

Political Challenges to Regional Integration in Africa: The Case of IGAD Region

Kidane Gebrehiwot Tadeos*

1. Abstract

The research examines the political challenges of regional integration in the sub region of Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Political and Economic integration has been part of African strategy to overcome fragmentation and improve the region and ultimately the continent's position in the global political economy. Political and economic integration are closely related Varied theories that include Neo-functionalism, Inter-governmentalism, Custom Union theory, Optimal Currency theory, and International Political Economy are in the literature. The study using desktop research approach has assessed the political challenges for regional integration in the IGAD region. The major challenges are political (lack of supra nationalism, lack of political will, security), structural (weak institution, over lapping membership, lack of a proper managing of relations among member states) and also economic (low level of development) and social challenges (poverty, unemployment and inequality). The regional integration process in the IGAD region is still at lower level due to bad governance, intra and interstate conflicts, civil wars, and intervention from superpowers. The study stresses that if actual and sustainable regional integration is to advance, IGAD needs to be strong and impartial enough to intervene effectively in the governance matters of member states.

Keywords: IGAD, Custom Union, ECOWAS, Regional Integration, free trade area

1. Introduction

In the International political arena and the academy, the phenomenon of regional integration has gotten a very clear surge since the end of the WWII. The processes of regional integration can have different forms and with very different levels of achievement. In the academia, regional integration has been growing in importance; and social scientist likewise dedicated an interest to this timely phenomenon. The emergence of regional blocs and the growing trend of regional cooperation in Europe have brought the academic world to explore this new field of study, and social authorities invest to draw out theories that would help them better explain the field (Fanta,2008).

The regional cooperation in Europe appeared as an international benchmark of Regional Integration of integration process. The European Union served as primary a model of a regional integration scheme, where politicians and scholars use it as references as most advanced model of regional integration (ibid).

Regional Integration at the African continent level, though the pan Africanists were not only for Regional Integration, but were also dreaming for continental integration one Africa, was emerged in the latest years of the 20th century. The three important landmarks for regional integration Africa are Lagos Plan of Action of April 1980 Regional integration, the Abuja Treaty (June, 1991) Africa Economic Community, and the Sirte Declaration (9th September, 1999) Regional Economic Communities (RECs) (Mzukisi,2007). According to the Abuja Treaty, the African Economic Community (AEC) would be in place by 2028 (ibid). It was envisaged that, through RECs, deep-seated challenges of poverty and underdevelopment would be eradicated. Among the latest initiatives has been the New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), as well as the vision for the 'United States of Africa'.

Apart from these treaties and declarations, question to rise when talking about the regional integration on Africa are: are African leaders and nations ready for regionally and continentally integrated? Are African Nations free and independent to work for regional integration with its neighbor countries? Are the regional integration initiatives home grown from member states? Is there a theoretical framework and standards that can rightly explain the ongoing dynamics in Africa's integration processes? Are the regional integration blocks are really serving for the intended integration and are capacitated well?

The literature shows that alike other regions of the world which have successfully used their integration schemes to improve their economic welfare, Africa's integration efforts witnessed

failed to secure satisfactory fruit, it lags behind with respect all the key indicators of Regional Integration like, GDP growth, per capita income, capital inflows, and general living standards though the existence of a plethora of policy plans and grand visions (Fanta,2008).

1.1. Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD)

1.1.1. Establishment and development of the IGAD Region

The political geography of the Horn of Africa primarily comprised Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda. The regional formation of the Horn has been driven by variety of natural, internal and external factors and forces. The multiplicity of internal and external problems, and the challenge faced by the sub region, i.e. civil wars, violent power struggles, warlords and state collapse, natural disasters and the cold war conflict and geo-political and geo-economic interests of supper power rivalries played out and have led to further reconstruction and expansion of the region (Higgins, 2003).



The IGAD region structures over an area of five point two (5.2) million kilometer square comprising the countries of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda and South Sudan (IGAD, MIP 2010:6) and a population of a population of over 230 million people characterized by high natural population growth rates. The average population density is about 30 persons per km² as of 2016 (IGAD, 2016).

The Horn of Africa is one of the most fragile crisis regions in the world, and close observers have not hesitated to proliferate ideas of what the major resources of conflict identity fault-lines, resource, poverty, super power rivalry, porous borders, among others (Medhane, 2003).

The Horn of Africa is distinguished by the international community as the hopeless Region or a Region at war with itself because according to the international media coverage of issues and developments in the sub region. It has been seriously affected with famine, droughts, poverty and starvation, civil conflicts and inter-state wars, proxy wars, and political instability and thus has been and still is dependent on international humanitarian agencies, relief organization and UN agencies for crisis and development intervention (Francis, 2006).

Ecologically, the region can be classified as arid, and semi-arid accounting 80% of it and the rest 20% are sub humid and humid where major of the population depends on subsistence agriculture and pastoralist. Pastoralist is an important production system in the region. The region is well known as pastoralist region as largest concentration of pastoralist population is found there. The harsh livelihoods and eco-systems have led situations where by armed pastoralist groups clash over the use of access to water resources, grazing land and cultivation areas; but also because of environmental problems caused by mining activities and oil exploration (Higgins, 2003).

The region has important strategic value owing to its proximity to the Red Sea, which is an important and expeditious route of international trade and communications between Europe, the Middle East and the East, as well as the navigation through which oil is transported from the Persian Gulf to consumers in North America were forced in to economic, political and military dependence on either one of the two super powers of the cold war, the U.S.A and U.S.S.R (Brouk, 2011).

For the sake of such geo-political and geo-economic interests, proxy wars were experienced in the region during the cold war especially in the 1970s, as it was the scenes of super power rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States. Yet, as a continuation of that, various disputes and wars in the region as being caused by outside powers or at the very least exacerbated by those powers are witnessed (Medhane, 2003).

The same to the end of the cold war wars continued as the wars in Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia intensified end of 1989 and in to 1990 so, conflict remained as serious problem for the Horn of Africa, despite the favorable developments in the regional and international systems, hence the

end of the cold war or bipolarity has not contributed to the creation of a regional context for peace (ibid).

The coup d'état of Sudan in May 1989 by Omer El-Basher (current president of the Sudan), the civil war in the Sudan, which was further complicated by political Islam, oil, and the split of SPLA in the early 1990's, the silent civil war in the port state of Djibouti between the Issa and the Afar opposition, the brutal civil war in Somalia between the warring factions still continued (Ibid). Furthermore, the revision of boundaries (as evidenced in the Ethiopia and Eritrea, Eritrea and Djibouti, Ethiopia with Kenya and Sudan, Somaliland and punt land) which is incomplete, hence are key part of the Horns instability (Ibid).

