3. Conceptual Issues

Insurgency has been defined differently by different people with all agreeing that the act involves using violent strategies and tactics to pursue personal or group goals or objectives are political, religious, ethnic, socio-economic, and cultural. The above statement is in line with Gompert and Gordon, (2008) statement that when they described insurgency as the pre-determined and work-out adoption of violence or its threat against state forces and unarmed civilians with a view to achieving political, religious, ideological and ethno-national goals. In many instances, insurgency is carried out using intimidating, coercing, and causing fear in the minds of the people. Insurgency involves attempts to overthrow and replace an existing government, state or arrangement with one that is similar to their political, economic, ideological or religious views (Abdulahi, 2015; Adeyeye, Akinrinde, & Omodunbi, 2022; Amos & Petraeus, 2006; Gompert & Gordon, 2008; James & Laitin, 2003; Okoli & Philip, 2014; Omobuwajo, 2015; Wojdakowski, 2007). Also, insurgency has been conceived as political-military activity directed towards complete or partial control of the resources of state using irregular military forces and illegal political organizations. Insurgent activities include guerrilla warfare, terrorism, and political mobilization. The general denominator is their objective to control geographical location. It is this objective that often serves as mark of difference between insurgents and pure terrorists and terrorism organizations whose objective does not always include creation of alternative government that has capability to control an area or country (Rineheart, 2010; United States Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency, 2009; US Department of the Army, 2014). For this study, insurgency is used to describe actual acts of rebellion against governments of a state and the people. This conception however recognizes that not all cases of rebellion are insurgency (Amusan, Adeyeye and Oyewole, 2019). While this description identifies non-violent-civil resistance, the usage of the concept-insurgency in this study is premised on individual or groups adopting the position of armed rebellion and adopting terror tactics and strategies to achieve their stated objectives. Insurgency is unlike terrorism or conventional war even though it also involves

the use of violence and force and asymmetry-guerrilla tactics to achieve desired objectives. This is often limited in scope to conventional war, especially in the application of a wide range of damages. Insurgency is about forces which are unequal, weak, and sub-state groups (Abdulahi, 2015; Cassidy, 2006; Imassuen, 2015; Johari, 2012; Okoli & Philip, 2014; White, 2014).

Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency: These two concepts are basically different, yet they are related. To that end, understanding the strength and weakness of each will help appreciate the compensation effects they might have. Boyle, (2008) in querying the mutuality of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism submits that the two strategies are indeed mutually compatible, and they complement and strengthen one another. Counterterrorism is used to describe as anticipatory and forward-looking strategies and policies initiated and/or put in place to end or possibly eliminate terrorism, terrorist environments and groups. It includes counter-terrorist legislation and laws, which specifically criminalize terrorist acts and supportive operations (Adeyeye & Omodunbi, 2018; Amusan & Oyewole, 2015; Byman, 2010; Martin, 2006; Oyewole, 2015, 2016a, 2016b; Perry, 2010). The US Joint Military (2009) describes counterterrorism as those functions and decisions which often include invidious strategies and capacities taken to prevent, deter, displace, think, and act ahead and respond to activities of terrorists and terrorism. Simply put, counterterrorism consists of activities, strategies, operations, functions, decisions, tactics, and techniques which nations and governments, individuals and groups initiate and carry out in pre-empting, acting to stop perceived and/or real terrorist threats and operations (US National Counterterrorism Center, 2009). The idea of classical counterinsurgency (COIN) was to try to combat domestic insurgency-insurgency confined to border of state. The theory of contemporary counterinsurgency simply adopts and replicates the principles of the classical counterinsurgency to the international level. Hoffman (1993; 1988) called it Global Counterinsurgency (GCOIN), which fundamental desire is to fight terrorism and at the same time resolve the basic and fundamental socio-economic realities that motivate and act as triggers of terrorism.

