Federal Bicameralism and Second Chamber Powers in Parliamentary Form of Government: A Brief Analysis of the Ethiopian System

Abstract

Abstract
The conventional wisdom about the original idea of federal bicameralism is
that it works effectively along with a presidential rather than parliamentary
governmental form. Second chambers exercise real powers normally associated with
their traditional function as institutions organized for representation of vertically
dispersed subnational power entities at the national level when the presidential
system of governance ensuring clearly separated horizontal and cross-checking
distribution of power is superimposed on the federal state structure. In this sense, the
the parliamentary system adopted in the Ethiopian federation has produced a second
chamber significantly weaker than the first chamber. However, a multiplicity of other
factors adds to form of government to impact the power configuration in the upper
house. Proper concern for these factors in the political design or redesign of the
federation would remedy the apparent power deficit second chambers display in the
parliamentarian governmental form, and even making parliamentary governance the
preferred form for ensuring the central representation of politically salient territorial
cleavage patterns in ethnically diverse polity such as Ethiopia.