IGAD region is part of the African continent, which is inhabited by dominantly by Christian and Islam, economically important area is referred mostly as area engulfed by struggles over economic and political power, often taken the forms of ethnic conflict as Costantinos (2016) described as:

“The Greater Horn of Africa (GHA) is a multiplicity of geo-politics, a rich chronicle and abundance of art, music and literature. It is situated at the cross roads the main trading route between the east and the west. This has made the region so prone to conflict that people pluck what they wish from that variety to generalize that have allowed outsiders to play proxy politics with the region. The Horn is also a region that has been at an historical crossroads. Traders have travelled through the region, north to south and west to east. Empires have grown and subsided. Islam and Christianity embedded themselves in the region from the earliest days of each faith. The river Nile links nations in a mortal association for survival. Along the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, its people were engaged in trade for millennia. It straddles a geographical space of such strategic importance that those who treat it with indifference will one day pay a price for their neglect, whilst those who try to manipulate it will get their fingers burnt...”

The region, because of its geographical position, the current tension in between the Gulf Countries is mostly to affect the political ambiance of the it, especially the peace and security of the horn states, which could have unforeseen overall effect in the region.

More importantly however, the conflict in the Horn has been intra-state but with spillover effects, which necessitates developing regional cooperation mechanism in order for states to easily cope with the challenges if they cooperate with each other (Elizabet, 2007). Formation of regional structure as a way of bringing about interstate and region wise coordination to overcome common challenging situation was necessary.

Furthermore, the situation of the IGAD region is challenged by overlapping problems of fragile ecological inheritances of cyclical drought compounded armed conflict, which forced the people to be displaced, subjecting them to migrate as an environment refugee (Tesfaye, 2007).

Taking all those challenges and others into account, eight countries namely, Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda, Eritrea, Somalia, the Sudan and South Sudan established a regional organization formerly IGADD and now IGAD, initially to combat drought and desertification, and later on to promote cooperation, peace and security in this sensitive area (IGAD, 2017).

1.2. Regional integration in the IGAD region

IGAD originated from regional attempts to address environmental challenges, such as drought. As it evolved, it increasingly looked at peace and security measures. It is a Regional economic block created for regional economic cooperation and integration, to create an open, unified, regional economic space for the business community with the vision to create a single market open to competitive entry and well integrated into the continental and global economies. Among the IGAD's major areas of focus is the Economic Cooperation and Integration and Social Development Division which has the following programme areas: Trade, Tourism and Industry; Infrastructure Development; and Health and Social Development (IGAD, 2017).

The IGAD regional infrastructure set long-term and short term integration plans including: the IGAD Free Trade Area (FTA) and the Minimum Integration Plan envisaged in the six stages for the accomplishment of the African Economic Community (AEC), which include the creation of a free trade area and customs union in each of the eight regional blocks by 2017 (ibid), which entails the establishment of Free Mobility Regime through the implementation of a Protocol for the Free Movement of Persons. This seems however ambitious but good wishes.

Regional integration in the Horn of Africa is however particularly challenging due to the web of long run, inter and intra-state conflicts, rivalries, alliances and anti-alliances ('my enemy's enemy is my friend') that shape relationships among countries. At the same time, within-country politics are also subject to widely varying political settlements and capacities to govern, continually changing external interests and influences on the region has multi-faceted effect.

In the IGAD regional block, though frameworks for regional cooperation are in place, yet under complex conditions, regional market integration and conflict prevention could not be fruitful (Byiers, 2016).

2. Theoretical Perspective and Rationale for Regional Integration

2.1. Rationale to Regional Integration

Regional integration in general describes the process of states entering into a regional agreement, in order to achieve specific, agreement-dependent goals through enhancing regional cooperation. The merit of regional integration is obvious and is progressively being recognized as an important factor and complement for effective and fair global development process. It can serve as a vehicle for non-discriminatory liberalization of multilateral trade and integration into the globalized economy. It is logical that there is strength in numbers and in unity and that strength can speed up the pace of development as well as enhance security. Cooperation and integration are a strategy for overcoming perceived weakness and development obstacles (Mark Chingono and Steve Nakana, 2008).

Several reasons are for integration and the prime is the logic that regional groupings will enable economies of scale resulting from enlarged market and thus lower the costs of production and raise economic efficiency (Ouattara, 1999). On top of that, it would increase the demand for raw materials and food stuffs, and with time, exports of manufactured goods among developing countries which reduce economic and technological dependence on developed countries (Hans Singer et al cited in Yohannes, 1993). Regional unity or cooperation can also increase the bargaining power of member countries. It is argued that “the larger the trade area as a single bloc, more likely it is to get” better commercial treatment” in its negotiations with others, particularly developed countries (Bhala and Bhalla, 1997). Fourthly, most developing countries are exports of primary commodities the price of which are subject to general fluctuation.

From a global perspective, African states are not strong enough to survive in the world market on their own, there is always interdependence. The rationale behind African integration is quite obvious: acting on their own. Most African states are destined to remain vulnerable marginalized and dependent nations. Today more than six decades since “decolonization”, Africa remains still backward continent on the globe as attested by the alarming levels of economic underdevelopment, poverty, political instability, as well as the perennial armed conflicts in and among various states. “Between the 1960s and 2000 sub-Saharan Africa registered absolute declines on virtually all indices of socioeconomic development (Gerrit Oliver).” What needs to be overcome is the incapacity, particularly of sub-Saharan African states, to escape from their own backwardness and marginalization and to become integrated in the main stream of globalization (ibid).

African countries in particular are too small and too weak to compete independently in the global economy: and thus, the only hope for these countries lies in coming together to form regional and sub-regional economic groups (Mukisa and Thompson, 1996). Similarly, it is argued that regional integration in Africa provides for the pooling of resources that can bring about results in development enhanced external bargaining power which are greater than the sum of results if they acted alone; and thus, it is considered as “the only viable strategy for optimal development of all the peoples of the region in the contemporary economic and political circumstances in the continent as well as in the world as a whole” (Asante, 1997).

2.2. Theoretical Perspective of Regional Integration

The effort to build up new theories since the end of the WWII has been rich and very fruitful and has tried to touch on many different aspects of regional integration. There are mainly two major theoretical approaches for regional integration; first approach comprises the theories that mainly draw from political sciences and international relations (PSIR), which focuses on the institutional and policy dimensions of integration. Second perspective is, set of theories that have been developed from an economic perspective. Such approaches focus less on the institutional framework but much more on issues such as market relationship and trade flows.