Essentially counterinsurgency (COIN) is the combination of activities, policies, strategies, measures and concerted efforts of countries and their legitimate governments to guard against, fight, suppress and/or to defeat insurgent activities within or outside its territory. While the objective of insurgents is, for instance, to dismantle an existing government or political order based on professed ideology, belief, socio-economic or political factor, the purpose of COIN is to stop such anti-state, anti-population acts of violence from been carried out by terrorist groups. As opposed to insurgency, COIN often has the benefit of monopoly of violence, legitimacy and other material resources that are usually the preserve of the state. Although this sovereign right to monopoly of violence has been queried, the state is still legally recognised as possessing sovereign power and the mandate to deploy the use of violence to achieve political ends. However, the state initiating COIN must uphold respect for law and order, human rights as enshrined in the different global and continental legislations that they have willingly entered, and which are binding on state parties. It is these conditions that often technically reduce state

potential and real action in COIN. However, on the part of insurgents, because they are usually not bound by and often lack respect for domestic and international laws and legislations, and because of the unequal power in the prosecution of the war against the state, the only known strategy available to them in expressing their grievances is the destruction of properties, killing of innocent people, disrespect for domestic laws and abuse of human rights and damaging state institutions. For the sake of accuracy, the Joint Publication 3-24 Counterinsurgency Operations, of the United States Army-Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM 3-24) considers counterinsurgency as a ‘military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency’ (Amos & Petraeus, 2006:1-24). Two major approaches to COIN are identified: the enemy-centric and the population-centric approaches. While the former approach conceives COIN as a contest with anorganised enemy, and thus emphasises defeat of the enemy as its primary objective, the population-centric approach focuses on protecting the population and maintaining or winning its support. Although direct military confrontation is often required to defeat insurgency, it is not seen as the main objective as in the enemy-centric method that usually focuses on total annihilation of dissents (Adeyeye, 2017; Santos, 2011:1-5).

Terrorism: to fully capture the definition of terrorism, it is important to look at its historical and social contexts, social revolution, and radical democrat perspectives. It can also be viewed as strategy and tactics adopted by insurgents. That said, this paper approach the description of terrorism from the technical purview rather than from the moralistic angle. The components of targeting indiscriminately and arbitrarily-victimization of non-combatant civilians and outsiders scored 17.5 percent. If we draw inference from this exercise, it becomes clear that those who engage in terrorism for the purpose of causing violence-intention to physically, physiologically, economically, politically, racially, ethnically, and culturally hurt others are higher than other reasons often advanced as informing or motivating terror attacks by terrorist groups. Perhaps this agrees with the violence component of terrorism which as Blair, (2007:79-90) argue is criminal, unfair and/or constitute an illegitimate use of force. However, analysing terrorism has not been and cannot be an easy, plain, and trivial exercise as Blair’s position put it. Scholars, experts and students of peace and security studies have over the years, grappled with designing and agreeing on a generally accepted definition of terrorism (Adeyeye & Omodunbi, 2018; Cooper, 2001; Dyson, 2008; Ogunrotifa, 2013; Omar, 2008; Primoratz, 2004; Reveron & Murer, 2009; Schmid, 1992; Shultz, 1978). Chomsky (2002) opined that endeavour to clarify terrorism can be undertaken in two ways. It is possible to adopt literal approach to the study of terrorism, and the propagandist method-analysing the term as a weapon that can be taken advantage of.

3.1. Theoretical Framework

Important explanations for insurgency are molded in the social power structures of dominance. Usually, contending, and conflicting interests and system of change in political power processes possibility for conditions for mutual, concerted, and collective action targeted at bringing about reform. Therefore, the theory of insurgency infers that rebellion is a form of political action with

a set of rational collective actions executed by supposed or real marginalized group of people with a view to pursue their individual and/or group interests or goals within the context of a restrictive society. The interpretation will then be that the chance of insurgencies' success or failure is premised in the structure of social power. During the study, a few theories were advanced to situate the discourse on insurgency and terrorism in Nigeria, particularly as it relates to the activities of Boko Haram. These theories include the State Failure theory, Frustration-Aggression, Cultural Pluralism, Economic theory, Clash of Civilization, Identity, Globalisation and Self-opportunity. One of the various theories advanced for insurgency in Nigeria and adopted for this paper is the theory of governmental unwillingness. This was used to describe the seeming, dispassionate, apathetic, and unconcerned disposition towards Boko Haram activities at the initial stage of the activities of the group. The theory of unwillingness is premised on the assumption that the government was unwilling to tackle BH since it sees it as a machination of the 'political enemy'. When viewed this way, the assumption it assumed that insurgency is the problem of the northerners; the insurgents are sponsored by the president's political rival; it is ethnic and religious foe; and/or it is the northerners that promotes BH insurgency to frustrate the government, which at the time was under an easterner-Goodluck Jonathan. The assumption was that the government was unwilling to tackle the problem or should not do anything about the insurgency so long as it does not spread beyond the north-east (Gbadegesin 2014; Oshuntokun, 2012). This school of thought, nonetheless, is both cynical as it is political. This is because the north east is perceived by those in support of the argument as not a particularly friendly zone to the administration of Jonathan and that the government does not expect to enjoy political support in the 2015 elections.