Within the PSIR domain the attention that has been devoted to regional integration, two principal theories have been raised to explain regional integration: neo-functionalism and inter-governmentalism.

Neo-functionalist theories have been using as theoretical background some of the traditional theories that can be found within the field of IR. It was aimed to explain the reason and process of state cooperation aimed at solving conflicts between each other and gradually giving up on national sovereignty. The theory had its base on the assumption that the role of nation states would decrease, and did not see the state as single unified actor on the international stage (Ian Bache: 2011). This position is strengthened in the key features, expressing that the concept of the state is more complex and that the activities of interest groups and bureaucratic actors are not limited to the domestic political arena of the member states. Rather it was argued that interest groups with familiar ideologies and goals, but from different states would start to get together at a supranational level, which is called Transnationalism. The same cooperation-factor, though for state departments was described as Transgovernmentalism.

The neo-functionalists have tried to explain integration processes. According to this school of thought, whenever two states or more decide to collaborate on a given issue, a certain number of supranational institutions will be created which will in turn result in a change in the sovereignty of the participating states. Ernest Haas (1961), one of the founding fathers of neo-functionalism thus considers that regional integration corresponds to a process “whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations, and political activities towards a new larger center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing state”, which is a very utilitarian view of integration and regional cooperation.

Moreover, it is not just the nation-states that are considered to have a utilitarian endeavor but also the supranational actors. This notably demonstrated by the introduction of the concept of functional and political spill-overs. Functional spill-over corresponds to the idea to reach its original goal an organization cannot work solely in one sector of the modern industrial economy but also needs to get involved in other sectors. Therefore, so as to achieve its end the international or regional organization needs to empower itself so as to be able to act in the different sectors linked to his. Political spillover on the other hand corresponds to the capacity of the involved actors to accommodate the demands and changes brought about by the various groups affected or interested by the integration phenomenon.

The second theoretical perspective affiliated to PSIR scheme is intergovernmentalism. This was constructed in the 1960s and 70s as a critique to neo-functionalism which was perceived to be insufficient to explain some of the trends pertaining to regional integration. Intergovernmentalists criticize neo-functionalists for failing to appreciate the enduring importance of nationalism, the autonomy of the political sector, and the interaction between the international environment and the integrating region (Mattli, 1999:27). This school also rejects the idea that a continuum exists between the economic sector and the political sector as they also differentiate ‘high’ and ‘low’ politics. According to this approach, nation-states are wary of losing their national sovereignty and as a result may only agree to integrate issues that are not considered to be a threat to their sovereignty. Regional integration in this approach therefore corresponds to the outcome of interstate bargaining. Thus contrarily to the neo-functionalist its primary actors are no longer at the supranational level but are in fact the different governments involved in the talks to establish a regional cooperation framework.

Intergovernmentalism theorists came up with the argument that regional integration shall be driven by the national preferences that is formed by the preferences of various domestic actors (Moravcsik, 1991 and 2005). This approach known as liberal intergovernmentalism considers that the level of regional integration has two level game whereas states will position themselves according to the preferences reached at the domestic level and according to their bargaining power on the international scene.

Moravcsik (2005) perpetuates a state-centric perspective on integrative processes, and yet seeks to incorporate transnational economic factors. He establishes three explanatory variables a) national preferences develop in response to exogenous changes in the nature of issue-specific functional interdependence, b) interstate negotiation proceeds on the basis of relative bargaining power; c) delegation to supranational institutions is designed to facilitate credible commitments (Moravcsik , 2005), which seem to have contributed for the success of RI in the EU countries.

Intergovernmental school was also criticized for overlooking the processes of actual implementation of the regional agreements and decisions or that this implementation is not perceived to be problematic. The inter-governmentalist approach mainly views the process of regional integration as simply happening through defining historical moments such as the signing of an act or an agreement, which is more idealist than the reality in the world politics.

Turning now to to the second major perspective on regional integration, the economic approaches of regional integration, the effort to build theories has been rich and fruitful. In this perspective of regional integration theories three different theories are distinguished: Custom Union theory, Optimal currency are theory and fiscal federalism and economic integration theory (Mattli,1999). Another more recent theory is represented by the interests International Political Economy (IPE) has devoted to regional integration.

The custom unions theory is mainly concerned by the elimination of inter-state barriers and on the establishment of common import tariffs agreements. The main argument of the custom union theory is that the removal of tariffs will allow states within a region to benefit from cheaper imports from more efficient industries located in another member state. Here, the degree of Trade diversion is likely to be small where the members of a union have extensive trade with each other and a low common tariff on imports from non-member countries (Mattli, 1999). In this custom union theory there are six different steps through which economic integration happens: preferential trading areas, free trade areas, custom union, common market,

economic and monetary union and eventually complete economic integration (Bela Balassa, 1961).

Nevertheless, the custom union theory have been criticized for quick focus on only partly maximized national income and but give less importance what incentives are for a global union which can avoid all trade diversion.

Another economic theory of regional integration is the optimal currency area theory which focuses more on the attempts to establish currency union rather than to liberalize the movement of goods and people. A currency union is considered to be the conditions that allow fixed exchange rates among a set of countries, or going even further, on the introduction of a common currency. Such fixed exchange rates are believed to enable the member states to better manage internal and external balance in their exchanges with other states in the region, where FCFA is best example in the CEMAC zone of Africa and the Euro of Euro zones. To be truly efficient, this needs to have a high mobility of the different factors of production. The common Currency area theory, just as custom union theory, still suffers from a major flaw as they only take into consideration the rules and policies governing the economy of a region. Both theories fail in terms of explaining how regional integration can surpass the domain of trade and can be deepened by incorporating new non-economic areas of cooperation. This narrowly focuses on trade and market integration is clearly insufficient to explain the many spheres that states may decide to address regionally. Moreover, these two theories do not address either the framework under which the regional agreements can be signed as they are considered as already given and somewhat immutable.

Fiscal federalism theory is another theory with in the economic perspectives of regional integration. Contrarily to the theories of custom union and optimal currency area, Fiscal federalism theory allows for a better explanation of the role institution can play in regard to regional integration. Trade could be a factor of regional integration also because it would bring about a variety of political changes at both the national and regional levels (Cassela, 1994). The main leading idea of fiscal federalism theory is that regional differences in terms of taxation and the supply of public goods will need to be leveled in order to better accommodate the process of market integration. States within a given region will attempt to improve the coordination, or even centralize their fiscal policies in order to facilitate the mobility of capital, labour and goods. In other words “Jurisdictions must be redrawn to satisfy the requirements of unified, more competitive, more sophisticated markets (ibid).

Another set of economic theories of regional integration pertains to the International Political Economy (IPE) school of thought, which is mixed of both the economic approach and political approaches to regional integration. It represents an attempt to better incorporate elements of IR with the field of political economy. This IPE is not only concerned with the relationship between state authority and market powers but also considers the involvement of non-state actors and inter-governmental actors such as multinational companies or international financial institutions.

The fact that IPE does not solely uses nation-states as the actors involved in the regional integration process also allows it to consider the domestic and international dynamics in both the economic and political spheres (Fanta, 2008). The IPE views the domestic and the international as being involved in a long process of exchanges, interactions and mutual influence. Thus this school of thought views the regional level as an in-between the national and the global levels. Regional integration is understood as an institutional framework that allows state and non-state actors to participate to the world economy while at the same time being protected from the excesses of the globalization process. Nevertheless, the IPE approach also suffers from the syndrome of being constructed upon the study of advanced industrial economies and is still lacking to fully explain the dynamics that can be found in developing economies (Fanta, 2008).

2.3. Regional Integration Agenda of IGAD

IGAD's agenda on regional economic integration is in line with that of the African Economic Community (AEC) and African Union (AU), including NEPAD. IGAD was among the signatories of the Protocol on the Relations between the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and the AU, signed 27th January 2008 in Addis Ababa. The ultimate goal of establishing the African Economic Community (AEC) is to accelerate economic and social integration of the members of the continent through integration efforts of RECs and Member States. Therefore, the role of IGAD as a REC was derived from this strategic goal of the AU. This role entails harmonization and coordination of policies and programs among IGAD Member States and with other RECs and alignment with AU policies and strategies which are binding to all RECs, taking into account NEPAD to spearheading the process leading to creation of common African market as a prelude for AEC. More of its efforts was in accomplishment of regional integration agenda in terms of economic, political, social, cultural in IGAD region facilitates achievement of other IGAD strategic objectives in maintaining peace and security throughout the region and promoting advancement in environment and agricultural sector leading to sustainable development of the region and consequently contributing to the continental integration and development.

To this end, IGAD's leaders decided to implement the current Minimum Integration Plan (MIP) as a guiding and dynamic strategic framework for the economic and social integration. Under the Regional Strategy, IGAD will continue pushing ahead with its regional integration agenda by developing an IGAD FTA, taking into account existing harmonized frameworks such as the Tri-Partite Agreement and the continental FTA to be achieved by end of 2017 (Casella, 1994), which seems too ambitious to achieve.

The IGAD as regional institution does not have a comprehensive policy and strategy for governing partnerships, without which it could be very challenging. The need for a partnership emanates from mutual recognition that no country or organization, particularly organizations like IGAD, can meet the 21st century's challenges alone. Threats are often local or regional manifestations, but they also have global impacts and implications. Some of the MOUs with partners have not been operationalized yet. Also, there is a need for the IGAD to develop a mechanism for periodic performance reviews of MOUs with partners to ensure functionality and continued relevance.

3. Challenges of Regional Integration

In the post-colonial Africa, the use of state power as a means for self-enrichment and patronage by the political elite was the norm in most parts of the continent. The use of public resources and patronage to preserve political power were some of the most shameful aspects of this period and defined Africa's political character throughout this period. While the underdevelopment of Africa has its origins in colonialism, it worsened as a result of the post-independence political mismanagement by the new leaders. They created a new form of underdevelopment, because the state was used as an instrument for personal enrichment, diverting resources away from the poor (Mukai, 2007).

3.1. Challenges to Regional Integration

The global trend toward regional integration has benefited from intra-regional trade, investment and capital flows in the EU, ASEAN, and North America Free Trade Area (NAFTA) (USAID, 2009). In addition to this, they have been successful, at least partially, because they were not eager to achieving free trade or economic union objectives at the beginning rather than regional political issues. This in the sense that EU, ASEAN, NAFTA prioritized political union and cooperation. In addition to this, they are solving intra-regional conflicts through peaceful means (Ibid).

A range of technical, economic, institutional, and political issues have slowed or curtailed progress towards regional economic integration in Africa. One problem is countries overlapping membership in regional economic communities. A significant problem for all the RECs is lack of implementation of commitments, attributable to, in various instances, lack of political will, and lack of technical capacity. The largest market in each of the three major, REC's Kenya in COMESA, Nigeria in ECOWAS, and South Africa in SADC-has dominated formation of the REC's respective FTAs and has protected local industries. In addition, a plethora of non-tariff barriers remain, and a number of smaller countries have been unwilling to eliminate customs duties, arguing a need to service revenue requirements. Unfortunately, this trend has been reinforced by the global economic downturn (Ibid).

The predominance of one country upon others leads member states of a region to mutual distrust and undermines the role and involvement of other members in the region.

Source of revenue generation for most of states are custom duties so that states do not willing to enter the products of other countries into their countries without custom duties.

Political instability and conflicts within and among member states of the region are also undermining the objectives of regional development communities. Thus, sustaining peace and security, as well as, enhancing the democratic process are decisive factors for the regional block to be able to attract tourists. In addition to this, overlapping and multi-memberships are also perceived as wasting efforts and resources and in turn, leads to a loss of efficiency and adds burdens to member states (ECA,2007). Overlapping of regional development community is not solely faces multiple financial obligations, but also obliges to follow different conference, strategy, decisions, procedures and schedules (ibid). Sometimes these decisions, procedures and schedules are conflict and contradict each other and this, in turn, affects the effectiveness and efficiency of regional sub-organization.

Paulo Borba Casella cited in Simms et al (2006) identified that the “political will” to support deepening of economic ties between countries; where “political will” is lacking, integration is unlikely to be successful. Casella acknowledges the role played by successful models of integration, such as MORCOSUR. He also notes that blindly following a model will not bring success, especially if the political will to support deepening of economic ties is absent. Commenting this issue Simms stated that:

“On the one hand, it is not possible to solve every problem before starting implementation, yet on the other hand, integration cannot be implemented without first having defined parameters. The evident variation in models and paths illustrates the vital relevance to the success of integration of factors that go beyond strictly economic and legal ones, notably the key role of political will, its stability and capacity to reflect national inter”.