Another perspective derived from the interviews conducted was the governmental inability thesis. This theory argues that the government lacks the capacity and ability to effectively deal with the insurgents (Al-Kassim, 2015; Field report, 2017). Perhaps one can be tempted to say that this thesis is empirically validated considering that for close to ten years (2010-2020), it was almost impossible for the government of Nigeria to defeat Boko Haram insurgents. The questions raised by this theory are: Why was it difficult for the government to defeat the insurgents? What accounts for the inability? Is it weak or absence of political will or leadership? Is it about strategic or tactical incompetence? In situating the above position earlier, Oshuntokun (2012) said that the government shows inconsistency, incapability, and lack of clue as to how to tackle the insurgents.

Another theory adopted is political contraption and conspiracy thesis. This perspective emphasise that the BH crisis is a political contraption of the northern elite who felt betrayed by the leadership of the ruling party (PDP). According to them, the leadership of the ruling party and the Nigeria state denied the north the opportunity to inherit the presidency following the demise of President Umaru Yar'dua (from the north Daura, Kastina State). As such, the north was using BH to make the country ungovernable for the Igbo-led government. This is the

explanation that this school of thought gives for the aloofness of northern leaders in the fight against BH (Field report, 2017; Gbadegesin, 2014; Mordi, 2012).

3.2. Counterinsurgency Mechanisms and Initiatives in Nigeria: 2010-2022

Force-Military Hard Power Mechanism: Just like the narrative of conflicts in Nigeria, an overview of the Nigerian Counterinsurgency (COIN) initiatives and state responses to conflicts shows that the government often adopts use of force-military hard power, as a preferred strategy for managing insecurity issues. This assertion is captured in the statements made by Albert (2011) and IPCR's (2003), Strategic conflict assessment (Nigeria) sponsored by the World Bank and UNDP that "...responses to conflicts have been mainly the use of military force. Root causes have been allowed to persist and, in many cases, have been exacerbated by money-oriented politics". Nigeria often adopts military force in handling the BH insurgency since 2010. For example, in early 2011, three thousand six hundred (3,600) troops were deployed to Maiduguri, Borno state, cities and major towns in the north-east region, forming a special force, Joint Task Force-JTF comprising of the army, air force, police and State Security Service-SSS (Sampson, 2014). And between 2013 and early 2015, the Nigerian military expanded its COIN deployments from about 5,000 troops to over 25,000 troops complemented by the counterterrorist special force that was commissioned in Nigeria in 2011. And as parts of the operations in the Lake Chad region Cameroon, Chad, and Niger Republic to contribute over 15,000 troops to COIN in 2015. These commitments and COIN formation helped regained the occupied territory and to some extent crippled Boko Haram's capacity for large-scale insurgent attacks, but terrorism has remained undeterred in the region (Adam, 2010:147; Albert, 2012:1-16; 2011a: 38-62; 2011b: 14; Omede, 2011; Onuoha, 2010; Osaghae, 2007; 1998, 1994; Osaghae & Suberu, 2005; Oyewole, 2015,? 2016; Sampson, 2014, 2009). Immediately President Buhari assumed office in 2015, the pace of military operation increased. The purpose of which was to degrade and destroy the insurgents and to reclaim the territories under the control of the Boko Haram insurgents. Although the US and the United Kingdom (UK) gave a tacit approval to the offensive strategy of the Nigerian government to tackle the insurgents, they however cautioned against the use of excessive force. Affirming the positions of the UK and the US, Robert Fry, a lieutenant general of the British Royal Marines on 22nd May 2013, during the 2013 African Lecture on the Relevance of Special Forces in Contemporary Challenges in Abuja, Nigeria, concludes that hard power is unlikely to bring about long-term solution to the Boko Haram insurgency (Kebonkwu, 2014; Sampson, 2014; *TELL*, May 17, 2013).

Sampson (2014:23-50) argues that state violence radicalized the group; ineffective, and it is counter-productive with level of collateral damages and perceived human rights abuses from both ends. Although government consistently reiterated the desire to dialogue with BH but was in dilemma of who to physically relate with and when such perceived opportunity came about in 2014 (Auwal, 2010; Sampson, 2014, 2009, 2008; Sampson & Onuoha, 2011). However, this

does not mean that the Nigerian government has not used non-coercive strategies. To be sure, it is on record that the government has severally set up judicial commissions of inquiry to manage violent conflicts in the past. (Adams, 2013; Albert, 2012; *Daily Trust*, August 8, 2013; Ero, 2012; Omotola, 2010; *TELL*, July 9, 2012). The Nigeria government has been government increased the defence budget; it set up committees to investigate how to solve the problem, declared state of emergency in Yobe, Borno and Adamawa states; launched military attacks; and explored the possibility of dialogue with insurgents.

In outlining the efforts of the governments of Nigeria in fighting terrorism; insurgency and other violent activities, the Deputy Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the UN, George Edokpa (2021) at the 76th Session of the UN General Assembly, 5th October 2021, reinstates the commitment of the government of Nigeria to fighting and ending terrorism and insurgency not only in the country but in the adjoining states and at the global level. In this connection, the country introduced and implemented National Counter Terrorism Strategy in 2016 and the Policy framework and National Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (2017), provided funds for Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) for the purpose of battling terrorism in the Lake Chad Basin and partnered neighbouring countries- to fight terror activities. And has put in place a few national legislations and the Terrorism Prevention Act of 2013 (Amendment) Edokpa (2021) asserts that Nigeria has consistently shown commitment to working closely with the global War on Terror (WoT) entities such as the UN Office on Counterterrorism (UNOCT) Counter Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) and the United Nations Global Counter Terrorism Coordination Compact (UNGCTCC).

3.3.The Legal/Legislative Approach: Nigeria's Terrorism Prevention Act 2011(as amended)

A fundamental step taken by the government of Nigeria was the enactment of the Anti-terrorism Prevention Act 2011 (Sampson, 2014) and the anti-terrorism legislation-Terrorism Prevention Act (TPA) 2011. (*The Nation*, May 26, 2015). The government of Nigeria came up with the legal framework for the prevention of terrorism in Nigeria. The framework is the Terrorism Prevention Act (TPA) 2011 and Terrorism (Prevention) (Amendment) Act 2013. The two is here referred to as Terrorism Prevention Act (as amended) or to put in a simple way TPA 2011. The Terrorism (Prevention) Act 2011 (as amended) was put in place fundamentally to stop and deal with the repeated cases of terrorism occurring in the country (*The Nation*, May 26, 2015; Federal Constitution of Nigeria, 1999 as (amended). To strengthen all aspects of the state defence against the threat of insurgency has been from one hundred (100) billion Naira (\$625million) in 2010 to nine hundred and twenty-five (925) billion Naira (\$6billion) in 2011 and 1 trillion Naira (\$6.25 billion) in 2012, 2013 and 2014 and in 2022, the defence budget is #80.93 billion (*Leadership*, March 10, 2014; Vanguard, October 9, 2022).Also,successive governments since 2010 have put in place the following legal and institutional efforts: (1) the administration of Criminal Justice, May 2015. This regulates the procedure of all criminal investigations and trials to include terrorism cases in the Federal Courts. (2) The Exchange Control (Anti-Sabotage) Act, replaced by Foreign Exchange (Monitoring and Miscellaneous Provisions Decree No. 17 (1995); (3)