Political will, must be coupled with the potential for economic gain, in order to provide the impetus for deeper regional integration; one cannot exist without the other (Simms et al, 2006).

Lack of complementarities in trade flows is the challenges of regional integration. The potential for economic gain will also be very limited if the countries involved in regional integration agreement have overlapping production and trade flows. Overlapping trade flows refers to the scenario where the Regional Trade Blocking (RTB) members produce similar goods and export these goods to same or similar markets (Simms, 2006). This overlap in the kinds of goods produced and /or the markets for the goods may affect the potential for economic gain for each country in the RTB as the prospect for intra-regional trade will be produced if all members are producing the same goods and also RTBs may result in some members capturing a greater share of the external market at the expense of other smaller/weaker members(Ibid).

Inadequate and poor regional infrastructure network is also the other critical challenges for African RECs to regional integration, which limits economic growth and trade expansion (Keita and Kone, 2010: 12).

3.2. Major Challenges Particularly in the IGAD Region

Regional integration in the IGAD region, as most RECs of the continent is not successful in many cases, and its geo-political, geo-economic location and its social and political construction seem negatively affecting its success. Somalis is emerging from a two-decade conflict, South Sudan is a collapsing state, Sudan has four wars going on (Darfur, Kordofan, Abey and Blue Nile State) and Eritrea is a failed state. On the other hand, Ethiopia and Kenya has their internal problems. This leaves however Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda (and Somaliland) as the main players. Despite this, Ethiopia is connecting in power supply, water supply and trade with all the nations and put up the infrastructure needed for it. Added to this the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) war on Yemen and Qatar is drawing the IGAD nations into conflict. The GCC has contracted the ports of Sudan, Eritrea, Somaliland and Somalia to attack Yemen, which is dangerous for the stability of the region. Therefore, the challenges for regional integration in the region, especially the political dimension could be seen in three dimensions: internal (within each member states) challenges, regional challenges and global (external) political challenges.

3.2.1. Internal Challenges to Regional Integration

3.2.1.1. On the Concept of Governance

Governance is used in this paper to refer to the conscious management of public affairs through publicly promulgated rules and structures which help effect political action and the solution of societal problems. The rules in question would also determine the extent to which those in authority can legitimately exercise their power in attempting to solve or deal with societal problems. Governance thus comprises complex mechanisms, processes and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, mediate their differences and exercise their legal and constitutional rights and obligations (UNDP: January 1997: ii). Viewed in this way, governance can be carried out at the political or state level; the institutional and administrative levels; and at the economic level. Governance at the state level we shall call political governance, while that carried out by institutions we shall call institutional or administrative governance. Political governance occurs at the state level, where social,

economic, and political relationships are regulated by major political actors up on which their achievements can either promote tensions or create conditions of peace and trust among citizens irrespective of the variety of interests represented in the country.

The nature and type of governance is therefore very relevant to issues of conflict and conflict management of one's country or group of countries. Though the conflicts in the region are different in forms they manifest themselves and the historical specificity of each, they all involve primarily questions of the use or misuse of political power in the management of public affair i.e., governance in their respective governments; and conflicts referred as either ethnic, clan, race or religious conflicts are with common and basic reason of bad governance. Behind ethnic conflicts are often structural issues transcending immediate grievances (Rupesinghe; 1989:2).

The Greater Horn region is one of the most conflict-ravaged areas on the African continent. The populations of the region have endured many inter-state and intra-state armed conflicts during the post-independence era, starting in 1956, when Sudan became the first sub-Saharan African country to get its independence, and the present. The region was by no means peaceful before the era of decolonization. During the period roughly between the early 1800s and the era of decolonization, for example, it experienced many wars, which revolved mostly around state formation and empire building; slave raids; control of resources and trade routes; colonization and resistance to colonialism; and the liberation struggle.

The region presently consists of eight countries, including Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan and Uganda, which are members of the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD).

The Region's Major Wars and Conflicts: Inter-State Wars and Conflicts the Horn of Africa has experienced more inter-state wars than any other region on the continent. It has seen four major inter-state wars and at least three violent conflicts in the post-independence era. The major wars were fought primarily but not exclusively over territorial and border disputes. However, member states also are experienced with domestic wars and conflicts, which are more or less governance caused.

3.2.1.2. *Intra-State Wars and Conflicts*

Every country in the region has faced at least one civil war during the postcolonial era. In most cases, states have fought multiple civil wars, with the parties to the conflict the state or militia

groups created by the state on the one side and sub-state actors, such as ethnic, regional, religious or other political organizations on the other.

Internal factors for Intra-State Wars and Conflicts in the horn countries are militarization, competition for state power, war-making for economic gain, and the problems of political liberalization; being the backbone for their sustenance is bad governance.

The region's civil wars differ in scope and intensity and many of them are closely linked to inter-state conflicts, since in many cases the groups that fight against the state either serve as proxies for other states or are supported by them.

Governments in the Greater Horn have intervened in each other's internal conflicts for a variety of reasons. Some support insurgencies in a neighboring country because of ethnic ties with the rebelling groups. It is also not uncommon for ethnic-based insurgency groups to obtain support from populations of neighboring countries because of ethnic ties, even when they do not obtain direct support from governments of those neighboring countries. Insurgency movements in Ethiopia's Somali-inhabited Ogaden region, such as the Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF), for example, were supported by the Somali state before its collapse in 1991 during the regime of Siyad Barre. The Shifa wars in Kenya's Somali-inhabited North Eastern Province were also backed by the Somali state, which aspired to unite all Somali-inhabited areas in the region under the Somali state (Kidane, 2011).

In other cases, regimes have supported rebel groups in a neighboring country as extensions of their foreign policies, including destabilization of regimes they have antagonistic relations with. Ethiopia and Kenya responded to what they perceived as a Somali threat to their national integrity by establishing a mutual defense pact in 1964. Moreover, successive Ethiopian regimes countered Somalia's support for irredentist movements by aiding insurgency movements such as the Somali National Movement (SNM) and Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) against the Somali state to weaken its ability to pursue its claims over the Ogaden. As noted above (see footnote 8), in the early 2000s Ethiopia supported the Somali Restoration and Reconciliation Council (SRRC) against the Transitional National Government. Presently Ethiopia supports the TFG against the al Shabab-Hizbul Islamiya insurrection.