Decree No. 24, Central Bank of Nigeria Decree (1991, Section 28; (4) National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) Act (1990), Sections 3, 4, 18-25; (5) Decree No. 3, Money Laundering Act (1995), Section 17; (6) Anti-Terrorism, Economic and Financial Crime Act; (7) Banks and other Financial Institutions Act No. 25 (1991), Section 30; and, (8) the Extraction Act, Section 1, 4-14 and the NDLEA Act, Section 35 are meant to combat terrorism at the international level and at the domestic environments (Sampson, 2008, 2010; Federal Ministry of Justice, 2015, Abuja, Nigeria). In January 2022 the Nigerian government under the Terrorism Prevention Act (TPA), designated BH and other violent groups as terrorists and intensified military operations in the troubled zone using military airstrikes. One notable issue raised in the criminalize last two years is that the country's armed forces that have been deployed to two-third of the states make them overstretched by the expansion of BH and ISWAP (Bala and Tar, 2021; International Crisis Group, 18 May, 2020; Nigeria Security Situation, June 2021; Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, Nigeria: Population at Risk, 28 February, 2023).

3.4. The Galtimari Presidential Committee on Security Challenges in the Northeast

The government established in 2011 the Ambassador Usman Galtimari led Presidential Committee on Security Challenges in the region. The seven-man committee chaired by Ambassador Usman Galtimari (known as the Galtimari Presidential Committee on Security Challenges in the Northeast) was established to essentially analyse security challenges in the northern region. The committee highlighted the factors that led to the emergence of Boko Haram and the motivator and instigator of insurgency in Nigeria and noted that the police do not enjoy the support and confidence of the people and highly underfunded. For instance, comparatively the 2012 budget allotted N1.6 million (\$10,000) per soldier but only N870, 000 (\$5,400) per police officer. The Civil Society Panel on Police Reform in Nigeria-CSPPRN, (2012) report which further corroborates the Galtimari white paper further echoed that the police colleges in Nigeria turns out demoralised, frustrated, and dehumanised policemen. (Adeyeye, 2017; *Punch*, January 23, 2013). The Civil Society Panel on Police Reform in Nigeria-CSPPR, (2012) set up by the then president Goodluck Jonathan to advise the government on the report on police in the country confirms that the police have received less than 5% of the country's budget since the 1999. (Source: Adeyeye, 2017; Civil Society Panel on Police Reform in Nigeria final report, September 2012; *Daily Trust*, September 13, 2016; *Punch*, January 23, 2013).

3.4.1. The emergency rule approach

The government on May 14, 2013, imposed emergency rule in Yobe, Borno and Adamawa states. This followed the first state of emergency rule that was declared in 15 local governments in Borno, Yobe, Plateau, and Niger states on December 12, 2011. The 2013 state of emergency coincided with the creation of the Joint Task Force (JTF) (Mordi, 2013; Leo, 2012; *Reuters*, June 7, 2013). President Goodluck Jonathan (2011) said that this response was imperative to enable the military and other security agencies to effectively and efficiently carry out operations to defeat insurgency (*Vanguard*, December 26, 2011).

3.4.2. Military training

Also, the Nigerian government put in means at improving the ability of its military and security services to respond to the daring task and difficulty posed by the insurgents through improved training, coordination, and provision of equipment. The issues regarding management, training, and re-training of personnel, in addition to equipment for close-quarter combat, intelligence and amphibious operations, tactical communication, destroying and explosive breaching and civil-military relations were prioritised. In September 2012, the commandant of the Counterterrorism and Counter-Insurgency Centre (CTCIC) (Jaji, Kaduna state), Brigadier-General Tijani Golai declared that the centre had graduated three hundred and sixteen (316) personnel in its ninth class. He maintained that seven thousand soldiers, police and Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) were trained and retrained in urban and acts of guerrilla warfare with a view to respond to the challenge posed by BH insurgents (*International Crisis Group* Report, No. 216, April 2014: 31). However, with all these, senior security and military officials admitted that their agencies are ill-equipped for the BH challenge due to various limiting factors such as They pointed out that lack and/or insufficient funds, lack of and/or inadequate training and equipment, dearth of and/or inadequate and insufficient intelligent strategies, and corruption (*This Day*, May 3, 2012).