Sudan supported Eritrea's liberation movements, the People's Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) and the Tigray People's Liberation Front against the regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia. Ethiopia, for its part, supported the SPLM against successive Sudanese regimes. Uganda also supported the SPLM while Sudan reciprocated by

supporting Uganda's LRA and other Ugandan rebel groups. Sudan supported the Eritrean Islamic Jihad in 1993–94 and Eritrea reciprocated by supporting Sudan's opposition groups, the National Democratic Alliance (Kibreab 2009).

Today, Eritrea supports various Ethiopian insurgency groups against the Ethiopian regime and the horn¹, while the Ethiopian regime retaliates by supporting Eritrean opposition groups.

The civil wars in the region are not simply products of proxy engagements by other states, however. Despite their engagement in such wars against each other, the region's regimes have also cooperated in curbing the activities of each other's insurgencies (Kibreab 2009). Many of the civil wars are cumulative effects of domestic factors, such as problems of diversity management and nation-building, including the real or perceived uneven development and ethnocratic characteristics of the state, even though some form of external intervention might be involved. Others are reactions to repressive rule and ineffective governance, while yet others are triggered by intra-elite power struggles. As Deng (1995) notes, intra-elite rivalry often leads to inter-ethnic rivalries.

The collapse of the Somali state in 1991 resulted, at least in part, from the country's civil wars. Since the collapse, the country has endured wars among various warlords, 1991–2006; in Puntland against the fragile state of Somalia, 2004; ICU vs. The Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT), 2006; TFG vs. ICU, 2005–06; TFG against the al Shebab and Hizbul Islamiya, 2009-present. Similarly, Sudan has perhaps faced the deadliest civil wars in terms of casualty figures. Among Sudan's most important wars are the North-South war of 1955–72; the North-South war of 1983–2005; the Darfur Conflict, 2003–present; the Beja Congress and the Rashaida Free Lions of the East; and rebellion of the Nuba mountain region.

Ethiopia has encountered the greatest number of civil-wars in the region, among which against the Eritrea liberation movements, 1961–91; the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), 1975–91; the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF), 1974–78; the Oromo Liberation Front, 1975–present; the Afar Liberation Front, 1975–97; and the Ogaden National Liberation Front, 1984–present are critical ones.

¹ UN Security Council, the US government, the African Union and IGAD accused Eritrea of supporting Somali insurgency groups against the TFG as an extension of its conflict with Ethiopia, although little evidence has been disclosed on Eritrea's military support to the Somali insurgency.

Kenya has faced similar wars, among which the 1992 violence which led to approximately 2,000 deaths and 500,000 displaced persons (APRM Kenya 2006), the 2007 post-election violence that resulted in the death of about 1,300 people and the displacement of over 600,000. The same Uganda also has faced a number of civil wars waged by various armed groups. Among them are the Buganda war of 1966; the wars during the regime of Idi Amin (1972–79); the wars waged by the Ugandan National Rescue Front against the Obote government, 1980–85; the National Resistance Army, 1982–86; the Uganda Peoples Democratic Army (UPDA), 1986–88; the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), 1996–present; and the LRA, which emerged in 1987. The war against the LRA continues to destabilize the country.

More importantly, the civil wars also have both contextual and core factors. Precolonial empires and the colonial state left behind ethnic identities fragmented in several states, fragmented economic and institutional systems and uneven socioeconomic development among regions and ethnic groups. These conditions have made diversity management and nation-building difficult.² (ibid).

All in all, being all the member states in the regional block internally in conflict which mainly is caused by weak governance, it is less probable that they strongly work for the regional agenda as they are occupied with internal agenda. Moreover, bad governance within each member states could not be ready to see strong regional political institution which will impact regional problems.

3.2.1.3. *Inter-Communal Conflicts*

In addition to civil wars, Horn countries have faced many inter-communal armed conflicts, which are often fought between ethnic and clan groups over resources such as land, water and even livestock. Inter-communal competition over resources may intensify into deadly conflicts, due to government inability to address such conflicts in a timely manner.

Countless inter-communal conflicts, which have often intensified with the availability of small arms, have contributed to instability and economic disruptions in the region. These conflicts though are of much lower intensity than inter-state and civil wars, they are highly destructive because of their frequency and their sporadic nature (Kidane, 2011).

² As will be explained in the next section, the postcolonial state and regional governance have done little to correct the inherited legacies and have often exacerbated the problems.

3.2.2. Regional challenges to regional Integration

3.2.2.1. *Political instability and military conflicts among members*

The slow implementation of agreements and protocols made so far towards the integration of the sub region is mainly attributed the political instability and conflicts between member states which posed serious challenge for IGAD'S initiatives. The region experienced a wide range of intra and inter-state conflicts, some of which prevailed for more than four decades. Full scale war between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 1998/99³, the border conflict between Eritrea and Djibouti, the civil war in South Sudan, in Somalia, Sudan and Uganda and the Nile issue among all riparian countries constituted a major challenge to IGAD integration efforts. Such military conflicts among states and within state deteriorate the already low physical and social infrastructure. The integration efforts in the IGAD region, as noted above, are hindered by pervasive conflicts.

3.2.2.2. *Overlapping membership*

Many IGAD countries are members of more than one regional grouping with different aims and objectives, different levels and patterns of development and political systems and ideologies. All IGAD countries with the exception of Somalia are members of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and Kenya and Uganda also belong to the East African Community (EAC). Djibouti, Eritrea, Sudan and Somalia belong to the regional groupings of CEN-SAD (the Community of Sahel-Saharan States). These multiple membership arrangements may lead to duplication of efforts and to an unnecessary competition among countries and institutions. For countries belonging to more than one regional grouping, the burden and cost is high because they have to participate in different meetings and accept policy decisions, instruments, procedures, and schedules. Their customs officials also have to deal with different tariff reductions rates, rules of origin, trade documentation, and statistical nomenclature (ECA, 2004). The result is lack of commitment due to divided loyalties and poor funding for integration.

3.2.2.3. *Uncoordinated macroeconomic policies*

Different countries in IGAD and other regional trading blocs in Africa have different macroeconomic policies which slow down the integration process. When countries have different customs procedures, different investment codes and divergent macroeconomic policies, it will take much effort and resources for the countries as a whole to come closer and integrate their economies. In relation to this, inconvertibility of national currencies also hinders

³ Ethio-Eritrea border issue is not yet solved and both countries are still disputing.

inter-state trade; when traders are unable to convert Ethiopian Birr into Kenyan Shillings and Kenyan Shillings to Djiboutian dollars, it will be costly for these traders to engage in such trading activities.

3.2.2.4. *Economic imbalance between members*

Regional imbalance is also identified as a cause of instability and slow progress towards regional integration. Relatively less developed member states fear the potential fierce competition from the relatively strong economies. The eastern part of Africa has experience with regard to regional imbalance. The industrialization of Kenya in relation to the other member countries had contributed to the collapse of the EAC in 1977. Regional integration in IGAD can also be constrained by regional imbalance particularly with regard to the efficient Kenyan manufacturing that would potentially displace domestic producers in other member countries. As the failure of the 1977's EAC showed, the remedy can also be learned from the modern EAC (Abdi and Edris, 2013). In an effort to address the problem of regional imbalance as a threat to an effective IGAD, member countries can devise a mechanism that would afford some temporary protection to infant industries in the less developed partner countries against the more developed Kenyan industries (ibid).

3.2.3. Global (external) political challenges to Regional Integration

The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 created a geopolitical situation which increased the competition among the European colonial powers for control of the coast along the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean.

The successful uprising in the Sudan by the Mahdist Movement in 1885 precipitated an unexpected geopolitical event in the region. To reinforce its presence in the Sudan, Egypt had to withdraw its forces from the Somaliland coast and the route to Harar.

And to stop its European rivals from filling the vacuum left by the Egyptian withdrawal, the British government from 1884 to 1889 concluded agreements with the coastal Somali clans. On 1 September 1896, a treaty of Protection with the Ogaden people was signed (Abdisalam M. Issa-Salwe, 2000).

The Horn of Africa being one of the most geostrategic regions in the world due to its location along the Bab el Mandeb strait that connects the Gulf of Aden with the Red Sea, which is one of two maritime chokepoints (the other being the Suez Canals) that link Europe with South,

Southeast, and East Asia. All sea bound trade between the EU and these corners of Eurasia must transit through its narrow passage. As could be expected, this makes control over the strait a heightened prize for any power or combination thereof, and it is not for naught that greatest Powers scrambled their navies to the region over the past decade ostensibly to —combat piracy Korybko cited in Costantinos (2016).

The factors that generate the Horn's conflicts are many and complex. Besides the socioeconomic structures and institutional systems left behind by pre-colonial empires and the colonial state, to the ongoing influences by the global system, including economic, political and military interventions by external powers have critical role in generating conflicts among communities and among states (Kidane, 2011).

A number of developments and socioeconomic arrangements and inter-identity power relations left behind by pre-colonial empires and the colonial state have become critical sources of conflict in the postcolonial era (www.saylor.org/2011). Another important legacy of colonialism in Africa is the problem of boundaries and in some cases territories. In many instances colonial boundaries are not demarcated on the ground or even clearly delineated. This vagueness has caused a number of border disputes. The Eritrea-Ethiopia border war was the greatest of these, but border disputes are rampant.

Moreover, the complexity of conflicts in the IGAD region lies in the fact that apart from the state, a number of other forces become involved in the conflicts. In the case of the Sudan, conflict, which has been manifested in racial, religious and regional forms (Nyot Kok, 1993), it is also complicated by external forces which have been drawn into the conflict. On several occasions the Sudanese government has accused Uganda for supporting and allowing Sudanese opposition in Uganda to destabilize the Sudan. Uganda has also been accused of supporting the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA), the main opposition to the Sudanese government. In the same vein, Uganda has on many occasions, accused Sudan of supporting Ugandan Rebels, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) fighting the Museveni government. In fact, the two countries have even severed diplomatic relations over the conflict. The Ethiopian and Eritrean governments have also joined the list of foreign governments accused of involvement in the current Sudanese conflict. This critically show how difficult could it be for these leaders of these member states to come up and make strong regional integration among each other.

Allegations of extra-continental involvement in the conflict in the region under discussion have also been the order of the day. One has only to remember the involvement of the Super Powers

in the conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia during the height of the cold war to appreciate what is being said here. Involvements of regional powers in these conflicts have also complicated the conflicts. Whatever the validity or otherwise of the accusations that foreigners are involved, there is no escaping the fact that it has complicated the conflicts and thus made efforts at solution difficult. Some of the countries accused of involvement find themselves in an embarrassing situation when they are part of the team negotiating a solution to the conflict. Second, the involvement of foreign powers or actors has also changed the character of the conflict from a purely internal matter to an international problem (Wanyande , 1997). This is what is happening today in South Sudan, Somalia, the Eritrea- Djibouti relation, the Ethiopia-Eritrea case, etc. This really shows that, regional integration in the Greater Horn of Africa is determined neither by the economic nor political interest of the owners, goes beyond-interest of external powers. Which existing theory fits this really need to be researched.

3.2.3.1. *Failure of Regional and Global Governance*

The failure of the region's states in transforming their socioeconomic structures and institutional systems is compounded by the failure of regional and continental intergovernmental organizations. The countries of the Greater Horn are members of IGAD, Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), as well as the African Union. Yet none of these intergovernmental bodies has been effective in reducing the conflicts of the region. Although the continent is replete with border disputes, intergovernmental organizations, including the African Union, have yet to develop effective mechanisms and consensus for settling boundary disputes before they escalate into war. These organizations also failed to develop mechanisms that would ease the challenge of fragmented ethnic identities. Somalia's attempts to redraw its colonial boundaries in order to unite all Somalis under one state received little support from other African states or the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in the early 1960s. The OAU decided that colonial boundaries are sacrosanct since tampering with them was likely to open a Pandora's Box and lead to wars all over the continent. Though redrawing colonial boundaries would be risky, the OAU and still the AU have not instituted mechanisms that would allow populations divided by national boundaries to maintain their economic and cultural ties with each other though flexible borders. Furthermore, despite the numerous conflicts the region as well as the continent face, the regional organizations as well as the African Union have yet to establish effective conflict-resolution mechanisms. It seems the resolution of African conflicts is often outsourced to actors outside the continent (Kidane, 2011).

4. Conclusion and Recommendation

4.1. Conclusions

Regional integration as a political and economic phenomenon has attracted a lot of attention from the academic world.

The political geography of the Horn of Africa primarily comprised Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya and Uganda.

IGAD originated from regional attempts to address environmental challenges, such as drought. As it evolved, it increasingly looked at peace and security measures.

Today more than six decades since “decolonization”, Africa remains still at the lower end of the global economy as attested by the alarming levels of economic underdevelopment, poverty, political instability. Africa is late in building a strong integration. IGAD still as regional institution does not have a comprehensive policy and strategy, which shows lack of mutual consensus among member states with partners and in the globalized world at different endeavors.