3.5. Inter-state collaborations

Nigeria and its neighbouring countries (in line with the approval of the AU) reached an agreement in January 2015 to deploy a multi-national force of 8,700 soldiers to fight insurgents in the region around Lake Chad. In response to BH insurgency and reviewing the security crisis faced by West Africa and Central Africa Region-CAR, Presidents from the two regions (Nigeria's President Goodluck Jonathan, Denis Sassou N'Guesso, RoC, and Teodoro Obiang Nguema of Equatorial Guinea) sought a multi-pronged approach in the form of regional, continental, and international support and collaboration when they visited Abuja in January 2015. Nigeria, RoC and CAR underlined and emphasised the importance of adopting a multi-pronged strategy in the fight against insurgency and terrorism (Augustine, 2015:6; Bala and Tar, 2021; Conway, 2015; 2015a).

In February 2015, allied forces led by Nigeria and Cameroun, Chad and Niger carried out an operation in the Sambisa Forest in Borno state (an operational base of BH since 2010), where they dislodged many of the insurgents. At the 489th meeting of the AU PSC, the Council authorised the deployment of the Multinational Joint Force (MNJTF) for an initial period of 12 months renewable for strength that could go up to 7,500 military personnel (Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on Implementation of Communiqué PSC/AHG/COMM.2 CDLXXXIV). The government further called for more global sanctions, especially by the UN on Boko Haram, Ansarul and their leadership. (Augustine, 2015:6, 2012). In response to the role of porous borders and the prolonged border conflicts between Nigeria and its contiguous countries, particularly the recurring violence between Nigerian forces and Cameroonian gendarmes, many

identify it as a major factor that has continued to aid insurgency. It was reported that the government of Nigeria deported 7,000 immigrants over BH bombings in 2012 (Adepegba, 2012). Nigeria assigned bilateral agreements with its neighbours and is currently engaged in Joint Operations with Chad, Benin Republic. (Amusan, 2013b; Jonathan, 2014) Also, the government of Nigeria intensified intelligence and information exchange on cross-border mobility and the movement of illicit and illegal goods and services and engaged private security companies (Field study report, 2015; US Convention on Arms Transfer-USCAT).

5.1.1. Exploring dialogue alternative

Although the Galtimari committee recommended negotiation and amnesty for surrendered BH insurgents and those who had given-up terrorism, it was the former president, Olusegun Obasanjo who advocated for the carrot-stick strategy (*The Nation*, November 27, 2014). Obasanjo proffered dialogue with insurgents when he visited and held talks with members of the group on September 15, 2011 (Crisis Roundtable, Nigeria Defence College in Abuja on February 8th, 2012; *International Crisis Group Africa Report* No 216, April 3, 2014). However, President Jonathan declared on 17 April 2012 that “there is no dialogue between Boko Haram and government. (*Daily Trust*, August 27, 2013; *Vanguard*, November 19, 2012).

3.6. The Kabiru Tanimu Turaki Dialogue and Reconciliation Committee

The government set up an amnesty committee (made up of 26 members) led by the then Minister for Special Duties, Kabiru Turaki. The committee was given a three-month deadline to complete its mission. The main term of reference of the Turaki committee was to meet and discuss, negotiate and persuade insurgents to lay down arms. The committee (which was later renamed the Dialogue and Reconciliation Committee), submitted its report in 2013. The report painted a picture of the group’s readiness to negotiate with the government to end insurgency. This report was, however, rebuffed and denounced in a video released by the group through its leader, Abubakar Shekau. Also, an NGO (Human Rights Writers Association of Nigeria), labelled the Turaki’s committee report as “a huge scam and a scandalous contraption which ought not to have been set up in the first place” (Modibbo-Kawu, 2012; *This Day*, 22 July 2013; *Daily Trust*, November 6, 2013). In fact, a member of the committee, Dr Hakeem Baba Ahmed in an interview in 2013 confirmed that the government did not act on the report of the committee submitted November 13, 2013. He attributed the increase in the insurgent’s operation to the inability of government to follow up the dialogue and agreement the committee had with Boko Haram (*The Nation*, March 3, 2014).