Regional integration in the IGAD region, as most RECs of the continent is not successful in many cases, and its geo-political, geo-economic location and its social and political construction seem negatively affecting its success. Hegemonic predominance of one country upon others and political instability and conflicts within and among member states of the region are also undermining the objectives of regional integration block.

With the triggering effect of bad governance of governments of IGAD member states and AU, the challenges for regional integration in the region (political challenges in focus) are: Intra-State Wars and Conflicts, Inter-Communal Conflicts, Political instability and military conflicts among members including proxy wars, Uncoordinated macroeconomic policies, Failure of Regional and Global Governance, colonial legacy, geopolitical and geo-economic interests of powerful countries.

4.2. Recommendation

It is a necessity to integrate the greater Horn of Africa to be an open, unified, regional economic space for the business community with the vision to create a single market open to competitive entry and well integrated into the continental and global economy. Unfortunately, the integration process in the IGAD is not successful due to different reasons. The following measures may assist to address the political. Economic and social challenges:

- First and foremost, the Africa Union shall wake up and really own and use the RECs work for its short term and long term plans, to work not only on crisis management, but also on governance of member states. Therefore, it shall capacitate the RECS. It shall also incorporate issues of proxy war among member states.
- Sustainable solutions for the region's conflicts requires bold and fundamental change. The border conflicts that lead to inter-state wars and conflicts can be dealt with through effective and proactive measures by regional organizations. However, to become effective a regional organization such as IGAD would require a level of independence from member states as well as external powers so that it could operate as a neutral body.
- Being the fundamental problem bad governance, governments of member states shall invest on building their capacity and good governance instead of creating chaos to sustain their stay in power. If internal governmental problems are cured, for sure countries will go for genuine cooperation for regional development. IGAD, the African Union and International community shall help.
- As one of the important pre-conditions and features of successful integration is the political will for closer cooperation, a strong political commitment is required to advance towards common objectives. In this regard, three important issues for success are needed: ceding power to the regional body, meeting the human and financial resource commitments made and incorporating regionally adopted policies into national programs.

5. References

- Ali I. Abdi & Edris H. Seid, 2013, *Assessment of Economic Integration in IGAD* The Horn Economic and Social Policy Institute (HESPI) Policy Papers No. 13/2
- Abdisalam M. Issa-Salwe, 2000, *Cold War Fallout: Boundary Politics and Conflict in the Horn of Africa*, Haan Associates Publishers
- Andrew Moravcsik, 2005, *The European Constitutional Compromise and the neofunctionalist legacy*, Journal of European Public Policy, no 2.
- Asante SKB. 1997. *Regionalism and Africa's Development*, Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd.
- Bhalla, A.S. & P.Bhalla, 1997, *Regional Blocs: Building Blocks or Stumbling Blocks?* London: Macmillan Press Ltd.
- Brouk Mesfin, 2011, *The Horn of Africa Security Complex: Regional Security in the Post Cold War Horn of Africa*. published by Institute for Security Study Pretoria, South Africa.
- Byiers, B. 2016, *The Political Economy of Regional Integration in Africa. Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Report*. Maastricht: ECDPM. Available at <http://ecdpm.org/peria/igad>
- Casella, Alessandra, 1994, *Trade as an Engine of Political Change: A Parable*, *Economica*. New Series, 61(243).
- Costantinos BT. 2016, *The Horn of Africa & the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC): Martial & Security Scenarios Public Lecture* - Respublica Literaria CXXXIX-I, MMXVI.
- Economic Commission for Africa, 2004, 'Assessing Regional Integration in Africa', *ECA Policy Research Report*.
- Fanta, E., 2008, *New directions in IR in Africa: Comparative Regional Integration Studies (UNU-CRIS)* United Nations University –Open University Milton Keynes (UK).
- Higgins, C., 2003, *Linkage between Governance, Environment and Conflict in the Greater Horn of Africa*: paper presented at conference on Governance and the rule of law in the Horn of Africa, Mombasa, Kenya 11-13 September 2003.
- Keita, C. & S Kone, 2010, *Eastern Africa Regional Integration Strategy Paper 2011 – 2015: Revised draft for regional team meeting*.
- Kibreab, G., 2009, "Eritrean- Sudanese Relations in Historical Perspective", in Reid, R.(ed.), *Eritrea's External Relations: Understanding its Regional Role and Foreign Policy*. London: Chatham House.

Kidane M, 2011), *Critical Factors IN THE Horn of Africa's Raging Conflicts*. Nordiska Afrika Institutet,UPPSALA 2011

Mattli, W., 1999a, *The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Medhane T., 2003, *Turning Conflicts To Cooperation: Towards An Energy-Led Integration In The Horn of Africa*. Friedrich –Ebert-Stiftung Ethiopia Office.

Nyot Kok, Peter, 1993. *The Ties that will not Bind: Conflict and Racial Cleavage in Sudan* in Anyang' Nyong'o ed. *Arms and Daggers in the Heart of Africa*. Academy Science Publishers.

Ouattara A., 1999, *Regional Integration in Africa: An Important Step Toward Global Integration* - Address by Mr. Alassane D. April 14, 1999

Rupesinghe, K. 1989. *Internal Conflicts and their resolution; The case of Uganda* in Rupesinghe (ed) *conflict resolution in Uganda*. Ohio University Press, Athens.

Simms, Rachel and Simms, Errol, 2006, *The Building blocks of Successful Regional Integration: Lessons for the CSME from the other regional integration schemes*. paper prepared for the 8th SALISES-conferences 26th up to 28th March 2007

Mzukisi Q., 2007, *The challenges of regional integration in Africa In the context of globalisation and the prospects for a United States of Africa*. ISS Paper 145 • June 2007

Tesfaye H., 2007, *IGAD: Challenges and Opportunities*. Unpublished MA thesis., Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia.

Thompson & Richard S. Mukisa, 1996, *Legal Integration as a Key Component of African Economic Integration: A Study of Potential Legal Obstacles to the Implementation of the Abuja Treaty*, 20 COMMONWEALTH L. BULL. 1446, 1447 (1996).

United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 2009, “*Regional Economic Integration in Africa*”. *Building on Successes and Lessons Learned*.

Wanyande, P., 1997, *State Driven Conflict in the Greater Horn of Africa*. Revised Paper Presented at the USAID Organized workshop on Conflict in the Great Horn of Africa, Methodist Guest House: Nairobi May 21-23.