3.6.1. Support from international development agencies

The British Council, USAID, the EU, DFID, Friedrich Ebert Foundation, IDASA, UNDP, the World Bank and NORAD, working in Nigeria have over the years, taken up the responsibility of building the capacity of Nigeria on joint problem-solving strategies, particularly on the recurring domestic violence in Nigeria. Each of the organisations funds and/or carried out conflict

management training programmes aimed at empowering Nigerians to respond positively to the various conflicts in the country. One fundamental gap in these interventions, which may be different if they had been carried out by the government, is the fact that they are only able to change the attitude and behaviour of Nigerians in limited cases but hardly touch the root causes of the problem. The issue raised here is the fact that there are three critical angles to a conflict situation: (i) what caused it; (ii) the change in attitude produced by the cause of the conflict; and (iii) the change in behaviour caused by the cause of the conflict as well as the changed attitude it promoted (Albert, 2011a). Findings show that many of the response projects aimed at conflict management target the people rather than the government. Hence, even when people choose to be peaceful, poverty drives them towards quarrelling with one another. Political elite instigate them to fight one another, and lack of justice in the Nigerian state forces many to resort to self-help strategies to deal with their adversaries rather than trying to deal with the problem through due process (especially the judicial or a commission of inquiry) (Albert, 2011a, 2011b, 2012; *The Nation*, September 26, 2015; *Vanguard*, August 15, 2014).

The government of Nigeria participated and hoisted several Multinational efforts. It participated in the United States Counterterrorism Capacity-building Programme under the US Department of State's Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) programme, including training of the Nigerian Police Force (NPF) officials in the detection and handling of IEDs, which helps to increase the NPF awareness and capacity to protect and preserve evidence from crime scenes and suspected terrorist acts (US Department of States Country Report, 2016). Also, through the Global Security Contingency Fund-Boko Haram Programme, the Nigeria Custom service, Police and Immigration service officials participated in inter-agency rural-border security patrol training to build the law enforcement sector's ability to use all agencies to tackle rural-border security problems in an effectively (US Department of States Country Report 2016). Equally, Nigeria worked with the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), to investigate specific terrorism cases, predominantly through the DSS. For the purpose of analysis of the insurgent's devices, the government of Nigeria provided IEDs components to the FBI at the Terrorist Device Analysis Center (TDAC). The Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA), the Nigerian Army, the Nigeria Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) and the Nigerian Police Force (NPF) Ordinance and Post-blast personnel worked with the FBI special agency and special agent bomb technicians. The Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) and the NPF were also trained in relevant counterterrorism investigation (US Department of States Country Report, 2016). In order to tackle the border issue, border security duties are shared by the Police, DSS, Custom, Immigration service and the Army (US Department of States Country Report, 2016). Screening at the ports of entry at the major airports-Lagos, Abuja and Port Harcourt, has continued to improve with passenger Name Records being collected in advance for commercial flights. And the government has instituted the collection of Biometric data for passport application to all citizens. As part of the global mechanism, Nigeria's implementation of the UN Resolutions (UNSCRs) 2178, 2199, and the UN 1267/1989/2253 ISIL (Da'esh) Al Qaeda Sanction regime has continued to evolve. However, the capacity of the Nigerian security forces

to control land and maritime borders is still a serious doubt and challenge (US Department of States Country Report, 2016).

4. Conclusion

The paper examines counterinsurgency and counterterrorism mechanisms put in place to end terror activities in Nigeria since 2010 to 2022. In line with the objective, the paper identifies several root causes, institutional and administrative issues as causal factors for insurgency and terrorism in Nigeria. Also, it points that Nigerian government has put up various mechanisms to fight and end insurgency and terrorism in the country, but a lot still must be done to addressing the root causes of insurgency and terrorism. Conclusively, the paper argues that military operation-hard power, has not succeeded in ending insurgency and terror activities and other non-coercive mechanisms though has sometimes reduced insurgent activities in some parts of the country but has not succeeded in ending the scourge of terror. And dialogue which is usually fundamental to conflict resolution has failed to work in solving insurgency and terrorism. There is no face, so you don't have anybody to discuss with". Dramatically, Reuben Abati, the President's spokesperson later declared that there were 'back-channel' discussions with BH with a view to putting an end to insurgency.

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